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JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN: JUSTICE FOR A CHANGE
SHARI SHINKt
"In the little world in which children have their existence,. there is
nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt as injustice."]
- Charles Dickens
INTRODUCTION
Children find themselves in the legal system in a variety of ways-
as the subjects of abuse or custody proceedings, as victims or witnesses
in criminal trials, or as delinquents. Despite the context, their court in-
volvement is often predicated upon the failure of an adult in their lives to
protect them or to guide them. Too often it is the inability of the child's
parents to provide adequate care and supervision that trigger legal pro-
ceedings. Sadly, once a child is caught in the legal system, new opportu-
nities for failure often arise. Having been initially neglected by their
families, these children may then be re-traumatized by the institutions
that purport to serve their "best interests."
Despite decreases in crime and domestic violence, child abuse and
neglect reports have dramatically increased to approximately three mil-
lion per year.2 One need look no further than the cover stories of Time
magazine over the last decade to acquire insight into the shortcomings of
"the system's" ability to protect children. The cover of the December 11,
1995 Time issue features a black and white photo of six-year-old Elisa
Izquierda. The angelic appearance of Elisa is contradicted by the head-
line describing her horrific fate--"A Shameful Death: Let down by the
system, murdered by her mom, a little girl symbolizes America's failure
to protect its children.",3 Elisa's mother had forced the child to eat her
own feces and violated her with a toothbrush and hairbrush before even-
tually bludgeoning Elisa to death.4 As tragic as Elisa's demise was, even
more troubling is the knowledge that it could have been prevented.
Neighbors had heard Elisa's cries for months and the city authorities had
t Founder and Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Children's Law Center. The Author
wishes to thank Dawn Bauder, third year law student at the University of Colorado, for her cxtensive
research and writing preparation for this article.
1. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 30 (Harper & Brothers 1877) (1860).
2. Annie G. Steinberg, Barbra Bennett Woodhouse, & Alyssa Burrell Cowan, Child-
Centered, Vertically Structured, and Interdisciplinary: An Integrative Approach to Children 's Pol-
icy, Practice, and Research, 40 FAM. CT, REV. 116, 117 (2002).
3. TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at cover.
4. David VanBiema, Abandoned to Her Fate: Neighbors, teachers and the authorities all
knew Elisa Izquierdo was being abused. But somehow nobody managed to stop it, TIME, Dec. 11,
1995, at 32.
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been notified at least eight times of the abuse.5 Despite the evidence of
abuse and concerns for Elisa's safety from friends and family, a judge
awarded full custody to Elisa's mother. 6 Calls to Elisa's child welfare
caseworker were met either by no response or by claims that he was "too
busy" to check up on the family.7 All of the adults in the system respon-
sible for protecting Elisa-police, judges, and caseworkers-either failed
to recognize the threats to her safety or simply ignored her perilous situa-
tion altogether.
Another six-year-old child, Terrell Peterson, serves as cover model
for the November 13, 2000 issue of Time. Again, the reality of the head-
line betrays the innocence of his photo--"The Shame of Foster Care:
The coroner gave up counting injuries inflicted on six-year-old Terrell
Peterson. A Time investigation into a system in shambles."8 After inves-
tigating reports that Terrell's mother had been neglecting him, the Geor-
gia Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) placed the
child with his step-grandmother despite the fears expressed by his mother
that the woman would harm Terrell.9 As it turns out, Terrell's mother's
fears were well-grounded-Terrell died after suffering severe abuse in-
cluding being cut, burned by cigarettes, whipped, and chained to a rail-
ing.10 Terrell's death resulted not only from the injuries inflicted by his
step-grandmother, but also by the system's failure to adequately assess
his situation. The DFACS not only ignored his mother's pleas to remove
him from his step-grandmother's home, but even went so far as to help
the step-grandmother obtain legal custody of Terrell." Having taken
control over Terrell's placement, the DFACS then failed to take the ac-
tions necessary to ensure his safety.
Colorado had its own tragic headline, "Little Girl Lost", 2 detailing
the horrors inflicted on five-year-old Stephanie Martinez. There were so
many visible warning signs, all of them repeatedly ignored.' 3 When
Stephanie lay dying alone in a closet, she had reportedly been scalded,
beaten, whipped, starved and tortured.1 4 The pathologist who performed
the autopsy counted 130 bruises and injuries all over Stephanie's body.' 5
More recently, New Jersey's child welfare system has been criti-




8. TIME, Nov. 13, 2000, at cover.
9. R. Robin McDonald, News, Child Advocates Convince Judge Shelters' Lawyers are
Stonewalling, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Sept. 25, 2002, at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.





JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN
Vanessa and Raymond Jackson after authorities discovered that four of
their adopted children-ages nine to nineteen-were being starved by
the Jacksons, barely surviving on a diet of peanut butter, pancake batter,
and even wallboard. 16 Since the New Jersey Division of Youth and Fam-
ily Services (DYFS) has no official oversight of adopted kids, even regu-
lar visits by a caseworker to check on foster children living in the home
did not lead to a reporting of the suspected abuse. 17 In January of 2005,
authorities arrested Florida couple John and Linda Dollar who had fled to
Utah after accusations that they had abused seven of their adopted chil-
dren.' 8 In addition to beating their children, the Dollars also allegedly
shocked them, yanked their nails out, and starved them. 19 So severe was
the malnourishment that the Dollar's twin fourteen-year-old boys,
adopted at age four from Florida Department of Children and Families,
weighed only thirty-six and thirty-eight pounds each. 20
Unfortunately these stories are not rare occurrences exploited by
sensational journalists to sell magazines. Those within the legal system
have also been confronted with similar examples of the failure to protect
abused and neglected children. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
21partment of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court held that
substantive due process did not require the county's social services de-
22partment to intervene to protect a child from his father's violence. In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun decried the majority's lack of compassion
for the abused child, Joshua DeShaney:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essen-
tially nothing except . . . "dutifully recorded these incidents in
[their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and
proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all"-that
16. Susannah Meadows & Brian Braiker, Arrested Development, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2003,
at 39.
17. Id.




21. 489 U.S. 189(1989).
22. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-203. In DeShaney, because Joshua's attorneys did not raise
the point in the courts below, the Court declined to consider whether "the Wisconsin child protection
statutes gave Joshua an 'entitlement' to receive protective services in accordance with the terms of
the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due process protection against state deprivation .... "
Id at 195 n.2. In a recent opinion, however, the Court closed the procedural due process door to
children like Joshua by declaring, "In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that
a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its 'substantive' manifesta-
tions." Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
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this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the
remainder of his life profoundly retarded. 3
Elisa, Terrell, Stephanie, the Jackson children, and Joshua,
along with the infinite number of children throughout the nation
whose stories go untold, stand as primary evidence that America is
doing something wrong. Every year approximately one million
children in the United States are victims of child maltreatment,
with over one thousand of these incidents resulting in the child's
death.24 One might expect that with the safeguards and trappings
of a complex legal system, American children would not fall
through the proverbial cracks. Sadly the system has not only failed
to achieve its goals but has in many ways exacerbated those prob-
lems it seeks to remedy by intervening. The institutionalized
power of the state harms children with impunity in an area of the
law that is solely designed to protect them. In other areas of the
law in which children are implicated, the same is often true.
This article argues that the current legal system does not, and
inherently cannot adequately protect the rights of children. The
system is designed primarily to protect adults; and without effec-
tive legal representation, children are denied fundamental due
process. Part I illustrates through three recent cases how the legal
system fails children. Part II elaborates on the legal system's
treatment of children's legal issues. Finally, Part III proposes
changes to insure a child-centered system of decision-making.
I. RECENT CASES: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS CHILDREN
The symposium planners have selected three cases through which to
explore the treatment of children in the legal system-Nicholson v.
Scoppetta,25 Crawford v. Washington,26 and Simmons v. Roper.27 While
each of these cases involves children, upon closer examination, their
analyses provide compelling evidence of the inherent failure of our legal
system to address the needs of children. The fundamental problem is the
fact that the United States legal system is designed to protect the rights of
adults. Steeped in tradition, the rights of children warrant protection
only insofar as they implicate adult interests. Accordingly, none of these
cases provide an accurate analysis of the legal rights of children, but
rather, an analysis of adult rights as they happen to relate to children.
23. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
24. Marvin L. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the A ttorney-Child Client Relation-
ship, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 264 (1995).
25. 820 N.E.2d 840 (2004).
26. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
27. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
[Vol. 82:4
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The fact that children remain a tangential issue in each of the cases is
indicative of how courts in general view children.
A. Nicholson v. Scoppetta: A Domestic Violence Issue
Nicholson v. Scoppetta is a federal class action in which several fe-
male victims of domestic violence alleged that the New York City Ad-
ministration for Children's Services (ACS) violated their constitutional
rights when it removed their children from them based on a finding that
the children had been exposed to domestic violence, and therefore ne-
glected.28 The court held that where the sole allegation of neglect is that
the mother allowed the child to witness domestic abuse, the mother can-
not be held responsible for neglect.
29
While the outcome of this case will significantly impact the lives of
children, it is clear that the court views Nicholson strictly from the per-
spective of domestic violence. Children enter into the discussion only
because it is the fundamental right of the mother to raise her children that
is threatened by the ACS removal policy. The court in Nicholson views
the child in the context of the mothers' rights, not as a separate person
deserving of protection. The primary focus in the case is the mother's
rights. First and foremost, the court wants to ensure that the mother's
constitutional rights are not violated by the ACS's removal of her chil-
dren. Only after proper constitutional safeguards are provided to protect
the mother's rights, does the court then consider the implications of
ACS's actions on the children.
However, child victims in domestic violence cases are typically not
represented. Courts and battered women's advocates have long mini-
mized the impact of domestic violence on children by describing the
child as a witness, not a victim. Witnessing domestic violence is experi-
encing the horror of it in all its brutal detail: six year olds calling 9-1-1
and toddlers hiding under the bed in the midst of yelling and broken
dishes. While professional organizations and advocates continue to em-
phasize the devastation domestic violence has on children, advocacy on
their behalf is often not addressed.
B. Crawford v. Washington: A Hearsay Issue
In Crawford v. Washington, Crawford, an adult, was charged with
assault and attempted murder. The trial allowed a recorded statement as
evidence and Crawford was convicted. The United States Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits
out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature.30 The
holding in Crawford tightened the previous standard for the admissibility
28. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 842-44.
29. Id. at 844-47.
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
20051
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of hearsay testimony articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.3' Although the
Court did not explicitly describe what types of statements it may con-
sider "testimonial," it hinted that any statements the declarant would
reasonably expect to be later used in a court of law, such as statements to
police during interrogation or statements made to a physician, would
qualify as testimonial.32
The primary concern of the Court in Crawford is the protection of
the accused's constitutional right to confrontation. The case lacks any
discussion of how the holding may potentially impair the role of children
in the legal system. The Court goes into a lengthy discussion of the his-
torical development of cross-examination dating as far back as Roman
and Colonial times.33 Notably, these are both eras in which children
were completely absent from the legal world. Today, however, children
routinely find themselves in court, primarily as victims, and sometimes
as witnesses, or as the accused.
Although the facts in Crawford do not involve children, the case's
holding has many implications for children as witnesses. In a situation
where the witness against the accused happens to be a child, it is clear
that the rights of the accused will trump any consideration of the child
witness's interests. Child abuse cases present the most likely setting for
Crawford to affect children because the victims in these cases do not
always appear in court.3a Prior to Crawford, prosecutors often played
videotaped interviews of the victim if the child was too young to tes-
tify.3 5  After Crawford, this practice will be impermissible and many
convictions based on such recorded testimony may be subject to rever-
sal.36 The full impact of Crawford has yet to be determined as practitio-
ners alter their behavior and test the limits of the ruling.
Crawford also highlights the deeper issue of how courts deal with
child witnesses generally, not just in the context of hearsay statements in
child abuse trials. Courts strictly adhere to established norms of proce-
dure to ensure the rights of the accused, despite the potential trauma to
child witnesses in an adversarial system. The unfamiliar environment of
the courtroom, the impersonal approach of the attorneys and recounting
the traumatic experience itself may all serve to inflict more harm on the
child witness. Direct and cross-examination, which may confuse and
intimidate children, are not the best means of eliciting truthful informa-
31. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In Roberts, the statement of an unavailable
hearsay declarant may be admitted only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. Statements
that fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or show "particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" may be inferred as reliable. Id.
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
33. Id. at 43-50.




JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN
tion from a child.3 7 Child witnesses are not independently represented,
as other witnesses who may rely on legal counsel to advocate and protect
their interests.
In addition to the impact Crawford will have on the court's treat-
ment of child witnesses, the holding may also lead to decreased prosecu-
tions and convictions of some alleged child abusers. Crawford will ex-
clude many child hearsay statements when in-court, under-oath testi-
mony is not available.38 Many times, the child victim may be the most
knowledgeable about the torture inflicted upon him or her. Where the
strength of the case depends on the testimony of a child who is incompe-
tent to take the stand, the inadmissibility of hearsay statements may be
fatal to the prosecution's case.39 Faced with this prospect, many prosecu-
tors have already given up on otherwise promising child abuse cases.4°
This is a striking example where a child's seeming incompetence is used
not as a shield to protect the child, but a sword that denies accountability
for harm inflicted by adults.
C. Simmons v. Roper: A Capital Punishment Issue
In Simmons v. Roper, Simmons committed murder when he was
seven years old and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that recent legislative action supports a finding that a national con-
sensus has developed against the execution of defendants under age
eighteen at the time of their offense. 4' The United States Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Oklahoma said that the determination of what constitutes
"cruel and unusual" punishment should be evaluated according to
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. 42 In the fourteen years following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Stanford v. Kentucky,43 only eighteen states have barred executions of
juveniles. However, no state has lowered its minimum age of execution
below eighteen, and the overall imposition of the juvenile death penalty
has become increasingly rare.44 Thus, the court in Simmons concluded
that based on such evidence of a national trend against the juvenile death
37. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for
Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 237, 294 (1999).
38. Davis, supra note 34 passim.
39. Id.
40. According to Victor Vieth, director of the American Persecutors Research Institute's
National Child Protection Training Center, "A lot of prosecutors have just thrown in the towel." Id.
at 24.
41. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 397.
42. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988).
43. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361 (holding that execution of individuals who were age sixteen
or seventeen at the time of the crimes did not violate constitutional prohibitions of cruel and unusual
punishment because no national consensus existed against such executions).
44. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
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penalty, the Supreme Court today would likely hold that these types of
executions violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.45
On March 1, 2005 the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling
in Roper v. Simmons,46 confirming the predictions expressed by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court and overruling Sanford. In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit execution of defendants who were under eighteen years of age at
the time they committed their crime.47 The Court first determined that
the various state legislative actions banning the juvenile death penalty
provided evidence that a national consensus had developed in opposition
to the execution of individuals who had committed their crimes as mi-
nors.48 Additionally, the Court used its own independent judgment to
come to the conclusion that the death penalty is a disproportionate pun-
ishment for juveniles, due in large part to the reduced culpability of
young offenders which negates the retribution and deterrence rationales
behind such a severe form of punishment.49
At every stage of Christopher Simmons's case, from the Missouri
courts to the United States Supreme Court, the system viewed the defen-
dant primarily as a death row inmate, not as a child. While age and the
special circumstances that accompany it serve as a major factor in the
court's ultimate decision, the main focus of the case never shifts far from
the overarching theme of whether or not the death penalty itself is justifi-
able in any case. The historical development of death penalty jurispru-
dence in the United States, cited by both the Missouri Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court, reflects the nation's changing
opinion of capital punishment in general, rather than a changing view of
how the legal system should treat child offenders.
While the Supreme Court ultimately came to the correct decision
regarding capital punishment of juveniles, this latest opinion, along with
earlier cases addressing the issue, almost entirely ignores the causal con-
nection between the legal system's treatment of children in areas such as
abuse and neglect and their eventual involvement in the criminal system.
Often the children who become alleged delinquents in juvenile court,
including death penalty cases, are the same children who were once the
victims of severe abuse and neglect. Studies show a startling correlation
between risk factors for children in both the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems. 50 Regrettably, our political system ignores the long-term
costs of child abuse and neglect such as criminal activity, substance
45. Id. at 400.
46. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
47. Id. at 1194.
48. Id. at 1192-94.
49. Id. at 1195-97.
50. Claudette Brown, Crossing Over: From Child Welfare to Juvenile Justice, MARYLAND
BAR JOURNAL, May/June 2003, at 22.
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abuse, domestic violence, and unemployment, which often plague mal-
treated children into adulthood. 51 In a cruel irony, the state that failed to
protect these children ultimately ends up incarcerating them as a means
of protecting society from their delinquent behavior.
Unfortunately, there is far too little collaboration between
abuse/neglect and delinquency professionals, especially considering the
fact that these two areas each have responsibility for the same children
and often do not even realize it.52 Perhaps now that the Supreme Court
has resolved the debate over the juvenile death penalty, the legal system
can begin to focus more attention on the root cause of why these young
people find themselves defendants in such serious cases in the first place.
Cooperation between the abuse/neglect and delinquency systems is es-
sential. A step in the right direction, movements have begun to require
dual agency involvement in the hopes of providing increased attention
for these so-called "nexus kids".
5 3
II. THE DISTORTED VIEW OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
SYSTEM
The three cases discussed above, though involving children in vari-
ous ways, merely skim the surface of the larger issue of how the legal
system treats children. These cases do, however, provide snapshots of
the various ways in which the courts have failed to adequately consider,
then meet, the special needs of children. This section analyzes in more
depth the various deficiencies of the system in regard to its treatment of
children. Part IIA outlines the inherent inability of a system designed for
adults to protect the rights of children. Part IIB discusses the disadvan-
tages to children of giving undue weight in light of facts to the rights of
parents in protection and custody cases. Finally, Part IIC gives a brief
overview of federal law involving children.
A. The Legal System is Designed to Protect Adult Rights
When considering what goals society hopes to advance through a
complex legal system, one plausible answer is the protection of an indi-
vidual's rights. But exactly whose rights-and even more specifically,
which rights-are important enough to warrant the full protection of our
legal system is a question apparently so obvious that we seldom even ask
it. In a legal system designed by adults, and arguably for adults, it is
clear that only those rights considered fundamental by individuals with
the requisite level of maturity will be relevant to the courts. As a result
of this inattentiveness to the experiences and feelings of children, the
51. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Challenge of Children's Rights Advocacy: Problems and Pro-
gress in the Area of Child Abuse and Neglect, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoC. 215, 220
(2004).
52. Brown, supra note 50, at 19.
53. See id.
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legal system shows an exaggerated reverence to adult authority.54 When
children become participants in this system, they find themselves subject
to rules which rarely contemplated their special needs. Unfortunately,
even in the best circumstances, this places children on an uneven playing
field with little chance of a meaningful victory.
One example of this is a custody dispute. States vary in the weight
accorded to children's preferences in custody battles. 55 Although most
states allow courts to consider the child's wishes,56 the legal system in
general typically denies children any meaningful voice in custody dis-
putes that profoundly affect their lives. How the court becomes aware of
the child's wishes if it even chooses to hear them may vary from court-
room to courtroom.
In re the Marriage of Hartley provides an illustration of how courts
overlook the expressed interests of children in custody cases. In Hartley,
the court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
twelve-year-old Eric Hartley in a custody dispute following the divorce
of his parents.57 Throughout the proceedings, Eric voiced concerns to
both the court and his guardian ad litem that his interests were not being
adequately represented in court.5 8 The Children's Legal Clinic then filed
an entry of appearance on Eric's behalf, arguing that due to abuse by
Eric's stepfather in his mother's home, custody of Eric should be
awarded to his father. 59 The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that even
though the guardian ad litem did not voice Eric's custody preferences to
the court, the court appointed guardian ad litem sufficiently represented
Eric's interests. 60 This ruling demonstrates the court's unwillingness to
give credence to the child's complaints about the guardian ad litem's
lack of time and attention to his case, his failure to get to know his client,
or understand his needs, as well as not expressing his preference. Thus,
the court failed to realize that what Eric wanted was also factually in his
best interests. In fact, the trial court granted Eric's wish to live with his
father because it was in his best interests. What the Supreme Court re-
fused to find was that Eric had a right to an attorney to promote his view.
The interests of a child involved in a custody dispute are often com-
pletely foreign to adults. In the midst of conflict, an adult man or woman
may become, even unconsciously, self involved and cannot appropriately
empathize with the child's feeling of being emotionally torn between the
54. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children's Role in Policy Formation, 45 ARIZ.
L. REv. 751, 752 (2003).
55. Barbara A. Atwood, The Child's Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Study and
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 629, 630 (2003).
56. See id
57. In re Marriage of Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo. 1994).
58. Id. at 668.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 676.
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people they most love in their lives and on whom they are completely
dependent. Parents often do not recognize the divided loyalty a child
may feel. Yet the courts have less difficulty declaring that a child would
desire freedom of speech or freedom of choice, even though such con-
cepts may be outside the scope of a child's understanding. Similarly,
adults may promote an eighteen month old's right to confidentiality in
the child welfare system, while denying her more compelling right to a
permanent home. Such inconsistencies demonstrate the point made by
one commentator that,
We accept that children's claims must fit adult purposes because
children are potential adults and childhood is preparation for adult-
hood. To the extent any child's claim diverges from adult purposes,
then, the law refuses to entertain it. Any purpose or interest of value
only to children as children can command no legal recognition or
representation because, by definition, any such interest or purpose is
merely childish and inferior, of course, but so long as they serve no
politically powerful adult purpose, those claims remain unvoiced.
61
Not only does the legal system illogically ascribe certain adult-
valued rights to children, it also makes light of those issues that impact
only children. Children's relative immaturity is merely a pretext for the
legal system to marginalize children and the issues important to them.62
Children face a disadvantage in the legal system merely because they are
children. Our legal system today views children as impaired adults, in-
capable of understanding or perceiving until they reach adulthood.63 In
this way, the system bars children from adequately redressing injustices
against them in much the same way women and racial minorities experi-
enced exclusion in the past.64
Some commentators argue that unlike other groups deprived of
rights, children have an assured remedy to their inferior legal status in
that they will eventually attain adulthood and all of its accompanying
rights.65 This view not only ignores the foundational value of childhood
but also the fact that the rights denied to children now-particularly in
abuse and neglect cases-may gravely impact their lives after they reach
adulthood. By perpetuating a cycle of violence, drug addiction or wel-
fare dependency, children reach adulthood without ever escaping the
system. Discriminating against children in the legal system does them an
immediate disservice as well as sending them a message about the legal
system that will likely stay with them for years to come. This is not to
say that courts should treat children as miniature adults, but merely that
61. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 14 (1994).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Harry Brighouse, How Should Children Be Heard? 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 691, 695 (2003).
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courts should recognize the unique needs of children. The law should
not dismiss children's perspectives as immature and inferior, but rather
should respect and embrace their views as simply different.66 This view
demands not only legal protection, but also effective legal representation
to prevent routine harms.
An additional way in which the legal system fails to meet the needs
of children is in its inability to provide timely resolutions to issues. This
effect is most profound in the area of child placement. Court delay pre-
sents one of the biggest obstacles to ensuring that children are placed in a
permanent home.67 While an adult may be annoyed by a case that drags
on, for a child left in limbo about their future such a wait can have seri-
ous long term effects. Studies show that delays in child placement mat-
ters have significant negative impacts on children's development and
may lead to aggressive, even criminal behavior in adolescence and adult-
hood.68 Children also experience lapses in time differently from adults,
and what seems a short period to an adult may be perceived as an eternity
to a child.69 Court delay is just one aspect of an overwhelmed system of
too many cases, and too few workers and judges. Children in this system
are denied services, separated from siblings, arbitrarily and multiply
placed and suffer harm. Judicial accountability compounds this problem
because judges are seldom held responsible for harmful decisions or de-
lays in cases involving children.70 Judicial leadership is critical for creat-
ing a culture of accountability to children, from parents, the state, and the
court, as well as insuring effective legal representation for children.71
Lack of finality in judgments also makes the legal system ill-suited
to resolve children's issues. Where children are involved, an erroneous
decision on the placement of a child will dramatically impact the child's
life. The consequences on the child's growth and development are per-
manent. It makes little difference to a child who was removed from his
or her family, if several months and multiple placements later, the court
decides that the child in fact would have been better served by staying
with the biological parents. The trauma of repeated separations outside a
child's home inflicts lasting scars that all the safeguards of the judicial
system cannot undo. It is unlikely that any later remedy, even a sought
after permanent home, will restore them to a healthy emotional state or
restore their faith in the adults that have failed them.
66. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 19.
67. Jessica K. Heldman, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001,
1006 (2003).
68. Id at to]1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1023.
71. One striking example, in this author's experience, of a juvenile court judge who dramati-
cally and positively changed the culture of the court in a mere two years and insured accountability
to children and families, is The Honorable Chris Melonakis of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial
District.
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B. Parents' Legal Rights are Always a Major Factor
Even when a dutiful court acknowledges that a child has a legal in-
terest in a dispute, that interest almost always takes a backseat to the con-
stitutional rights of the parent. Once the court takes notice of a parent's
constitutional claim, the only remedy for the child lies in the assertion of
a state interest that derives from an adult perspective.72 In the words of
one commentator, putting the child first is "often difficult and painful. It
is difficult because adults do not have the same needs as children and
cannot easily perceive what they are. It is painful because what is good
for children may be perceived as unfair to adults. 73
The danger in giving such great weight to parental rights is that in
some situations this unequal balancing may lead to outcomes detrimental
to the child. As noted by Richard J. Gelles and Ira Schwartz:
[T]he idea of a level playing field that provides both parties with le-
gal advocacy and allows for an unbiased assessment of the weight of
evidence is an illusion. The child welfare "'playing field" is in reality
decidedly unbalanced, almost always tilted in favor of the parents'
rights at the expense of a child's protection.
74
If the legal system is to give serious consideration to issues affect-
ing children, then courts need to distinguish when a child and parent
have the same interests and when the needs and interests of the parent
and child diverge. 75 Again, adequate legal representation for the child is
critical to this process. Just recently one Federal District Court held that
children have a constitutional right to an attorney in abuse and neglect
cases. 76
Giving more legal rights to children and more power to the state to
enforce these rights, however, conflicts with some of the fundamental
principles underlying the development of our nation's political and legal
structure. Parental autonomy is a concept deeply rooted in America's
traditional value system. 77 A look at Supreme Court decisions involving
family issues indicates a tendency by the Court to defer to the wishes of
the parents. 78 The ideal of parental autonomy has its advantages-it pre-
vents a movement toward a totalitarian government, the fear of which
initially inspired the parental autonomy tradition in America. 79 The chal-
72. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 38.
73. Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and Statu-
tory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 176, 196 (2004).
74. Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
95, 95 (1999).
75. Ross, supra note 73, at 192.
76. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
77. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 217-18.
78. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
79. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 218.
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lenge is to find a more appropriate balance between parents' rights to
raise their children as they see fit and the state's power to protect chil-
dren when parents fail in that role.8
C. Overview of Federal Law
Changes in federal law over the past few decades reflect changing
attitudes regarding the state's role in protecting children. Unfortunately,
just as the court system has failed to adequately address children's issues,
so too has the legislature. Congress has experimented with various legis-
lative acts as a means of protecting abused and neglected children. At
best, these changes in federal law indicate Congress's acknowledgment
that the current federal policy is not working. However, even the latest
child protection laws have the same inherent problem as the prior laws
the were meant to improve upon-they require that the protection of
children is to be decided within a system designed to protect adults, with
little attention to the need for zealous legal representation on behalf of
children.
From 1980 to 1997, a pro-parent emphasis dominated federal law.
The 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act mandated that if
the government removes children from a home for their protection, it
must take steps to eventually reunify the family.8 1 The Act came as a
response to criticisms that the system had gone too far by removing chil-
dren from their homes without good reason and leaving them in foster
care for too long.82 Designed to fix problems with the foster care system,
the Act conditioned federal funding for foster care on certain reforms.
8 3
In 1997, Congress passed new legislation intended to shift the em-
phasis from the parent to the child. The stated goal of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) is to place a "higher value on children's inter-
ests in safety and in moving on to permanent adoptive homes if their
birth parents cannot demonstrate within a reasonable period of time that
they are capable of providing a nurturing home."84 The legislation at-
tempts to reach this objective in three ways: 1) by identifying situations
where family reunification efforts do not have to be made; 2) by mandat-
ing that states seek termination of the parents' rights in cases where the
child has been out of the home for fifteen of the previous twenty-two
months; and 3) requiring states to implement concurrent planning in case
reunification attempts fail. 85 Despite the lofty goals of ASFA and similar
80. Id. at 217-18.
81. Judge Hector E. Campoy, Symposium Introductory Speech: Youth, Voice and Power:
Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 567, 570 (2003).
82. Marvin L. Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children's Law and
Practice, 32 COLO. LAW. 65, 68 (2003).
83. Id.
84. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 226.
85. Gelles, supra note 74, at 109.
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legislation, lack of funding and other supportive resources mean that
many children are in limbo far too long and are not getting the protection
and care they need and deserve. Laws alone are useless until they are
enforced. For the spirit of child protection laws to be enforced requires
the professional courage to examine what we know and to face the injus-
tice. Doing something about it requires ensuring effective legal repre-
sentation for children, without which they remain voiceless in a system
by and for adults.
According to one commentator, "The child welfare world is littered
with the wreckage of well-intentioned programs designed by adults but
irrelevant to children., 86 Recent studies of children in the foster care
system demonstrate the effects of this wreckage. A report by the Pew
Commission on Children in Foster Care examines the demographics of
the over one-half million children living in foster care throughout the
United States.87 Of these children, more than one-fourth had been in
foster care for between two and five years.88 Seventeen percent had lan-
guished been in foster care for over five years. 89 These alarming statis-
tics support the conclusion drawn by many observers that the current
system of protecting children "merely substitutes government neglect
and mistreatment for parental neglect and abuse." 90 A more recent study
by Casey Family Programs found that adults who had formerly been in
foster care had more mental health problems, were less likely to graduate
from high school, and had lower incomes then those in the general popu-
lation.91 Similar results are documented in the latest Chapin Hall study
in Chicago.92 The disappointment of repeated attempts over two decades
to reform the current system demands recognition that children are enti-
tled to no less than effective legal representation as one critically neces-
sary and overdue reform.
III. MAKING THE CASE
Having established that the legal system in its current state does not
serve the needs of children, one must next consider what changes should
be implemented to remedy these problems. Part IIIA of this section dis-
cusses the need for legal representation. Part IIIB urges the exploration
of innovative and unlimited options, in ensuring this benefit.
86. Woodhouse, supra note 54, at 754.
87. See ALFRED PEREZ ET AL., THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE,
DEMOGRAPHICS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (Sept. 16, 2003), at http://pewfostercare.org/
research/docs/Demographics0903.pdf.
88. Id. at 3.
89 Id.
90. Gelles, supra note 74, at 111.
91. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPROVING FAMILY FOSTER CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NORTHWEST FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDY 32-36 (Apr. 6, 2005), at http://www.casey.org/
Resources/Publications/NorthwestAlumniStudy.htm.
92. Monica Davey, Those Who Outgrow Foster Care Still Struggle, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2005, § A, at 16.
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A. The Critical Role of the Child's Attorney
Absent the assistance of legal representation, a child has no realistic
prospect of successfully navigating the complexities of the court system.
Therefore it is necessary that an adult act as the child's voice to insure
that the court recognizes the legal interests of the child. Until 1974, the
federal government had not even recommended-much less mandated-
that states have guardians ad litem represent children's legal rights.
93
Only about half of all states require that courts appoint lawyers for
abused children.94 Whether lawyers or guardians ad litem are appointed,
the exact role of the child's representative remains unsettled.
A quick glance through the literature on the subject of representing
children reveals a wide range of views as to the attorney's function when
dealing with a child client. The "best interests" model requires that the
attorney ascertain and advocate for the child's best interests, taking the
child's wishes into account only as one factor in this determination. In
contrast, the traditional attorney-client approach takes the view that the
attorney should represent the child in the same manner as he or she
would represent an adult client. Following this model, the attorney
would allow the child client to determine the direction of the case. 96 No
state has endorsed a child's attorney model exclusively, though the
American Bar Association and the National Association of Counsel rec-
ommend versions of this model for children. The guardian ad litem is a
hybrid of these two models-the attorney serves as a lawyer in the tradi-
tional sense, but advocates for the child's best interests when conflicts
arise between the child's expressed wishes and his or her best interests.
97
Even more divergent views of the attorney-child relationship argue that
financial and time constraints justify the position that a child's attorney
has no obligation to see their client before court.98
A single definition of the attorney's role, however, is impossible to
reach due to the wide range of circumstances such a description would
necessarily have to encompass. The age, maturity, and intelligence of
the child, as well as the reason for their involvement in the legal system
are just a few of the factors which may impact the responsibilities of the
attorney. This difficulty in establishing a consensus is demonstrated by
the fact that the relationship between children and their legal representa-
93. Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 74, at 109.
94. Shalia Dewan, Abused Children Are Found Entitled to Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2005, § A, at 16.
95. Astra Outley, THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, REPRESENTATION
FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 2-4, at http://pewfostereare.org/
research/docs/Representation.pdf (last visited June 25, 2005).
96. Id.
97. Ventrell, supra note 24, at 279.
98. Marvin Ventrell, Foster Care and Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 433,435 (2000).
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tion varies depending on the state, the case, and the proceeding.99 The
underlying reasons for such inconsistencies include: lack of binding uni-
form standards, scholarly debate over the issue, and insufficient training
and compensation for child attorneys, among others.' 00
According to Martin Guggenheim, the main reason why determin-
ing the proper role of the attorney in the context of young children is so
hard is that this area of law lacks the guidelines that exist in other prac-
tice areas.10 1 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which articulate the role of counsel,
assume that the client is an "unimpaired adult."'10 2 Obviously there are
substantial differences between a child and an "unimpaired adult" which
would alter the role of counsel in the context of a child client. Like the
legal system itself, the rules governing the ethics of the legal profession
are dominated by a focus on adult representation, providing virtually no
mention of how an attorney should go about representing a child.'0 3
Regardless of the form an attorney's representation takes, assur-
ances must be made that the quality of representation rises to the level
deserved by children. Whatever the theoretical debate about an attor-
ney's role, practical considerations of compensation and caseload un-
dermine each model. A recent federal district court in Georgia addressed
the connection between caseload and the quality of the child's represen-
tation. In Winn v. Perdue,'°4 the court held that Georgia statutes and the
Georgia Constitution provide foster children with the right to counsel in
deprivation proceedings. 10 5 The court based its holding on the conclu-
sion that a child in a deprivation proceeding inherently has a conflict of
interests with his or her parent, guardian, or custodian, which necessi-
tates a separate legal counsel for the child.106
The right to counsel, the court went on to note, means the right to
effective counsel. 0 7 While the National Association of Counsel for Chil-
dren advises that attorneys representing more than 100 child clients at a
time cannot possibly achieve effective counsel, the two counties in Winn
each had caseloads of 439.2 and 182.8 child clients per attorney.'0 8 The
99. Outley, supra note 95, at 2-4.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1401.
104. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
105. Winn, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-61. The Court described such cases with, "[d]eprivation
cases consist of a series of hearings and review proceedings that take place over the course of a
child's stay in the Georgia foster care system." Id. at 1356.
106. Id. at 1359.
107. Id. at 1361.
108. Id. at 1356. The author believes that a child's relationship with her/his attorney in abuse
and neglect cases is critical. That relationship must, by necessity, extend to the foster parents, treat-
ment providers and others. Such relationships are difficult to develop with 100 or more children.
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plaintiffs in Winn presented evidence that the number of cases signifi-
cantly compromised the ability of the counties' child advocate attorneys
to provide adequate representation.10 9 Among this evidence was testi-
mony by attorneys that they often never meet and personally speak with
the children they represent.'
10
When the additional factor of poor compensation is added to the
equation, defining the proper role of the child's attorney becomes even
more complex. Even if an agreement can be reached as to how a lawyer
should properly go about representing a child, there still remains the
looming issue of who compensates, as well as how and whether the
compensation provided for taking on such a role is sufficient incentive
for a lawyer to devote the requisite time and care to the child's case.
Lack of compensation raises the question of whether children can ever be
adequately represented in a system that does not sufficiently reward the
efforts of their lawyers.1 1' The fact that lawyers representing major cor-
porations make many times the income of attorneys representing the
most vulnerable members of society generates accolades for attorneys
serving children. But without close scrutiny of the quality of that repre-
sentation, children continue to be underserved and society's responsibil-
ity goes unattended.
Before any meaningful dialogue can take place in regard to the role
of the child's attorney, the issue of compensation must be addressed.
The inherent value of having lawyers to represent children must be re-
flected in the compensation available for those willing to take on such an
important role. Compensation schemes based on hours spent rather than
number of cases will allow lawyers to give more time and attention to
each child, as opposed to taking on caseloads so large that the quality of
representation is severely diminished. While some jurisdictions imple-
ment such methods, no studies have documented the long-term success
of these compensation reforms on outcomes for children
B. Best Interests Informed by the Least Detrimental Alternative
The "best interests" standard is a rallying cry for children-
compelling, yet elusive. Most courts currently use a "best interests of the
child" standard to determine child placement in the area of dependency
and neglect as well as in custody disputes. The standard has perpetuated
the law's tendency to divert its focus away from the child by concentrat-
ing instead on parental rights and the nebulous concept the courts have
Our respective systems must continue to evaluate the results achieved for children in making these
judgments. With that in mind, it would be appropriate to have an attorney who is not as over-
whelmed as the caseworker, judge and almost every other player in the system.
109. Id. at 1363.
110. Id.
111. Low compensation has been cited as one of the main impediments to quality legal repre-
sentation for children. See Outley, supra note 95, at 4-5, 8.
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paradoxically labeled "best interests of the child."' 1 2  The "best inter-
ests" standard articulates the procedure a judge must follow, but does not
assure children that their lives will be improved by the court's ruling.'"
3
A major shortcoming of the best interest standard is that it poses a
danger that children's futures may be adjudicated on the basis of societal
norms that are immaterial to their well-being. Many factors-gender
issues, constitutional concerns of race and religion, the subjective view
of the judge--can cloud the court's ability to fully and fairly examine
which course of action truly serves the child's best interests. 14 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, courts deciding abuse and neglect cases
are particularly susceptible to bias stemming from race, class, and cul-
ture. 115 Custody disputes also invite the same prejudices when applying
the best interest standard. 16 Stereotypes of men and women may con-
taminate the best interests determination, creating a situation where the
court is in effect choosing between the parental interests of the mother
and father rather than the interests of the child.1' 7 Adding to the ambigu-
ity of the best interest standard is the fact that the United States currently
has no national consensus as to what type of family structure and parent-
ing techniques fulfill the child's best interests."1
8
As mentioned in Part IIB, the child's best interests will always suc-
cumb to the constitutional claims of the parents. 119 This happens most
often in joint custody cases when the court upholds the non-custodial
parents' visitation rights. 120 Even a "bad" parent who does not provide
adequate care or support to their children-and may even be abusive-
retains a constitutional right to visit the children, regardless of the child's
preferences or best interests. 121
In light of the unfavorable outcomes potentially created by use of
the best interests standard alone, judges faced with a choice between
multiple outcomes should augment their decisions by a weighing of
which option would be the "least detrimental alternative" for the child.
122
Under this revised standard, the best interests of the child would remain
the focal point of the court's analysis, but the determination of what is
112. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 63-64.
113. Guggenheim, supra note 101, at 1426.
114. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 59.
115. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982); Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 61-62.
116. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 62.
117. Id. at 59-69.
118. Id. at 62-63.
119. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 60.
120. Id.
121. Id. at60.
122. "[B]ecause the best-interests standard did not in and of itself define what it is that a child
needs, we propose that the placement standard should be one that provides the least detrimental
alternative for safeguarding a child's growth and development." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATtVE 50 (1996) (citation omit-
ted).
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truly in the "best interests of the child" would be made significantly more
accurate by the additional consideration of which alternative would be
the least detrimental. In keeping with the Hippocratic oath of physicians,
attorneys serving children should be called to do no harm.
The standard acknowledges the fact that detriment is inherent in
every child placement decision and that the deprivation of the child's
"best interests" has already taken place. The wording of the "least det-
rimental alternative" reminds courts that their primary task at this point is
to "salvage as much as possible out of a less-than-satisfactory situa-
tion." 1 23 In this way, the least detrimental alternative provides a more
realistic guideline for courts than the best interests standard, which often
involves irrelevant and time-consuming data gathering. 124 This modified
"best interests" standard would be more in harmony with the proposition
that a child's attorney should "maximize the possibility that the case will
impose the least harm possible on the child."'
' 25
In the case In the Interest of A. V.M, 126 the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals in an unpublished opinion agreed that the least detrimental alterna-
tive best serves the child's interests. In A. V.M, an Anglo couple ap-
pealed the trial court's decision to deny their request to adopt their Afri-
can American foster child.127 Despite the fact that the five year old child
had lived in the foster home since infancy, the trial court had refused to
approve his adoption based on a finding that the Anglo foster parents
could not be sensitive to the child's racial and cultural needs, thereby
making them unsuitable adoptive parents. 128 The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals noted that the Colorado statutory law requires that upon removal, a
child's best interests require that he "be placed in a secure and stable
environment, . . . not be indiscriminately moved from foster home to
foster home, and ... have the assurance of long-term permanency plan-
ning." 
12 9
The court held that "Choosing the least detrimental alternative
available under these circumstances will best serve A.V.M.'s inter-
ests.' 130 The "least detrimental alternative" standard acknowledges the
fact that thus far the system has failed to serve the best interests of the
child, that the injury to the child has already been done, and that the best
strategy at this point is for the court to make a decision which will not
increase or prolong the detrimental effects of the system's past failure.
Had the court opted instead for the "best interests" standard, clearly a
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Guggenheim, supranote 101, at 1428.
126. No. 88CA1074 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1989) (not selected for publication).
127. A.V.M,No. 88CA1074 at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.; See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(l.5)(a) (2005).
130. A.V.M, No. 88CA 1074 at 2.
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reasonable person could have concluded that being raised by adoptive
parents of the same race would be in A.V.M's best interests. Similarly,
one could also argue that staying with the same foster parents who had
essentially raised him from birth would be in A.V.M.'s best interests.
The problem with the "best interests" standard therefore becomes clear in
situations such as A.V.M.'s where two different custody outcomes could
arguably serve the child's best interests. In this case, it is necessary to
apply the least detrimental alternative.
Recognizing that either alternative would serve the best interests of
A.V.M., the court must next consider which of the two alternatives
would be the least detrimental to the child. Removing A.V.M from the
only stable home he has ever known, based solely on the belief that a
African American family would be more culturally sensitive to his needs,
would clearly be disruptive and moreover devastating to a five year old
child. At this stage in his life, A.V.M. would unlikely share the trial
court's perception that his adoptive parents were not suitable. The only
factor a child of this age would care about is maintaining the parents he
has loved his entire life. The least detrimental alternative standard gives
more weight to A.V.M.'s viewpoint than does the "best interests" stan-
dard by requiring the judge to stand in the shoes of the child. Implemen-
tation of this standard in custody placement decisions would be a step
toward a greater appreciation for the unique needs of children.
C. Recommendations
This article urges two critical recommendations. First, to ensure
that every child has the right to and benefit of an effective attorney; and
second, to promote partnerships between specialist children's attorneys
and volunteer attorneys to enhance opportunities for every child to bene-
fit from an effective legal relationship.
1. Right to an Attorney
The majority of states statutorily require some form of attorney
guardian ad litem model of legal representation, whereby an attorney is
appointed to represent the child's best interests. 131 Traditional attorneys
are utilized in fewer states, and some states allow the appointment of
both guardian's ad litem and attorneys for children. 3 2 In Georgia, chil-
dren in the welfare system are assigned lawyers only in cases where the
state is seeking to terminate parental rights.' 33 This intolerable situation
gave rise to the recent federal district court decision by Judge Marvin H.
Shoob that "foster children have both a statutory and constitutional right
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111 (2005).
132. DAVID KATNER ET AL., NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN
IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 10-13 (Apr.
2001), at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/documents/naccrecommendations.doc-
133. Winn, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
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to counsel .... ,,13 Additionally, an appellate court decision in Illinois
held that children have the right to substitute private counsel for their
court-appointed Public Guardian.'
35
In celebrating this huge step toward justice for children, attorneys
can now mobilize the legal talent to realize this achievement for every
child caught in the throes of a system that is failing them.
2. Promote Partnerships between Specialist Children's attorneys
and Volunteer Attorneys
a. The Need
In July 2004, The Pew Charitable Trust released a national survey
of more than 2,200 dependency court judges. The judges identified
overcrowded dockets and inadequate resources as the greatest obstacles
to finding safe, permanent homes for children. 136
Abused and neglected children have complex, urgent, and individu-
alized needs. Though there are many able and dedicated children's at-
torneys, most are faced with overwhelming caseloads, far beyond the
ability of an individual to devote the time and effort necessary for each
child. In addition to caseloads, the difficulty of repeatedly challenging
the inadequacies of the child protection system: depleted resources, mul-
tiple routine displacements, bureaucratic indecision, competing values
and contradictory visions leaves advocates emotionally and physically
exhausted. The time available for one child is severely limited.
Now, more than ever, children need attorneys with sufficient time to
go beyond legal advocacy and explore innovative and individualized
solutions, identify treatment resources, explore family and alternative
placements, and seek professionals willing to donate their time and talent
to serve the unmet needs of children. Children need attorneys with
whom they can develop a meaningful relationship; a relationship that
ensures the counseling role of an attorney's responsibility, as well as the
advocacy role. These roles allow an attorney to anticipate needs, prevent
problems, and ensure the critical implementation of treatment that is so
often delayed or non-existent.
The companion issues of huge caseloads and inadequate compensa-
tion have systemically colluded to deny children effective legal advo-
cacy. Burdensome caseloads are typically justified by the compensation
available, so compromising the legal needs of children becomes standard
134. Id.
135. In the Interest of A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729, 732-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
136. CHILDREN & FAMILY RESEARCH CENTER, VIEW FROM THE BENCH: OBSTACLES TO
SAFETY & PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF DEPENDENCY COURT JUDGES 1-4 (July 2004), at
http://www fosteringresults.org/results/reports.htm.
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fare. Attorneys have little time to challenge the routine harms inflicted
on children by multiple placements, the separation of siblings, and the
denial of timely treatment. Thus, individual children are often denied
basic safety and permanence. 137 Collectively, children continue to be
denied meaningful access to justice.
b. One Option
It need not be this way. We must instill spirit and meaning into the
system by viewing legislative mandates within a framework of innova-
tive and unlimited options. Volunteer attorneys engaging in pro bono
work on behalf of children is one option to complement the work of spe-
cialist attorneys. Specialists must work in partnership with volunteer
attorneys. The specialists provide the critical training, support, and nec-
essary consultation critical to the effective use of volunteer attorneys.
Particularly when a child is the beneficiary, pro bono work is not a mat-
ter of mere charity, but a matter of social and professional responsibil-
;t .138ity. Attorneys yearn for the opportunity to seek justice in an area of
the law where the level of satisfaction can rarely be replicated else-
where.
By engaging highly skilled, effective and talented attorneys, we can
enhance the quality of representation by ensuring adequate time and at-
tention to each child, reducing the caseloads of specialist attorneys, and
involving influential firms in statewide legislative battles for resources.
It is the experience of the author that volunteer attorneys are able to
spend a hundred hours getting to know a child, understanding his needs,
and exploring appropriate resources and placements, in part because they
are not constrained by the demands of hundreds of children. They bring
outstanding legal skills and support staff to enable them to zealously
advocate for clients. Further, because otherwise experienced counsel are
often newcomers to such matters, they offer novel ideas and persuasive
arguments in a system that is often closed to all but a close knit group of
attorneys. The potential impact of private attorney involvement in im-
proving service delivery for children cannot be underestimated. In the
area of children's law, everyday tragedies and national statistics demand
such innovative solutions.
The concept of pro bono attorneys is one crucial step to help mobi-
lize needed resources and create the child-centered system worthy of the
collective talent of all Of us. 139 The American Bar Association Litigation
137. Id.
138. Effective Jan. 1, 2005, Colorado allows lawyers to apply for and receive CLE credit for
pro bono legal representation. COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.8. See also JoAnn Vogt, New Rule Authorizes
CLE Credit for Pro Bono Representation, 34 COLO. LAW. 25, 25-26 (2005); see also Grob, infra,
note 139.
139. Seth A. Grob & Shari F. Shink, Advocating Excellence for Children: A Call to Action, in
CHILDREN'S LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE 111, 134-47 (1995 ed.).
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Section's Children's Rights Committee is available to assist local com-
munities eager to recruit volunteer attorneys. 140 Additionally, there are
Children's Law Centers in many states with active volunteer pro bono
partnerships to offer models for replication. 14 1 By partnering with pro
bono attorneys, each state's Bar Association has the opportunity to make
the same critical difference for children that they have made for every
other protected class in history.
CONCLUSION
The needs of children in the court system and the demand for re-
form are as dire as at any time in our history. Abused children are
among the most vulnerable in our society and the most invisible. They
are no longer abstract statistics or unnamed faces in far off nations. Ju-
venile courts offer a window into the shattered lives of our children, yet
much of their suffering is preventable. Their suffering is the conse-
quence of deliberate decisions that should be morally and politically re-
pugnant to us.
One author suggests using a "civil rights" analysis for children. He
encourages us to fight to end the mistreatment and abuse of our children
with the moral outrage and indignation it deserves. 142 This approach is
supported by the continuing failure of our system to respond to the 1990
report of the United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect
that warned of a "national emergency."' 143 So, too, by the 1991 Final
Report of the National Commission on Children that questioned the
moral character of a nation that tolerates the consistent presence of insti-
tutional immorality. 144 As a result of our failures, incalculable harm con-
tinues to be done to children and families, each state's finances and our
future.
We are nearing almost two decades since these reports were issued.
Since their release, the more recent Pew Report (2004) issues yet another
resounding cry for action, while our moral outrage remains stifled.
145
We tolerate the injustice, settle for promises and boast about incremental
improvements.
140. See About the Children's Rights Litigation Committee, American Bar Association, at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committee/childrensl/home.html (last visited June 25, 2005).
141. Grob, supra note 139, at 147.
142. Lewis Pitts, Beyond Rhetoric to Due Process Protective Rights for Children: A Civil
Rights Approach is Imperative, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ADVOCACY LAW IN THE EARLY 2 1
s
CENTURY 31, 48-49 (2000).
143. THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 1-9 (U.S. Gov't Print-
ing Office Stock No. 017-092-00104-5, 1990).
144. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 84 (Summary ed. 1991).
145. See supra note 136.
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Financial measures are needed to address the fundamental inequities
faced by the poor, abused and neglected children in our system. Re-
sources are needed for child protection, health care, mental health treat-
ment, social workers, and juvenile court counselors; and adequate com-
pensation for judges, court personnel, as well as attorneys to engage in
high quality litigation to ensure the basic necessities of life for all chil-
dren. Without such representation, children will continue to struggle
against the imbalance of power that corrodes their human spirits in uni-
maginable ways.
Yet, new strategies are also needed. We need a clarion call for chil-
dren - a visionary movement on behalf of our future. Like the civil
rights movement, we must draw upon creative lawyering, simultaneously
with public education and media strategies. We cannot stand by until
Congress and state legislatures allocate the necessary funds. It is profes-
sionally irresponsible to wait. We must take all necessary steps to as-
sume responsibility for the children who need us today.
Children, more than any other population in our community, need a
champion to assert their rights. As ministers of our system of justice,
lawyers are uniquely qualified to lead the movement in this vast pioneer
area called children's law. Judge Charles Gill, a co-convener of the Na-
tional Task Force for Children's Constitutional Rights, calls on attorneys
to provide the impetus for improving the legal system for children. He
declares attorneys are a powerful force in our country who "hold the key
to unlocking the bold, dramatic solutions needed by children and fami-
lies.',
46
Only through diligent, persistent, and widespread efforts can we
reach a "tipping point" and move toward a more child-
centered system. 147 Perhaps the most critical role to be played by each of
us, specialists and pro bono attorneys alike, is making the injustice visi-
ble. Only by accepting our personal responsibility as attorneys, and as
human beings, can we begin to achieve for children what every other
disadvantaged population has won for itself - meaningful access to the
courts and fundamental fairness. Only then will we have achieved rec-
ognition of the compelling needs and rights of children.
In looking toward the future the Bar must have the foresight now to
identify the legal barriers and problems facing children and be able to
offer creative answers. The legal community must have a vision of what
tomorrow should resemble in terms of achieving excellence in outcomes
146. Telephone Interview with Charles D. Gill, Senior Judge, Connecticut Superior Court,
Litchfield Judicial District (July 6, 2005); see also Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status ofthe Ameri-
can Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
543 (1991).
147. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING PoNT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 3-14 (2000).
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for our nation's "invisible" population. In charting that path, we must
not be constricted by resources, inertia, skepticism, and convention. For
as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, "Injustice anywhere is a threat
to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mu-
tuality, tied in a single garment of destiny."' 
48
148. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963) available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/popular-requests/.
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JILL M. ZUCCARDYt
I am an attorney at Sanctuary for Families, a multi-disciplinary
agency in New York City. Sanctuary provides shelter, counseling, chil-
dren's programs, job readiness counseling and legal services to domestic
violence victims and their children. It was founded in 1985. At that
time, Sanctuary did not include a legal services component. In 1989,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law professor Kris Miccio
founded Sanctuary's legal center, called the Center for Battered
Women's Legal Services. Our legal center has grown to nineteen attor-
neys now and, to our knowledge, is the largest legal services provider in
the country serving exclusively victims of domestic violence. We work
collaboratively with the clinical side of the agency to provide families
with holistic services.
I am the Director of Sanctuary's Child Protection Project, which fo-
cuses on issues related to domestic violence and child welfare. And, as
mentioned, I was trial and appellate co-counsel in Nicholson v. Wil-
liams,1 which challenged as unconstitutional the removal of children
from and the prosecution of, battered mothers solely or primarily because
the mothers had been victims of domestic violence in the presence of
their children. Of course, there are so many things to be said and dis-
cussed about Nicholson, as evidenced by the mere fact of this Sympo-
sium, but I will focus my comments today on how the Nicholson case
unfolded, our theories and our proofs.
In 1995, as mentioned, Professor Miccio was one of the first to
identify a disturbing trend in child welfare cases involving domestic vio-
lence in New York State, a trend which was being repeated throughout
the country. In an article published in the Albany Law Review, she high-
lighted that domestic violence victims were being charged with child
neglect for failing to protect their children from exposure to domestic
violence.2 This burgeoning trend reached its tipping point in New York
in 1998 with a state court case called In re Lonell j. 3 In In re Lonell J.,
both mother and father, victim and abuser, were charged with child ne-
t Director, Child Protection Project, Sanctuary for Families, New York City. The following
is a transcript of remarks made on March 3, 2005 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium,
"Children and the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"
1. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the
Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1088-90 (1995).
3. 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998).
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glect. Along with some vague and unsupported allegations of medical
neglect, the neglect petition alleged that the respondent father had beaten
the mother and that she had failed to separate from him, and that the re-
spondent father was arrested for beating her.
After trial in In re Lonell J., which included little testimony even to
establish the facts of the domestic violence or the children's exposure to
it, the family court reluctantly dismissed the petition.
4 The family court
held that domestic violence between the parents was not sufficient to
establish neglect of the children unless there was testimony from an ex-
pert that the children's witnessing of the violence had caused them emo-
tional or mental impairment as defined by our child 
neglect statute.
5
However, while noting that it was constrained by New York law from
finding neglect under the circumstances of this case, the family court
used the decision to "beseech the legislature to amend the definition of
neglect to include domestic violence which does not involve physical
harm or the imminent risk of physical harm to children"
6 _ i.e., to amend
our child abuse statutes to make domestic violence in the presence of a
child per se child neglect.
The child welfare agency, which in New York is called the Admini-
stration for Children's Services (ACS), appealed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that expert testimony was not required to establish that
the children had suffered harm and that nothing in the law required ex-
pert testimony "as opposed to other convincing evidence 
of neglect.",7
What the court actually held in In re Lonell J. was that expert proof
of emotional harm due to exposure to domestic violence is not required
to establish neglect.8 But ACS decided that the holding in In re Lonell J.
meant that the element of harm, the requirement that there be proof that
there was harm or imminent harm to a child, was done away with alto-
gether in cases involving domestic violence; and, that a child's exposure
to domestic violence was per se neglectful on the part of the abuser par-
ent and on the part of the victim parent. ACS went even further, deciding
that the potential for emotional harm to a child from witnessing domestic
violence was so high that ACS could do away with the requirement of a
court order before removing the child from the parent who was the vic-
tim of the violence. That is, ACS decided that it could do away with the
requirement of due process. And that it could simply remove children
from a home any time domestic violence was found and go to court later.
Shortly after In re Lonell J, other appellate courts rendered deci-
sions which, short on discussion of the facts or law, appeared to endorse
4. Matter ofLatisha J. andLonell J, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1997, at 28, 28.
5. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2005).
6. Id.
7. In re Lonell J., 242 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
8. Id.
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something close to a per se standard as well, 9 and we were off and run-
ning.
We knew that battered mothers in other states and counties were
facing the same problems, biases and judgments as battered mothers in
New York. In other jurisdictions, and early on in New York, these cases
were called "failure to protect" cases. Battered mothers were charged
with failure to protect their children from the potential emotional harm of
being exposed to domestic violence. ACS was also alleging "failure to
protect," but it phrased its charge in a different way. ACS claimed that a
battered mother was neglectful because she "engaged in domestic vio-
lence in the presence of her children." In choosing this language to de-
scribe the victim's role in her own assault, ACS said very clearly what
other jurisdictions were saying more obliquely: the victim is equally re-
sponsible for any violence in the home. She fails to protect her children
if she is unable to stop another person from being violent.
In New York City, there had been another development leading up
to the almost hysterical atmosphere of removal in which we found our-
selves in 1998 when In re Lonell J. came down. The highly-publicized
death of a child had led to the creation of ACS, a new child welfare
agency, in 1996. In New York City, whenever there's a death of a child,
the government changes the name of the child welfare agency. I've been
practicing law for fifteen years and I've been through four child welfare
agencies -- BCW, SSC, CWA and, finally, ACS.
The new agency - ACS - issued a mission statement that said any
ambiguities regarding safety of children shall be resolved in favor of
removal. Now, this is an incredible policy statement and one which we
believe to be unconstitutional, because it does away with the requirement
of probable cause. We believe, on its face, that that policy statement is
unconstitutional. And the frontline workers indeed took it as a license to
search and seize children at will, and as an elimination of the need for
any court order authorizing removal or, really, any justification for re-
moval beyond an ambiguity. Of course, every domestic violence situa-
tion is fraught with ambiguity. So, the mission statement combined with
the misread holding of In re Lonell J. and its progeny had a devastating
impact on children who were exposed to domestic violence and their
mothers who were the victims of it. It was this combination that led to a
frenzy of removals in child welfare cases involving domestic violence.
That was the legal landscape when, in 1999, I met Sharwline
Nicholson. Sharwline had been separated from her child's father for
some time. He lived in South Carolina. Although he had not been a
9. See, e.g., In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1998); In re Deandre T., 676
N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998).
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model partner during the relationship, he was never physically abusive
toward her or threatened physical abuse during the relationship.
From time to time after Sharwline and her child's father separated,
he came to New York to visit his infant daughter. During one visit, he
got into an argument with Sharwline and became enraged. He beat her
very badly. She managed to call 911, and he took off. Her son was at
school and her infant daughter was asleep in the other room.
Sharwline was very seriously injured. She had a broken arm; she
had a concussion; she was bleeding from numerous wounds. Yet, even
before the police arrived, her first thought was of her children. She
called her neighbor, who was her regular child care provider, and had the
neighbor come over, get the baby and pick up the son from school.
Sharwline was removed by ambulance, thinking that her children were
safely with the babysitter. She provided every piece of information she
could think of so that the police could capture the abuser, although she
believed that he immediately fled the state.
While Sharwline was in the hospital, the police-and to this day we
don't know why-went to the neighbor's home with their guns drawn
and took custody of the children. This all sounds incredible, but it's true.
They called Sharwline at the hospital and said, "We have your children
here at the precinct. We can't allow them to be in the custody of a
stranger," which is not an accurate statement of New York law by any
means. A fit parent has the right to make child care arrangements for his
or her child. In any event, they said, "You have to call a relative to take
care of the children."
So, Sharwline called her cousin in New Jersey. By now, it was ten
or eleven o'clock at night. Sharwline's cousin went to the hospital, told
Sharwline that she would go to the precinct and get the children and eve-
rything would be okay. However, when Sharwline's cousin went to the
precinct, the police refused to release the children, saying the children
could not be taken out of state to New Jersey. Again, this was not a
proper statement of the law.
Sharwline received a telephone call early the next morning-and
the person on the other end of the line said, "This is ACS. We have your
children. If you want to see them, you'll need to go to court. We'll call
you back and tell you the date." Sharwline immediately left the hospital
against medical advice and went off in search of her children. ACS did
not file in court until five days later. So, Sharwline had five days during
which she did not know where her children were or whether they were
being cared for.
When Sharwline finally had an opportunity to appear in court, she
learned that she had been charged with child neglect for "engaging in
domestic violence." Make no mistake. Sharwline was not accused of
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perpetrating any violence. She was accused of being a victim and she
was accused of being a neglectful mother because she was a victim.
Now, at that time, I had just started working at Sanctuary. In the
early 1990's, I previously had worked in the field of child welfare. And I
found it so draining and so frustrating, because the system was so biased
in favor of the child welfare agency that, after a particularly difficult
case, I quit. And I went off and worked as a secretary for six months, as
a temp, to try to figure out what I could do, because I did not think I
could go back to child welfare. And for the next several years, I steered
clear of it, returning to legal services but as a housing attorney and, later,
supervising pro bono attorneys in family court.
When I got Sharwline's case, I was blown away. I read the tran-
script of the first court appearance in family court when I represented
her. I'm sputtering, "Your Honor, this is outrageous! I-I can't believe
this." And having been away from the field for a while, you know, I was
very nafve about what was going on. I knew the child welfare system
was crazy, but I couldn't believe it was that crazy.
So, I thought the case was some sort of aberration, some sort of a
mistake. But as Sharwline's story unfolded over the next nine months
that it took to get the charges against her dismissed, so did the stories of
many other survivors. I am not going to go over all of them, because
they're in the opinion, if you want to read them. But there are a few
worth mentioning.
Ekaete Udoh, a Nigerian woman, had five daughters and was mar-
ried to a very strict and punitive Nigerian man, who believed he had a
right to take a second wife because his wife had only produced daughters
for him. He was very free in admitting that this was the reason that he
would beat her, because she wouldn't consent to his taking of a second
wife. We had been representing Mrs. Udoh at the legal center for a year
or so. She had been to court approximately twenty-three times to try to
get him excluded from the home, to try to get child support, and to try to
get visitation limited. And, even with excellent legal advocacy, she was
unsuccessful in getting any meaningful relief from the court system.
After she was evicted, she had to return to the marital home with her five
daughters.
There was another incident of abuse-and in this incident, he hit the
child. Mrs. Udoh reported the incident to the police but her husband was
not arrested. However, a teacher reported the incident to ACS. ACS
came to the home and, with no investigation, removed all four of her
minor children. Mrs. Udoh was charged with child neglect for "engaging
in domestic violence" for twenty-five years.
Sharlene Tillett was another one of our class members in the
Nicholson case. She was hit while she was pregnant. After she gave
birth, she was charged with engaging in domestic violence in the pres-
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ence of her unborn child. That child was placed in foster care and mom
and child missed the first several months of the child's life - several
months of bonding and breast feeding gone forever.
Bizarrely, we also encountered women who were charged with en-
gaging in domestic violence in the presence of their children but, after
the women left, ACS placed their children in the abuser's custody. The
theory was that once the parents were separated, there were no more
problems. So, we even had cases like that; and so on, and so on, and so
on.
In the class action which ultimately came to pass, we never ran out
of plaintiffs. The City is fond of saying that there were only ten class
members in the Nicholson case because the judge chose to only tell the
stories of ten women. But there were not ten class members. There were
probably hundreds. There were at least close to a hundred that we knew
of. Now, the theory in all of these cases was that the children were suf-
fering, or in danger of suffering, emotional harm from exposure to do-
mestic violence against their mothers and, therefore, should be removed
from their mothers. These were not cases in which the City alleged that
the children were in danger of physical harm, or that the mother had
failed to protect the child from physical harm. Rather, they all focused
on the presumption that exposure to domestic violence, per se, consti-
tuted impairment rising to the level of imminent harm and neglect under
our child welfare statutes.
After the neglect charges against Sharwline Nicholson were dis-
missed in state court, she retained the public interest law firm Lansner &
Kubitschek in New York City to represent her in a civil rights damages
action. Lansner & Kubitschek is well known in New York City for its
success in civil rights actions involving children, including not only
unlawful removals, but also abuse in foster care. I had worked with them
before. They are a true public interest law firm dedicated to social jus-
tice in so many ways, and they were outraged by what was going on with
Sharwline and the other mothers. After the charges against Mrs. Udoh
were dismissed, she and her children also retained Lansner & Kubitschek
and filed a lawsuit, and then Ms. Tillett and her children did the same.
Our clients had the extremely good fortune to be assigned Judge
Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York to hear the case.
This was a random assignment, but someone must have been looking out
for us. Judge Weinstein is a prominent jurist with a distinguished career
which included creative, bold and, occasionally unpopular, rulings.
Judge Weinstein was once called the quintessential activist judge by the
New York Times. If anyone would listen, he would.
As we identified more and more of these mothers and children who
had been separated after domestic violence in the home, we considered
that Judge Weinstein might be receptive to a motion for class certifica-
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tion. Ultimately, on January 19, 2001, we filed the motion on behalf of
all battered mothers and their children, who had been separated or were
in danger of being separated solely or primarily because of domestic
violence in the home. Sanctuary signed on officially as co-counsel with
Lansner & Kubitschek for the lawsuit. Lansner & Kubitschek brought
the child welfare expertise to the table, and Sanctuary brought the do-
mestic violence expertise.
Our contentions were, in sum, that ACS was employing a policy
and a practice of removing children from battered mothers solely or pri-
marily because the mothers had been abused; of making those removals
without court order; of charging those mothers with child neglect for
engaging in domestic violence; and of marking cases "indicated" against
the mothers in the state register of child abuse and maltreatment.
This final element of the case related to the marking of cases against
mothers in the state central register is one that gets lost in the shuffle
sometimes. These moms, upon investigation, were being blacklisted-we
call it a blacklist-by the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Mal-
treatment. The cases are marked as having some credible evidence that
the subject of the report is neglectful or abusive. And this impacts the
mother's ability to ever get a job working with children which, for many
of our clients who work in jobs related to child care, is a real problem.
We sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class. Many of the
mothers also had individual damages actions. The damages claims were
separated out. This was not a class action about money; it was a class
action about an injunction.
Now, if anyone is familiar with Judge Weinstein you will not be
surprised to hear what happened when we appeared in April of 2001 on
our class certification motion.
The court fast-tracked the case and announced that on July 9, 2001
we would start a trial on the issues of whether class certification should
be granted, and whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. We
had very little time, three months, to conduct discovery, develop our the-
ory, locate our experts, and find more class members. The case was tried
primarily by me and by David Lansner, Carolyn Kubitschek and others
in their firm. We were in court by day and in depositions by night.
Now, you all aren't out practicing in the field yet, so you might not yet
appreciate this. You'll remember this when you're working your twelve-
hour days what it would be like to be on trial by day, go have some din-
ner, meet for a deposition at six o'clock, deposition's over at ten, wait for
the transcript till two in the morning, prepare your cross-examination and
then go to court the next morning and, you know, conduct a trial. It was
quite a wild ride.
We used some very unique methods of witness preparation, such as
holding a Fourth of July barbeque for class members and their children,
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who then met, one by one, with David Lansner, me and other attorneys in
separate rooms to be prepared for trial. As a practical matter, this was
important because it allowed us to prepare the moms without concern
about child care issues and scheduling conflicts, but it was also important
that the moms could see the faces of other mothers and draw strength
from one another.
The trial lasted for nearly two months and encompassed forty-four
witnesses, including twelve experts, and hundreds of documents. As one
of our first witnesses, we called a former family court judge, Philip
Segal, who had presided over nearly ten thousand child welfare cases
during his time on the bench. We called him to familiarize the court with
the realities of family court and to provide evidence as to the number of
cases that had come before him during his time on the bench in which a
battered mother was charged with engaging in domestic violence.
However, as Judge Segal described the experience in family court
of a battered mother who had her children removed, often illegally,
Judge Weinstein became very disturbed. It was clear that battered moth-
ers in New York were not receiving adequate representation from as-
signed counsel. In New York, indigent litigants in family court have a
right, a statutory right, to assigned counsel. New York State, however,
paid assigned counsel only twenty-five dollars an hour for out-of-court
work, and forty dollars an hour for in-court work. A state court case
which was challenging these rates had been languishing for years, and
legislative action seemed very unlikely.
Previously, we had considered including the issue of inadequate
representation in our complaint. Many of the women would appear in
court but because the rates were so low, there was a dearth of assigned
counsel. So a case would be adjourned, adjourned, adjourned-with no
substantive inquiry whatsoever into the facts of the case, while the court
officers would literally run around the courthouse trying to find an attor-
ney who was willing to take on the case for that little money. We had
rejected including this claim in the suit as potentially complicating the
issues.
But, after the family court judge's testimony, and Judge Weinstein's
reaction to it, we moved to amend the complaint and join the state as a
defendant on the grounds that, in addition to the city's misdeeds, the state
was providing unconstitutionally inadequate representation.
Why was this issue important? Because Judge Weinstein, as a fed-
eral court judge, could only affect ACS behavior before the agency
reached the state courthouse door. Once the government passed the
threshold of the state court door, the state court took over, and the issue
of whether the rights of battered mothers would be protected once they
were in state court was imperative. And not insignificant was the fact
that the inclusion of this issue in the lawsuit made the legal community
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sit up and take notice. A most cynical view of that is that once attorneys'
fees were involved, we started to get more publicity in the legal press.
During Nicholson, the city put forth one defense only, "We don't do
this. We don't remove children solely or primarily because of domestic
violence, period." The city said, "We employ best practices. Look at
our written policies." And, in fact, except for the mission statement that
I referred to earlier, the ACS domestic violence policies and guiding
principles looked really good on paper. Thus, it made the case simpler
for us that ACS actually agreed with us as to what constituted best prac-
tices in child welfare cases involving domestic violence. They claimed
they already employed them; we claimed that they didn't.
Judge Weinstein early on expressed his skepticism about our ability
to prove our case without statistics. Unfortunately, there were few statis-
tics to speak of. ACS did not keep reliable records on how many cases
involved domestic violence; how many times they removed children
from battered mothers; or, how many moms were charged with engaging
in domestic violence. In claiming that there was no municipal policy,
ACS relied almost exclusively upon a state study of domestic violence
cases which had been languishing for about a year. This state study had
been mandated as an afterthought by the legislature on another piece of
legislation years earlier. It was not a serious study. It consisted of un-
trained college students on a three-week winter break one January re-
viewing seventy-one cases involving domestic violence. The study had
not been completed or published. The study concluded that in only one
instance out of seventy-one cases was a child removed because of do-
mestic violence.
The City defendants repeated the words "state study" like a mantra
throughout the entire litigation. In fact, they continued to do so through-
out the appeals. Even after the Second Circuit confirmed Judge
Weinstein's findings that they had a pattern and practice of removing
children from their mothers solely or primarily because the mothers had
been victims of domestic violence, they continued to talk about this state
study. They talked about it to the media; they talked about it in the ap-
pellate courts. It was the one-note song that they had.
During the trial it was my job to debunk the study. With the help of
a statistics expert, we challenged shoddy methodology. But, we also
demanded that the seventy-one case files which formed the basis for the
study be produced to us and, nearly on the eve of trial, they arrived. We
divvied them up among paralegals, law students and attorneys and read
them very carefully.
We found that the state's definition of when removal occurred
solely or primarily because of domestic violence was very generous to
the city. For example, in one case the father beat up the mother while he
was drunk. The state study concluded this was not a removal because of
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domestic violence; it was a removal because of domestic violence and
alcohol abuse. So, we had a social worker who was qualified as an ex-
pert and who was a former child protective worker review the files, espe-
cially the ones that were problematic, and she testified about those par-
ticular cases and helped us undermine the validity of the state study's
substantive findings.
Now, we, of course, were seeking to prove that there was a broad
enough constitutional violation to warrant certification of the class. If I
was asked once, I was asked a million times, "How big is the class? How
many women are affected?" We couldn't answer that question. We
didn't have the statistics. However, again, those of you familiar with
Judge Weinstein will not be surprised to learn what happened at trial.
Judge Weinstein, in his brilliance, turned this piece of statistical
evidence on its head. He accepted the state study on its face as the city
urged. In the middle of testimony, he then extrapolated from the city's
numbers and he came up with eighty families a year that, by the City's
own data, were affected by this policy.
I was in the middle of my brilliant cross-examination, having had a
crash course in statistics over the course of a few days, and I had about
ten pages of cross-examination left where I was going to use words like
"inter-rater reliability study," and things like that. After the judge's
comments, I took the notes, and I folded them up and I said, "Nothing
further,"-and a short time later, we became a class action. Ultimately,
the judge said, "That's a lot of mothers. It doesn't need to be hundreds
and thousands of mothers. That's enough. It's probably bigger than that
and, you know, the plaintiffs have made some good points, but 1 think
that's fine."
The city also waved its written policies like a banner throughout the
case. And, as I mentioned, their written policies were actually pretty
good. The problem was the disconnection between the written policies
and the actual policies and practices. We illustrated this disconnection in
three ways. First, of course, our class members testified about their ex-
periences. Second, we had our experts. And, even one of their experts
testified that the practices in the class members' cases were not consis-
tent with the written policies. But, third, to prove the broader constitu-
tional violation, we focused our case on, and as calling as our witnesses,
child protective managers at ACS who were involved in some of the
cases of the class members. The child protective managers are third
level supervisors who sign off on all removals.
Deposing them and questioning them at trial might have been fun, if
it wasn't so sad. They were naYvely honest, believing that their actions
were righteous. Some had not seen the agency's written domestic vio-
lence policies or, if they had, were only vaguely familiar with them. The
child protective managers' description of the agency's practices with
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regard to domestic violence supported our contentions, and since each
child protective manager was responsible for twenty-five case workers,
each with a caseload of some fifteen to twenty cases, the child protective
managers' understanding and implementation of policy in domestic vio-
lence cases took us a long way to the finish line. Ultimately, we had five
of them testify at the trial.
Another striking moment for me as an attorney in the trial was as I
was cross-examining a child protective manager who said that sometimes
he removed children from battered mothers without ever going to court,
because if you remove their children, battered mothers tend to do what
you want them to do. That was another instance of restraint as a lawyer
where I had to say, "Nothing further." You're standing there listening to
this fellow and you think, "He did not just say that," but, alas, he did.
Incredibly, the city never disavowed or explained the actions of
their staff in the cases brought before the court. Not a single witness
called by ACS, not a single deputy commissioner, not a single director or
policy maker, not a single expert had looked at any of the case files of
any of the class members. The Commissioner of ACS testified that he
had not even directed anyone to look at the cases. So, de facto, the city
endorsed the policies.
In addition to calling class members, experts and ACS staff as wit-
nesses, we also called advocates who had worked in the field for many
years to discuss their anecdotal experiences, which were so plentiful that
they supported the conclusion of a practice. The advocates also served
another important purpose for us in proving our case. They established
that the practices complained of had been brought to the city's attention
time and time again. Suddenly, the advocates' coffee-stained, hand-
written notes of meetings with various Commissioners, and I thank God
that they were all meticulous enough to save them, were evidence in the
federal class action lawsuit.
I think Nicholson was a unique case for systemic reform: we be-
lieved that due to the nature of the lawsuit, because the safety of children
was involved, the case could not just be about proving that the city's
practices were unconstitutional or that they violated the civil rights of
battered mothers and their children. We firmly believed that in order to
prevail, we must educate, and challenge head-on some of society's most
deeply-held biases and judgments regarding domestic violence and child
welfare. And we had to show that what the city was doing was hurting
children. It was not a necessary component of our legal case, but we felt
that we needed to prove that.
The media was becoming interested in the case as well, and we saw
this as an opportunity to educate them and, through the media, the public.
The most prevalent judgment was, of course, "Why doesn't she leave?"
And the corollary in this context was that the mother who does not sepa-
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rate is a mother who is not protecting her children. This refrain that we
hear when members of general society are talking about battered mothers
always puzzles me, because we know that domestic violence homicides
frequently occur around issues of separation. I always ask people, you
know, we read articles in newspapers that talk about the death of battered
mothers and sometimes their children, but we never read an article that
says, "He killed her and the children because she told him she was stay-
ing." So, staying is many times protection. We felt at the trial that we
needed to make that point very clear. Fortunately, the people working at
ACS on domestic violence issues-there were three of them in this 2.3
billion dollar child welfare agency-were professionally sophisticated.
And, we were able to extract a lot of this evidence from them as well.
Very quickly, here are some other judgments that we had to chal-
lenge, "She didn't prosecute him when she had the chance." I don't
know what it's like here and the rest of the country, but in New York
City he gets out. He gets out pretty quickly. So, society judges her for
not going forward but if she does, for what? In all of the cases of our
class members, the abuser was set free and suffered no criminal conse-
quences for his behavior, not even the man who so brutally assaulted
Sharwline.
Another one of the judgments, "She didn't go into shelter." Now
first, there's the question of whether she even had access to shelter.
Originally in our complaint, we included the city's failure to provide
adequate shelter as a cause of action. The judge, for whatever reason,
didn't want any part of that. So, he didn't bite and we didn't get to go
forward on that. But, second, even if she had access to shelter, there's
the question of whether shelter is in the best interests of the child. Shel-
ter is relocating, removing a child from his or her community, changing
schools and every other familiar thing that may have contributed to the
child's resiliency.
We also had to challenge the notion that every child is irreparably
emotionally damaged and each in the same way by exposure to domestic
violence. Is witnessing domestic violence good for children? -- of course
not. But, as Dr. Stark I think will discuss a little later, if I'm not putting
him on the spot, even the research we have available now shows that
children are very resilient and the type and manner of any intervention
will affect that resiliency. So, we had our experts address that point.
I always think about this. You know, some children are devastated,
but some children grow up to live very productive lives. Some of you in
this room may even have been exposed to domestic violence as children.
There are 3.3 to 10 million children every year exposed to domestic vio-
lence and, clearly, not all of them suffer the level of dysfunction which
would require them to be taken from their parents.
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We also felt that we had to challenge the notion that removing chil-
dren from their parents is erring on the side of safety. You hear that a
lot. There is a notion that foster care provides safety for children. This is
simply not true. It's not just me who says so with my anecdotal experi-
ence. I won't go through all of the data but it's out there. There are re-
ports from the Department of Health and Human Services that the rate of
child maltreatment is more than seventy-five percent higher in foster care
than in the general population; that a child is twice as likely to die of
abuse in foster care as in the general population; that the rate of substan-
tiated cases of sexual abuse in foster care is more than four times higher
than the rate in the general population, and so on and so forth.
Many of our clients' children suffered in foster care, ranging from
the physical abuse of Sharwline's son, to variousincidents of medical
neglect and emotional harm. The mothers' testimony about their chil-
dren's experience in foster care was very powerful. But we did not only
use the mothers, the literature and the experts to help us establish the
trauma and danger of foster care.
We called the older children as witnesses. Listening to one fourteen
year-old describe her experience, Judge Weinstein and everyone in the
courtroom, including the city's attorneys, became teary-eyed and Judge
Weinstein had to call a ten-minute recess. Listening to her describe her
trauma of being taken from her mother and being placed in foster care
was one of the most wrenching moments in the trial.
Finally, we felt that we couldn't simply say the government is doing
it wrong, we believed that we had to say there's a way to do it right. And,
that there are ways to protect children without separating them from their
mothers. ACS provided us with some fodder for this argument.
From time to time in the 1990s, ACS had recognized systemic prob-
lems in handling of child welfare cases involving domestic violence. In
1999, they had a pilot project in which they placed a domestic violence
specialist in a local office, and this specialist looked at every case that
came in, and she helped the caseworker with the case. Out of seventy-
seven cases in the six-month period, there were only three removals.
There was a comparison study done of a Brooklyn site that had no do-
mestic violence specialist. Removals were twenty-four percent in the
site that did not have a specialist.
Although the advocates who pressed ACS to conduct the pilot pro-
ject will tell you that it was far from a perfect project, it was something
for us to show the court there's a way to do it right and ACS has chosen
not to do it right, because they refused to renew the pilot project when it
expired.
I think most compelling to the court was the fact that the federally-
funded National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and other
well-respected professionals decried the use of removal of children as an
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intervention in child welfare cases involving domestic violence. No one
from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges ever
testified for us. As a group representing judges, they didn't feel that they
could. But we put their treatise into evidence and got every expert to
recognize its principles.
Ultimately, Judge Weinstein said in his decision, in which he gave
the treatise a lot of weight, that ACS was not bound to follow best prac-
tices, it was only bound to follow the Constitution. However, he ruled its
failure to follow best practices bore on its justification for its behavior.
In other words, ACS was behaving punitively and couldn't really justify
it as being best for the child when there was this whole body of research
about what constituted best practices.
So here was our theory of the case: the city's behavior was wrong,
the way they are doing it harms children, and there is a way to do it right.
We boiled it down to what is technically part of the theory of the case but
what I sort of think of as the "bumper stickers"-this came about be-
cause, when we started getting media attention, to try to explain the com-
plexity of these issues to reporters was really a challenge, so, we came up
with these simple concepts: remove the batterer, not the child; protect the
child by protecting the mother; witnessing domestic violence is bad, re-
moving children is worse.
Of course, by now you all know that we won and we got a prelimi-
nary injunction. The injunction was very simple. It was only fourteen
paragraphs, but it was very powerful in its message. For example, the
federal court ordered that ACS could not remove a child when it could,
instead, remove the batterer. ACS could remove children without a court
order in only the rarest of circumstances. The city sought a stay of the
injunction and we defeated their motion by meticulously addressing each
paragraph of the injunction, looking at the trial record and saying, "Look,
Second Circuit. They say they already do that. So where is the irrepara-
ble harm to them of being held accountable for doing it?" We were very
pleased and excited that the Second Circuit declined to grant the stay.
We worked very hard on that particular brief, and Carolyn Kubitschek
withstood a particularly grueling oral argument.
An essential provision of the decision in the injunction was that
Judge Weinstein carved out a right to counsel for our clients and found
that they were being deprived of it. Now, in the case of Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services,' which is a Supreme Court case, the Su-
preme Court had rejected the general right to counsel for parents in cases
in which their parental rights were at stake, but had left the door open for
the right to counsel for certain sub-groups of parents.11 And, as far as I
10. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
11. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
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know, Judge Weinstein is the only judge in the country who has walked
through that door and found a federal right to counsel for a certain group
of parents involved in a case in which their parental rights are at stake.
And he ordered that attorneys for class members be paid ninety dollars
an hour.
Ultimately, as a result of Nicholson, there was a domino effect. The
state court case addressing the issue of rates for assigned counsel was
revived; the state courts issued opinions which mirrored Judge
Weinstein's; and, the New York State Legislature amended state laws to
provide that effective January 1st of 2004, attorneys in all cases for all
indigent litigants, including children, in family and criminal court, are
paid seventy-five dollars an hour.
In its appellate travels, the Nicholson case made its way to the New
York State Court of Appeals, which is our highest court, when the Sec-
ond Circuit certified questions of state law. So, at the end, it all came
back to In re Lonell J and some of its predecessor cases. The New York
Court of Appeals last October issued a sweeping decision clarifying the
law on removals without court order in all types of child welfare cases,
on what is necessary for a finding of child neglect, and, for our purposes
most importantly, ruled that a domestic violence victim is not presump-
tively a neglectful parent. 12 The New York Court of Appeals said that
there may be instances in which a domestic violence victim can be found
neglectful, but the circumstances must be very egregious. 13
My favorite part of that decision is where the court lists the factors
that must be considered when looking at the mother's conduct: risks of
leaving; risks of staying; risks of seeking assistance through government
channels; risks of criminally prosecuting the abuser; risks attendant to
relocation (going to shelter); the severity and frequency of the violence;
and, most importantly, the resources and options available to the mother.
The mother's conduct, ruled the court, must be judged in the context of
circumstances then and there existing. And that had not been done be-
fore. Now we have the highest court in the state saying to the state court
judges, "Listen! This is what you have to look at. You can't presume
she should have left. You can't presume she should have prosecuted.
You can't presume she should have gone to shelter."
The Nicholson decision had a domino effect locally and nation-
wide. ACS stopped removing children from battered mothers, and the
case spurred them to make vast improvements in their child welfare prac-
tice, some of which I hope will be institutionalized. Shortly after the
Nicholson ruling, the New York State Legislature passed a law requiring
specialized training for all child welfare workers throughout the state on
12. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2004).
13. Id
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the Nicholson principles. Advocates had pursued that legislation, unsuc-
cessfully, for many years. I'm told that Congress gave renewed funding
to the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges to explore
best practices in child welfare cases involving domestic violence in part
because of Nicholson. We have heard reports from domestic violence
and child welfare agencies throughout the country about the effect of
Nicholson, how it led to new programs and new state funding.
In December we settled the case after Judge Weinstein indicated
that he thought enough had been done. This was after we won in the
New York State Court of Appeals. ACS also has a new commissioner
who did not take the lawsuit personally and was willing to agree to abide
by the principles set forth in the decision-both the letter of the princi-
ples and their spirit. If the city behaves itself, the case will finally be
dismissed in September 2005.
Ultimately, it's hard to say what the day-to-day effect of the lawsuit
on New York's family courts will be. Ever the skeptic, I await a back-
lash or unintended consequences. Some judges in New York appear to
be unhappy with the case, and I'll talk about that a little more later, be-
lieving that it places too many restrictions on them. However, there can
be no dispute that the case has had wide-reaching implications.
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It was an unceremonious conclusion. After four years of bitterly
contested litigation, extensive legal and popular press,' interplay between
federal and state courts, and multiple judicial opinions, the class action
lawsuit Nicholson v. Scoppetta2 ended with a brief settlement order. On
December 17, 2004, the court entered a four-page Stipulation & Order of
Settlement. In it, the parties agreed that the New York Court of Appeals'
decision accurately reflected the applicable law to be followed by New
York City's child welfare agency, the Administration for Children's Ser-
vices ("ACS").3 This settlement averted further litigation to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
4
The Nicholson case, taken in its entirety, creates significant law for
battered women and their children, notwithstanding its short settlement
t Associate Professor, Southern New England School of Law. Thanks to Lisa Carlson and
Cathy O'Neill for their research assistance. Thanks, too, to Philip Cleary and Irene Scharf for their
counsel. Finally, I appreciate the writing support provided by Southern New England School of
Law.
1. Print, television, and legal media all covered the case. For instance, Dateline NBC fea-
tured a segment on Nicholson. NBC News: Dateline (NBC television broadcast, July 31, 2001).
New York papers, including the New York Times, New York Post, and the New York Daily News
also carried articles. Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice: Taking a Child Wen One Parent is Battered,
NY TIMES, July 8, 2000, at Al; Kati Cornell Smith, Court Boosts Custody for Abused Moms, NEW
YORK POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at 19; Mike Claffey, Testimony by Mother Rips ACS, NEW YORK DAILY
NEWS, July 17, 2001, at 24. The popular press coverage reached beyond New York. The Washing-
ton Post reported on a similar practice in the District of Columbia. Karlyn Barker, Policy Turns the
Abused into Suspects: Mothers Find Seeking Help Can Backfire in the District, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 26, 2001, at BI. Legal Press such as the New York Law Journal printed more in-depth articles.
Mark Hamblett, Stayed Injunction May Encourage Negotiations, Judge Pushes Deal on Foster Care
Suit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
2. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting preliminary
injunction), supplemented sub nom. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding state policy unconstitutional), certifying questions sub nom. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344
F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003). Certified question answered by Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840
(N.Y. 2004), remanded by Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 Fed.Appx. 313 (2d Cir. 2004). Stipulation &
Order of Settlement, Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00 CV 2229 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2004) (on file with
author).
3. Id. at 2.
4. In an article published shortly after the New York Court of Appeals' decision was ren-
dered, this author noted that the decision simplified the issues that would be revisited by the Second
Circuit. She did not foretell the settlement of the case less than two months later. Justine A. Dunlap,
Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to
Protect, 50 Loy. L. REV. 565, 597-98 (2004).
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order.5 The Nicholson "case" comprises at least three substantial opin-
ions from the federal district and appellate courts as well as the New
York Court of Appeals. That complexity notwithstanding, it can be
fairly summarized as follows: mothers who are battered in front of their
children are not guilty of neglecting them-on the sole ground that the
children have witnessed the violence-under New York's child abuse
and neglect laws.6 At several points within the opinion, the New York
high court explicitly rejected any notion that witnessing domestic vio-
lence is a presumptive ground for neglect or removal.7
This article will first examine the events that led to the filing of
Nicholson. Next, it will look at the Nicholson opinions, most particularly
the one issued by the New York Court of Appeals! The article will con-
clude by assessing the impact of Nicholson, in New York and elsewhere.
I. BEFORE NICHOLSON
Nicholson, of course, locates its beginning long before the lawsuit
was filed.9 In 1995, lawyers from Sanctuary for Families, a multidisci-
plinary organization that assists women survivors of domestic violence,
began noticing a disturbing development. Battered women were being
charged with failing to protect their children if the children were present
during episodes of domestic violence.10
5. The settlement order was entered shortly before the trial of the case on the merits, which
had been scheduled for Dec. 22, 2004. The order did not actually dismiss the case. Rather, the case
was placed on the court's suspense calendar; it will be dismissed with prejudice on Sept. 1, 2005
unless the Plaintiffs restore the case to the court's active calendar. As of June 7, 2005, no action had
been taken to restore the case and the Plaintiffs' attorney did not anticipate such an occurrence
before September 1, 2005. Telephone Interview with Jill M. Zuccardy, Esq., Director, Child Protec-
tion Project, Sanctuary for Families (June 7, 2005).
6. That was essentially the conclusion of the New York Court of Appeals in response to the
first question certified to it by the Second Circuit. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843-45
(N.Y. 2004).
7. Id. at 854.
8. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at 593-98 for an earlier discussion of these opinions. See also
Maureen Collins, Nicholson v. Williams: Who is Failing to Protect Whom? Collaborating the Agen-
das of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic Violence Services to Better Protect and Support Bat-
tered Mothers and Their Children, 38 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 725, 728-37 (2004).
9. Jill M. Zuccardy, Nicholson v. Williams: The Case, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 655, 655-57
(2005) [hereinafter Zuccardy, Transcript]. For a discussion of the evolution of the lawsuit, see also
Jill M. Zuccardy, Child Protective Cases Involving Domestic Violence Issues, in 189 PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 165 (2002).
10. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9; Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law
and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable
Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1487 (2001).
Similar cases also occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
See generally, V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect
Battered Women andAbused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229,238 (1996).
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The New York state court case of In re Lonell J. " was the "tipping
point," suggests Jill Zuccardy, Sanctuary's lawyer in Nicholson.12 That
1998 case held that the government need not offer expert testimony to
prove harm alleged to have been caused by witnessing domestic vio-
lence. 13 This, on its face, is a rather unexceptional declaration. Indeed, it
was repeated by the New York Court of Appeals decision in Nicholson
some six years later.' 4 However, soon after it was handed down, Lonell
J. began to be interpreted as adopting a per se standard that witnessing
domestic violence constitutes neglect by the battered mother.'
5
Sanctuary helped many of these women battle against charges filed
by ACS. After resolution of their cases in the family court, individual
battered women filed civil rights lawsuits against the agency. These suits
collectively formed the Nicholson class action.'
6
II. THE NICHOLSON DECISIONS
In January 2002, Judge Weinstein issued a preliminary injunction,
after a lengthy trial held during the previous summer and fall.' 7 The
injunction precluded the agency from seeking removal of children from
battered women on the sole ground that the children had witnessed do-
mestic violence.' 8  Judge Weinstein's extensive memorandum opinion
11. In re Lonell J., Jr., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998). LonellJ. is sometimes described
as the first case holding battered mothers liable for failure to protect. See, e.g., The "Failure to
Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the
Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 852 (2000). However, the cases of In re Melissa U, 538
N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989), and In re Theresa CC, 576 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1991), reached
similar conclusions several years earlier. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at 607-08, for a full discussion of
these cases. Nonetheless, Lonell I appears to be the case that started the trend of prosecuting bat-
tered mothers in New York.
12. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 655. Others have also suggested that Lonell J. was
a critical case. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note l1, at 852. Further, Lonell
J. has been described as adopting a de facto strict liability standard. Id. See infra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text for further discussion of strict liability.
13. In Lonell J., the mother was "charged" with abuse and neglect in a family court proceed-
ing. In re Lonell 1, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116. There are also instances in which mothers have been
charged criminally with failure to protect.
14. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 855 (N.Y. 2004).
15. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 656-57. An unrelated event further contributed to
the problem, according to Zuccardy. A child's death led the child protection agency to take a stance
that encouraged the removal of children. Id. at 657. Thus women who were beaten were being
charged with child neglect and their children were being taken from them, often without court order.
These removals exacerbated the wrongs-legal and otherwise-perpetrated against these women
and children; wrongs that the trial court judge termed "pitiless double abuse." Nicholson v. Wil-
liams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
16. A named plaintiff, Sharwline Nicholson, was represented by the public interest law firm
of Lansner & Kubitschek. Nicholson filed suit in federal court in April 2000. Her case was later
consolidated with other named plaintiffs. Zuccardy from Sanctuary joined as co-counsel. In August
2001, the classes were certified by Judge Weinstein. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 843. News reports at
the time hinted at a burgeoning class size that could top out at 30,000. Graham Rayman, Conflict
Over Size of Class-Action, NEWSDAY, Mar. 28, 2001, at A 16.
17. In reNicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
18. Id. at 188-93.
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followed in March.' 9 The opinion was far-reaching in its finding of
wrongs perpetrated by ACS.
In that awkward paradox of pending litigation, the city agreed to fix
its practices even as it averred its innocence.20 In this latter capacity, the
city appealed Weinstein's order. However, the Second Circuit refused to
stay the injunction pending appeal.2 '
The Second Circuit ruled in September 2003 .22 It determined that if
the case could be resolved through the interpretation of state child abuse
and neglect law, it might be unnecessary to reach the federal constitu-
tional issues decided by Judge Weinstein. Therefore, the Second Circuit
certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certification.23  It
heard oral argument in September 2004 and ruled the next month, an-
swering the three questions certified to it by the Second Circuit. Those
questions will be addressed in turn.
A. First Certified Question
The first question certified by the Second Circuit was: "Does the
definition of a 'neglected child' under New York Family Court Act §
1012(f); (h)24 include instances in which the sole allegation of neglect is
that the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care
allows the child to witness domestic abuse against the caretaker? ' 25 The
New York Court of Appeals simplified the issue: Does state law permit
a finding of neglect predicated upon "two facts only": first, had the
charged parent been abused and, second, had the child "been exposed" to
that abuse?26 In immediate response, the court said that "plainly" more isrequired to prove neglect.
The court then analyzed the two provisions of the statute cited in the
certified question. Section 1012(f) of the statute sets forth the basic defi-
nition of neglect with a two-part causal standard. First, a "child's physi-
cal, mental or emotional condition" must either be impaired or be in
19. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. Indeed, the city's defense throughout the trial was that it did not remove children based
solely on exposure to domestic violence. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 663.
21. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 668. Judge Weinstein initially stayed the injunc-
tion. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp at 193. The stay was later lifted.
22. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
23. Id. at 167-68.
24. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(0 (McKinney 2005) provides the core definition of neglected
child; § 1012(h) defines emotional or mental neglect - the type of neglect at issue in Nicholson.
25. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844.
26. Id The court did not analyze the potential difference between witnessing the abuse and
being exposed to it. For an analysis of these differences see Dunlap, supra note 4, at 570-72.
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"imminent danger" of becoming impaired.27  If the impairment is estab-
lished, the state must then prove that it is caused by the parent's failure to
"exercise a minimum degree of care." 28  This requirement that parental
failure be the source of the child's harm is significant in two ways.
First, it demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to make
child neglect a strict liability proposition. There must be a nexus be-
tween the harm and the parent's failure to exercise the minimum stan-
dard.29
This clarification is significant. The Lonell J.30 and Glenn G.3
cases, among others, have been described as imposing strict liability in
neglect actions. Indeed, the Glenn G. court stated that the neglect statute
imposes "strict liability. 3 2  This conclusion is clearly contrary to the
plain language of the statute, which requires a failure to meet a minimum
standard of care. 33  The Glenn G. court appears to have conflated liabil-
ity for unintentional actions with strict liability. Certainly neglect can be
found absent a parent's intent to be neglectful. Strict liability, on the
other hand, would apply in circumstances where harm occurred notwith-
standing the exercise of due care.
As a practical matter, however, courts may have been willing to
conclude that the "conduct" of being a victim fell below the minimum
standard of care. In In re Theresa CC, 34 the court cursorily concluded
that there was a causal connection between the children's problems-
e.g., the harm-and the parents' conduct. This conclusion is problem-
atic, however, as the mother's only "conduct" was being the recipient of
abuse.
35
27. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844-45. The imminent danger standard, the court said, demon-
strates that neglect may be found short of actual harm but that the risk of harm had to be more than
"merely possible." Id. at 845.
28. Id. at 844. The court noted that proof of this nexus is especially important in cases alleg-
ing emotional impairment, due to the "murky" nature of determining the source of such non-physical
impairments. Id. at 845-46.
29. This failure, however, can be attributable to inability as well as unwillingness. Id. at 845-
46. As one court stated, "Good faith, good intentions, and even best efforts" are not enough to
defeat this objective test. In re Katherine C., 471 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (Fain. Ct. 1984). This same
court later described the parental obligation to the child's welfare as "fundamental and absolute." Id.
at 220.
30. Working Group, supra note 11, at 852. The Lonell J. court, in addition to finding that
expert testimony was unnecessary to prove harm, stated that parental "spousal abuse" was an act
that, under the statute, fell outside the minimum standard of care. In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116,
118 (App. Div. 1998).
31. Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the
Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1092-96 (1995).
32. In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
33. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2005).
34. 576 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (App. Div. 1991).
35. This conclusion is reminiscent of language used to charge the Nicholson plaintiffs. They
were, as victims, said to be "engaged" in domestic violence. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
During the Nicholson trial, ACS's division of legal services wrote a memorandum clarifying the
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Second, the New York Court of Appeals' holding in Nicholson
fleshed out this minimum-level-of-care standard. Initially, the court
noted that this is a baseline standard, applying to all parents.36 Further, it
is a standard of minimum care, not ideal parenting. 3 Finally, the court
said that the failure to provide this minimal care must be actual, not
threatened.38
The court then stated that the issue must be evaluated by reference
to an objective person standard: how would a reasonably prudent parent
have acted under the circumstances? 39 The court thus declined to adopt a
reasonable battered mother standard.40  But it did make clear that the
circumstances and the special vulnerabilities of the child are part of the
calculus.41 In conclusion, the court set forth numerous factors that would
be relevant in assessing whether the battered mother behaved reasonably.
Those factors include: risks attendant to leaving as well as staying; risks
attendant to seeking redress and protection via "government channels;"
and risks attendant to both criminal prosecution of the batterer and of
relocation.4 2
The court's articulation of these specific considerations gives mean-
ing to the standard of a reasonable prudent person under the circum-
stances. First, the court explicitly discussed actions that are traditionally
deemed to be the "appropriate" response for battered women. Indeed,
women are often penalized for failing to follow one or more of these
steps. 43  Second, the court acknowledged that such actions carry risks-
to the children as well as to the mothers. Therefore, the court validated
the notion that battered women may be acting reasonably if they choose
not to take certain expected actions.
Of course, it remains to be seen if this principle will be correctly
applied. How can a woman demonstrate that if she chooses not to leave,
phrase "engaging in domestic violence," stating that its "usage misstates the nature of the victim's
role ...." Memorandum from Joseph Cardieri and William Bell, to ACS Department of Legal
Services and Department of Child Protection Staff (Aug. 14, 2001) (on file with author). The
memorandum mandated that the phrase no longer be used. Id. Attorney compliance with the
Nicholson mandates remains "uneven at best." Nicholson Review Committee Report, to Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York, 10 (Dec. 17, 2004) (on file
with author).
36. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846.
37. Id. This is clearly a constitutional requirement. The state could not coercively interfere
with the liberty interest that adheres to the parent-child relationship based on a parent's failure to
provide perfect parenting.
38. Id.
39. Id. This standard was suggested by early writings on the topic. Professor Miccio urged
such a standard over a decade ago. Miccio, supra note 31, at 1097-98, 1105. Professor Miccio has
since argued for a more stringent reasonable battered mother's test. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protec-
tive Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89,94-95 (1999). See also Enos, supra note 10, at 264.
40. Miccio, supra note 39, at 94-95.
41. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846-47.
42. Id at 846. See also Miccio, supra note 31, at 1098-99.
43. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 573-74; Miccio, supra note 31, at 1092.
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get a protective order, or pursue criminal prosecution, she has, in fact,
reasonably calculated the various options and their attendant risks? For-
tunately, the Court of Appeals' decision may help here as well. The court
credited this dilemma by citing favorably to recent legislative mandates
for social services personnel to receive special training regarding the
44dynamics of domestic violence in order to avoid punitive responses.
Although concluding that an allegation of witnessing alone does not
satisfy the statutory requirements for neglect, the court did not hold that a
neglect case alleging witnessing could never be properly established
against a battered mother. Witnessing, on its own, is insufficient. But
witnessing, coupled with evidence of harm and a parental failure of
minimal care, can constitute neglect.
45
B. Second Certified Question
The New York Court of Appeals then proceeded to the second certi-
fied question: "Can the injury or possible injury, if any, that results to a
child who has witnessed domestic abuse against a parent or other care-
taker constitute 'danger' or 'risk' to the child's 'life or health,' as those
terms are defined in the New York Family Court Act §§ 1022, 1024,
1026-28?
'46
This certified question is important because improper removal of
the children from their battered mothers was alleged throughout Nichol-
son. Indeed, the trial court found these removals to be a pervasive and
unconstitutional practice.47
Removals are statutorily authorized to occur in four different cir-
cumstances. The court phrased the overarching issue presented for re-
view as follows: "[W]hether emotional harm suffered by a child exposed
to domestic violence, where shown, can warrant the trauma of removal
under any of these provisions. '48 Consistent with this explicit statement
that removal causes trauma, the court stated, "removal may do more
harm to the child than good. ' 49
Courts have determined that removal itself is harmful and justified
only after a balancing of the harms that will occur absent removal-as
have legislatures, through statutes and legislative history, and agencies,
through written policies. Yet removal - often on an ex parte emergency
44. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 847 n.6.
45. Id. at 846-47.
46. Id. at 847.
47. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
48. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
49. Id The court further stated that removals should not be treated as the "safer course" to be
used "to mask a dearth of evidence or as a watered-down, impermissible presumption." Id. at 853.
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basis - is the rule in practice.50 The perennial battle between what is right
and what actually happens-the law on the books versus the law as it
looks-is often fought in child protection proceedings.5' Moreover,
these hasty and ill-considered removals are not wrongs that are easily
rectified. Removals often set the course for the case, in both the case-
work and legal focus.5 2 As a practical matter, the burden transfers to the
parents, who now must prove that they deserve the child back.53 More
importantly, as explicitly found by Judge Weinstein, removals harm
children.5 4 Removals are not a neutral, let's-play-it-safe option.
After acknowledging the trauma caused by removal, the New York
Court of Appeals analyzed each type of removal. 55 It did so with refer-
ence to the Second Circuit's speculation that, depending upon how the
state court interpreted the neglect statute, the removals were likely to be
constitutionally infirm in any number of ways.56 Further, the court noted
that its analysis included balancing potentially conflicting child welfare
policies such as keeping families together versus the need to protect chil-
dren in cases of domestic violence.
57
The court stated that since exposure to domestic violence is not pre-
sumptively neglectful, then exposure cannot be a presumptive ground for
removal. 5V Moreover, identifying a risk of serious harm is not enough.59
Instead, a court must balance the risk of staying against the risk of re-
moval.60 In addition, it must assess whether any risk that might flow
from non-removal can be otherwise ameliorated.61 To illustrate this lat-
ter point, the Court of Appeals cited with approval the possibility of re-
moving the batterer rather than the child.62
50. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 237. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Perni
cious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 540, 541
(2004).
51. The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that extant practice might be contrary to
statute. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 853.
52. Chill, supra note 50, at 542.
53. Id. at 542-45. Battered mothers are immediately suspect for their perceived lack of par-
enting skills or even maternal instinct. Thus, this burden may prove to be insurmountable.
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 157-68 (2000); Enos,
supra note 10, at 267.
54. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 251; Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protec-
tive Service Caseload: Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107, 118-19
(2002). Advocates of removal often appear to be unaware of or simply unwilling to acknowledge
the well-documented cost of removal. See, e.g., Melanie Margarida Nowling, Protecting Children
Who Witness Domestic Violence: Is Nicholson v. Williams an Adequate Response?, 41 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 517, 520 (2003).
55. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 849-54.
56. Id. at 847-48.
57. Id. at 84849.
58. Id. at 849.
59. Id. at 851-52.
60. Id. at 852.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 851-52.
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Two of the four possible avenues for removal create the greatest
concern. Both of these are removals that can occur before the filing of a
petition. The ex parte removal is pursuant to a pre-petition court order.6 3
The other-an emergency removal-occurs via the agency's unilateral
determination of risk of harm; a neglect petition and court review of the
removal follow.64 Describing the circumstances under which an emer-
gency removal would be legitimate as "urgent" and "very grave," 65 the
court gave a very cautious assessment of when such removals would be
appropriate.66 The court was unwilling to say never, but nonetheless
stated that it would be a "rare circumstance" in which emotional injury,
or the risk thereof, would be sufficient to justify these emergency remov-
als.
67
C. Third Certified Question
The third question certified by the Second Circuit to the New York
Court of Appeals was: "Does the fact that the child witnessed such abuse
suffice to demonstrate that 'removal is necessary,' or that 'removal was
in the child's best interests,' or must the child protective agency offer
additional, particularized evidence to justify removal? ' 68 Reiterating its
prior conclusion that witnessing domestic violence does not trigger a
presumption of removal, the court quickly determined that particularized
evidence is needed. 69 However, it rejected the idea that such particular-
ized evidence must include expert testimony.70
The reference to expert testimony carries Nicholson full circle back
to Lonell J.7 In Lonell J, the trial court had refused to make a finding of
neglect in the absence of expert testimony showing emotional harm as a
consequence of witnessing domestic violence. 72 The appellate court,
however, determined that such expert testimony was not required. The
Court of Appeals, in Nicholson, declined to read Lonell J. as holding that
witnessing was presumptively neglect. In so stating, it noted that the case
had involved more than an assertion of witnessing; there were, the court
said, "multiple factors" supporting a neglect finding.73 Thus, although
Lonell J. has been blamed74 for starting the rush towards holding battered
women liable for failure to protect,75 the New York Court of Appeals'
63. Id. at 852.
64. Id. at 853-54.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 853-54.
67. Id. at 854.
68. Id. at 854 (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 382-83.
70. Id. at 855.
71. LonelIlJ, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
72. Id. at 117.
73. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 855,
74. Or credited, depending on one's point of view.
75. See Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 656-57.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
conclusions support the notion that it was, in fact, misread and misap-
plied.
III. JUDGING NICHOLSON
In the final analysis, Nicholson offers a little something for every-
one. It clearly provides that women who are beaten in front of their chil-
dren are neither presumptively guilty of neglect nor presumptively sub-
ject to having their children removed. To some, however, that is a pat-
ently obvious reading of the statute. With its two-part, casually con-
nected definition of neglect, its valid interpretation could not be other-
wise. And, if it were, then federal constitutional provisions would re-
quire either that the statute be interpreted consistent with constitutional
mandates or that it be struck down.76
Of course, this "obvious" conclusion eluded trial and appellate
courts, as well as New York City's child welfare agency, for nearly a
decade. So this clear enunciation of the statute by the Court of Appeals
is welcomed relief to countless mothers and children who will, one
hopes, no longer be subjected to agency "pique
7 7 or "pitiless double
abuse." 78 Further, the court's unequivocal assertion that the state must
prove harm to children that is the result of a parent's failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care may lessen the divide between the law as it
reads and as it is applied. Nicholson was a lengthy and publicized case
that cannot be overlooked; perhaps judges, lawyers, and child welfare
professionals will now hew more closely to the law.
But the Plaintiffs' victory is not without limits. First and foremost,
Nicholson makes clear that battered women whose children suffer emo-
tional harm as a result of witnessing domestic abuse may still be neglect-
ful parents. 79 It is now plain that the state must prove that such harm is
the result of the mother failing to meet a minimum standard of care. It is
equally plain, however, that such evidence is readily adducible. Indeed,
Nicholson cites rather commonplace examples as to when a battered
woman might be held culpable for letting her child 
witness her battery.
80
For instance, the court said there might be neglect if: a) the mother knew
that her children were aware of the domestic violence; b) the children
were afraid of the batterer; c) the mother allowed the batterer to return;
76. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 847.
77. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
78. Id. at 163. Judge Weinstein found that children were not returned home simply based
upon the power of the agency to refuse to do so. Id. at 216. He also termed the ordeal of the bat-
tered mothers to be pitiless double abuse. Id. at 163.
79. Imminent risk of such harm would also satisfy the statutory requirement.
80. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846-47.
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and d) the mother lacked awareness of the impact of the violence on the
children.
81
Thus, Nicholson makes it harder for the government to prove its
case. Or, more bluntly, Nicholson holds that the government can no
longer rely on baseless presumptions in lieu of offering evidence of
harm.82 But Nicholson most assuredly does not take away the cause of
action. Thus, those critical of ACS's policy of alleging neglect based
upon exposure may yet be critical of this result.83
The flaws inherent in the policy-and found by Judge Weinstein-
are arguably still present. Battered women can still be held accountable
for the wrongs of their batterers. Based on their status as abused women,
they-and their children-are being subjected to the child welfare sys-
tem, which itself may cause harm.84 Further, they are not receiving the
support they need from institutional actors in order to extricate them-
selves-and their children-from a violent setting.85
IV. NICHOLSON'S PRECEDENTIAL AND PERSUASIVE IMPACT
It is difficult to accurately gauge Nicholson's impact. First, the final
outcome is still fresh. 86 Second, there is more than one Nicholson opin-
ion. Although the state Court of Appeals opinion is binding state law, it
may also be fairly argued that, in light of the way the case was resolved,
there is no single definitive opinion.87 Each of the three primary deci-
81. Id. (citing In re James MM, 740 N.Y.S.2d 730 (App. Div. 2002)). The court favorably
cited cases in which exposure had been shown to meet the requirements of the neglect statute. Id.
82. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 852-53.
83. This author has suggested that women never be charged with neglect on the sole ground
that their children have witnessed domestic violence. Dunlap, supra note 4, passim; See also
Collins, supra note 8, at 727-54. At least one state, Montana, appears to have done that. Dunlap,
supra note 4, at 605-06.
84. Richard Wexler, Take The Child and Run: Tales From the Age ofASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 129, 136-37 (2001).
85. Illustrating this point is the fact that the social worker in LonellJ. ceased working with the
family because the father-the abuser--objected to her involvement. So it was legitimate for the
professional to be scared off by the father but not for the mother to be so intimidated. In re Lonell J.,
Jr., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998). In many ways, Lonell J. is a textbook circumstance of
domestic violence and all that it can represent. First, and at the risk of essentializing, the mother was
a classic victim. She told the social worker that she deserved to be hit and, once the violence came
to light, she minimized it. Second, the chaos of a family living in domestic violence was exacer-
bated as this family also lived a shelter. Finally, the shelter raises several points to consider. How
was the violence occurring in such a public setting? That query, coupled with the fact that the social
worker stopped her work with the family due to the father's objection, demonstrates graphically the
sway exerted by batterers. Yet only the mothers are held accountable. See also Leigh Goodmark,
Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions
for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 7 (2004).
86. Indeed, the outcome will not be absolutely final until the case is removed from the sus-
pense docket on Sept. 1, 2005. See supra note 5.
87. The Nicholson lawsuit itself has settled and is on the verge of dismissal; none of the
judicial opinions that flow from this suit were reversed and thus are, at least, persuasive authority.
The New York Court of Appeals opinion is, of course, binding law in the jurisdiction.
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sions has value in its own way. As one might expect, each has been
cited in support of different propositions.s9
The Nicholson opinions have been cited most frequently, of course,
by New York courts. The New York Court of Appeals decision has been
cited several times for its clear articulation of what the government must
prove in a neglect case. In that capacity, it has been used by New York's
intermediate-tier appellate courts to reverse lower court neglect findings
against battered mothers. For instance, in In re: Eryck N., two years after
the Nicholson trial, a mother was charged with exposing her five children
to domestic violence. They were removed from her care.
90 The appeals
court reversed, citing the "landmark decision" of Nicholson in the New
York Court of Appeals.9' The court found that the "dearth" of evidence
adduced concerning the effect of the domestic violence on the children
did not meet the standard set forth in Nicholson.
92
Nicholson has also been cited in cases in which the lower appellate
courts have found the newly articulated burden to have been met. How-
ever, none of these cases yet involve the traditional failure-to-protect
scenario of Nicholson.93 But some come close. In In re Taisha R.,
94 the
harm requirement was deemed to be met based on the "fear and distress"
that one of the children experienced after the mother told the child not to
tell anyone about the domestic violence. 95 This one-page appellate opin-
ion raises several points of concern. First, there was another ground on
88. Those decisions are defined here as Judge Weinstein's memorandum opinion in support of
the preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit's opinion, and the New York Court of Appeals'
decision. There were, of course, other orders throughout the case. Judge Weinstein's Jan. 2001
order issuing the preliminary injunction, while the engine that ran the case, has not been cited as
frequently as his memorandum in support of that injunction.
89. Often the various opinions are cited for reasons not particularly relevant for this analysis.
For instance, Judge Weinstein's opinion has been cited for principles related to ineffective assistance
of counsel. People v. Toms, 743 N.Y.S.2d 690, 699 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2002). The Nicholson Second
Circuit opinion has been cited, e.g., for principles related to injunctive relief. Stauber v. City of New
York, No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,2004).
90. In re Eryck N., 791 N.Y.S.2d 857, 857 (App. Div. 2005). The mother had initially gone
with her children to a shelter and had secured a protection order. Id. However, she left the shelter in
order to "facilitate visitation between her husband and the children due to a modification of the order
of protection." Id.
91. Id. at 858.
92. Id. See also In re Ravern H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2005). Relying on Nicholson,
the Ravern court reversed a neglect finding because the government had merely proven that the
mother was a victim of domestic violence and the children had been exposed to it. Id. at 565.
93. See, e.g., In re Richard T., 785 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (App. Div. 2004), wherein the mother's
instigation of an altercation with her own mother in the presence of the children was found to meet
the standard set forth in Nicholson. But cf. In re Daniel GG, 792 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711-12 (App. Div.
2005), in which the court reversed a neglect finding based on a single incident of shoving where
harm to the child was not demonstrated. In In re Paul U., 785 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (App. Div. 2004),
the court determined that a neglect finding based upon a mother's attempt to place her son perma-
nently with the father who was subject to a stay-away order from both mother and child was consis-
tent with the just-announced Nicholson standard. The child, although not yet harmed, was in immi-
nent danger of impairment and the mother's actions, in light of her knowledge of the father's past
violence, were not within the necessary minimum degree of care. Id.
94. 788 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2005).
95. Id. at 358.
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which to establish neglect, so it can be argued that the court unnecessar-
ily found harm on the domestic violence allegation. 96  Further, this
mother may have reasonably believed that her actions-telling the child
not to tell anyone about the abuse-were protective.97 Thus, even if the
harm prong was proven, perhaps the failure to meet a minimum standard
of care was not.
98
Neglect was found in each of the preceding cases at the trial level,
even if subsequently reversed by an appellate court. And each of these
cases was initiated in 2003, over a year after the Nicholson injunction
was issued. But none of the trial level courts appear to have been influ-
enced by the case.
What can explain the initial reticence to follow Nicholson?99 There
is little doubt that these judges were aware of the Nicholson case, as it
received significant publicity.'00 One explanation is that natural, indeed
constitutional, tension between state and federal courts. This tension
may approach animosity when state courts perceive that the federal
courts are intruding upon state court jurisdiction.'' The Second Circuit
mentioned this as grounds for its decision to certify the three questions of
state law to the New York Court of Appeals. 102 Further, Nicholson law-
yers have suggested that, in general, courts were unhappy with the litiga-
tion. °3  It is also possible that, on a substantive level, the courts dis-
agreed with Judge Weinstein's decision, which was not binding on thestate courts.1 4 Therefore, they simply chose not to follow it.
96. The second ground was marijuana usage. Id.
97- Id. This case also flags the domestic-violence sensitive lawyering that will be required
under Nicholson. In order to demonstrate that certain actions are protective and reasonable, lawyers
representing these mothers will themselves need to be aware of the issues in a way that permits them
to bring relevant evidence before the court. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for
Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 217,305 (2003).
98. The Nicholson Court of Appeals decision listed factors that a court must weigh in assess-
ing whether the minimum standard of care has been met. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846. One can
easily imagine that a parent who has been threatened with further harm should she reveal the abuse
might reasonably caution her child against such disclosure.
99. Of course, no court has articulated this reticence. And in what are typically very brief
appellate opinions, rationale is often unstated and hard to discern. But in each of the referenced
cases, battered women were prosecuted for exposure notwithstanding the Nicholson case.
100. Supra note 1.
101. See, e.g, Nora Meltzer, Dismissing the Foster Children: The Eleventh Circuit's Misappli-
cation and Improper Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine in Bonnie L. v. Bush, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 635, 636 (2005).
102. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 176 (2d Cir. 2002).
103. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 670. The author's own practice experience in
Washington, D.C. corroborates this tension. The District of Columbia child welfare system was
placed under receivership by a federal court. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 988-89
(D.D.C. 1991). Following that action, there was general confusion over the jurisdictional boundaries
between the federal court, the receiver, and "state" court judges hearing individual neglect cases.
Zuccardy also discusses the state-federal court tension. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669.
104. The injunction was issued against ACS. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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Whether one agrees with it or not, the trial court's opinion is com-
pelling reading. Onc easily can come away appalled by the practices and
policies that the court found proved by the evidence.
10 5 However, the
decision, even with its extensive findings and conclusions, has been cited
relatively infrequently. Paradoxically, it has been cited for the proposi-
tion that witnessing domestic violence can cause harm.
10 6  While the
Nicholson opinion does say that,'0 7 its legally salient point is that wit-
nessing is not presumptively harmful. 
10 8
In addition, the Nicholson trial court opinion addressed more than
the three issues certified to the New York Court of Appeals. For in-
stance, Judge Weinstein found that the system of court-appointed counsel
for the "abused mothers is largely a sham."'
1 9  Much of the problem,
Weinstein opined, was the result of the inadequate system of compensa-
tion for court-appointed counsel."10 The Second Circuit, however, de-
ferred resolution of this issue, pending a decision by the New York Court
of Appeals."' That issue has been resolved subsequently by increased
compensation to court-appointed counsel." 
12
The trial court also discussed the impact of a report of neglect upon
a battered women's employability. The issue, in short, is the lingering
consequences of a substantiated report of neglect. In New York, the
State Central Register for Child Abuse and Maltreatment receives,
screens, and investigates reports of child abuse."
3 If a report is "indi-
cated,"'"14 all information concerning the allegation and its investigation
is maintained in the register until the youngest child in the subject family
turns twenty-eight."15 Persons on that register as subjects of "indicated"
105. Zuccardy describes testimony that caused everyone in the courtroom, including the judge,
to be teary-eyed. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 667.
106. MeEvoy v. Brewer, No. M2001-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794521, at *4 n.4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003).
107. As summarized by Judge Weinstein, the experts agreed that exposure to domestic vio-
lence could result in harm (emphasis added). Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp- 2d 153, 197
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 253. Judge Weinstein has written about this issue. Jack B. Weinstein, Hamlet in 
the
District Court: Facing Personal Ethical Dilemmas, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1175 (2004). 
His
findings on the issue of lawyer compensation have been cited several times. See, e.g., Kenny A. 
v.
Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005). See also Buel, supra note 97, at 290.
110. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
111. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
112. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669; N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney
2005).
113. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166. The investigation function is generally delegated to
local agencies. Id.
114. An "indicated" report is one that the agency, after investigation, determines is supported
by credible evidence. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 412(12)
(McKinney 2005).
115. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(6) (McKinney 2005).
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reports are generally prevented from obtaining jobs in which they will be
working with children.
116
For battered women, the resultant damage is obvious and cruel.
They are beaten up in the presence of their children. They are charged
with neglect. Their children are removed from their care and custody.
Their name is placed on the register. They are debarred from occupa-
tions involving children, e.g., as childcare workers, teachers, or teacher's
aides. They thereafter lose or are prevented from procuring employment.
Thus, they are deprived of the economic resources required to leave the
batterer. And the cycle starts over.
Of course, Nicholson has had an impact beyond what can be
gleaned from case citations. Most obviously, ACS has reformed its prac-
tices.117 Attorney compensation has been increased." 8 Further, the state
legislature has enacted a law requiring all child protection caseworkers to
be trained in the principles set forth in Nicholson. 119
Of what import is Nicholson beyond the state boundaries of New
York? Its ultimate resolution on state law rather than federal constitu-
tional grounds is likely to limit its national reach. Child abuse and ne-
glect law flows from both state law and federal constitutional law. But
the legal provisions for holding mothers liable for witnessing are primar-
ily state-law based. 12  Since the case was settled on the strength of the
New York Court of Appeals' interpretation of state neglect law, its legal
relevance for other state's statutory and decisional law is persuasive at
best.
There are often similarities, however, among state neglect laws.
Therefore, to the extent a state has laws identical or even similar to
Nicholson, its impact may extend beyond the boundaries of New York.
By way of example, New Jersey's definition of neglect is remarkably
similar to New York's. It has the same, causally connected, two ele-
ments: 1) harm--or its imminent risk; that 2) results from the parent's
failure to exercise minimum care. 121 Accordingly, a New Jersey court
116. There are ways around this barrier, but they involve the submission by the employer of
written rationale for hiring a person who is the subject of an indicated report. Nicholson, 203 F.
Supp. 2d at 166-67. One can easily imagine that employers may not choose to do this extra work,
especially if there are other potential employees.
117. Nicholson Review committee Report, supra note 35, at passim. The Nicholson Review
Comrmttee ("NRC") was established as part of the preliminary injunction. In re Nicholson, 181 F.
Supp. 2d at 192-93. It met monthly to assess compliance with the injunction. The NRC reports to
Judge Weinstein indicate that the reform of ACS practices was not always quickly or smoothly
accomplished. Nicholson Review Committee Report, supra note 35, atpassim.
118. See Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 668-69.
119. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669-70.
120. See, e.g., Dunlap supra note 4, at 599-607. See Mundorffinfra note 128, at 148-55 for a
description of some of the training for ACS workers prior to Nicholson.
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21 (c)(4) (West 2005).
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:4
could find New York's highest court's interpretation of an identical stat-
ute to be compelling.
Indeed, a New Jersey appellate court, in New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services v. S.S.,122 cited to Judge Weinstein's findings
when it held that witnessing domestic violence does not necessarily harm
children. 123 In reversing a neglect finding against a battered mother, the
court wrote that the agency officials and the court below improperly as-
sumed that witnessing domestic violence harmed children.
124  It thus
reached the same conclusion that the New York Court of Appeals in
Nicholson later reached: a battered mother may be held liable for neglect
for permitting her child to be exposed to domestic violence if and only if
the state proves harm that was the result of her failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care.125
The several Nicholson opinions have been cited in numerous law
review articles, both favorably
126 and otherwise. 127  Two articles have
recently examined the slavery and involuntary servitude parallels flowing
from Judge Weinstein's conclusion that there were possible violations of
the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
28  Likewise, legal com-
mentary has cited Nicholson.
129
122. 855 A.2d 8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
123. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 855 A.2d at 15-16.
124. Id. at 16. In S.S., the mother was attacked by her husband while their 21-month old boy
was in her arms. Id. at 10. The child was removed on an emergency basis without a court order. Id.
at 11-12. The mother was not allowed to be with the child unsupervised. Id. at 11. In its reversal,
the appellate court noted that there was no evidence that the child was harmed. Id. at 14. According
to the caseworker, he was "a cute little guy who was friendly, happy and healthy." Id. at 12. Other
testimony "confirmed" that the mother was a good parent. Id. Nor was any other testimony pre-
sented regarding the impact of witnessing domestic violence. Id. at 13-14.
125. Id. at 15. The S.S. court made clear, as did the Nicholson court, that the harm may be
unintentional, i.e., a parent who acts in reckless disregard of known risks to the child. Id.
126. See, e.g., Heidi A. White, Refusing To Blame The Victim For The Aftermath of Domestic
Violence: Nicholson v. Williams Is A Step In The Right Direction, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 527, 531
(2003); Buel, supra note 97, at 288-95; Collins, supra note 8, at 726-37; Trepiccione, supra note 10,
at 1522. Trepiccione's article was written while Nicholson was pending and predates even the trial
decision; however, she predicted it well. She criticized the rush to assume that witnessing causes
harm. Id. at 1501-06.
127. See, e.g., Nowling, supra note 54, at 523-24. In her negative assessment of Nicholson,
Nowling makes a series of challengeable assertions. Further, she urges courts not to be hasty in
deciding the "health and welfare" of children. Id. at 520. Of all the possible critiques of Nicholson,
that it was decided hastily seems ill-founded.
128. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 247-48 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Kurt Mundorff,
Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child Welfare, I CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 131, 136-47 (2003). Mundorff writes chillingly of his experiences as a
Child Protective Specialist for ACS. His conclusions about race and racism, improper removals,
monetary incentives, and the harms caused by foster care are sobering, to say the least. Id. at 148-
63. Moreover, they speak volumes about the folly of removing children unnecessarily. "When in
doubt, take 'em out" was one trainer's refrain. Id. at 152. See also Shima Baradaran-Robison,
Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice: Due Process and the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments in Child Removal from Battered Women, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227,239-63 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Janice Inman, Supreme Court Limits Removing Children From Homes Due to
Partner Abuse, N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY, Dec. 6, 2004, at 3; 3 AM. JuR. 2D Proof of Facts § 17.3
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It is somewhat surprising that the Nicholson opinions have not been
more widely cited. 30  The implications are open to interpretation. For
instance, does the low number of citations simply indicate that interested
persons were waiting for the litigation to play out? If so, then it is fair to
expect Nicholson to be cited more now that the case has concluded. Or,
is it that the number of different Nicholson opinions makes reference to it
more difficult? The exact holding of Nicholson is, in some ways, diffi-
cult to pinpoint. Finally, perhaps the lack of extensive citation reveals a
disagreement with the decision itself.
CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
Will the conclusions of Nicholson ultimately take hold, both among
the relevant professional cohort and in the world of public opinion? Will
those groups endorse the notion that witnessing domestic violence, stand-
ing alone, is insufficient to sustain neglect charges against battered
mothers?
Even those who think Nicholson was rightly decided must acknowl-
edge the challenge of this proposition. For years, advocates against do-
mestic violence have urged that courts consider the impact that exposure
to domestic violence has upon children.13' Finally, legislatures, courts,
researchers, and relevant agencies started to take notice. The assertion
that children are harmed by exposure then became engraved as sacred
truth. So to now urge that the impact of exposure has been oversold may
strike many as either self-serving or contrary to the evidence.
The evidence, however, does indeed show that the assumptions
about the universality of harm were not well-founded. The experts in
Nicholson agreed that harm was possible, not inevitable.1 32 There is, of
course, a range of "possibles" and some experts may find harm more
likely than others.1 33 The problem now lies with how to present the evi-
dence that witnessing is not necessarily harmful.
It is here that critical thinking about the purpose, effects, and legal
bases for the child abuse and neglect system is so important. Such criti-
cal analysis leads one to reject the sloppy logic that transforms the obvi-
ous assertion that it would be better if children did not witness domestic
violence into the conclusion that witnessing always harms children and
(2005); RONALD B. ADRINE & ALEXANDRIA M. RUDEN, BALDWIN'S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES §§
8:6, 14:24 (2004).
130. Whether a case has been widely cited is, to some degree, a matter of opinion.
131. See Dunlap supra note 4, at 583-84.
132. The evidence proffered at the Nicholson trial is a valid starting point. Competing experts
testified and Judge Weinstein made conclusions about areas of agreement. Nicholson v. Williams,
203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
133. Evan Stark, an expert for the Plaintiffs, suggests that in 60-75% of families in which
domestic violence is occurring, there are no mental health effects for the children. Stark, supra note
54, at 116-17.
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that battered women should be held liable if their children witness the
violence.
Jill Zuccardy, one of the Nicholson lawyers, is sanguine about the
long-term impact of Nicholson. 13 Calling it a "unique case for systemic
reform," she believes Nicholson provides the basis for changing societal
biases on domestic violence and mothering. 13  Her optimism may be
well-founded.1 36  She has spoken widely about the case in this country
and she, along with her Nicholson co-counsel, have traveled to Australia
to speak to local government officials in the hope of preventing whole-
sale wrongful removals similar those that helped precipitate the Nichol-
son litigation. 37
Those who are persuaded by the findings of the Nicholson trial
court can only hope that Zuccardy is right. There can be two opposite
reactions to the facts highlighted in Nicholson. First, the horrified, disbe-
lieving one. This reaction reveals disbelief and outrage that women are
being blamed. 138  The second reaction offers the requisite sympathy to
the battered adult, but firmly asserts that the children's interest must pre-
vail. 139  Perhaps both reactions need tempering. The first absolves the
mother of responsibility for protection that is inherent in 
parenting. 140
The second is ostrich-like in its assertion that removal benefits children.
Sweeping conclusions about Nicholson are yet premature. While in
their midst, cultural and legal change mimic a glacial pace. Fortunately,
hindsight can offer some perspective. As Professor Miccio pointed out a
decade ago, women were being charged with failing to protect their chil-
dren from witnessing acts that, a few short years earlier, were "socially
permissible."'14 1 Within a relatively short period, wife abuse moved from
134. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 665-70. Zuccardy's optimism is shared by others.
Inman, supra note 129, at 3; Buel supra note 97, at 291-92.
135. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 665-70. See also ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 148-78 (2000).
136. It is most important, of course, that Nicholson be successful within New York and, espe-
cially, New York City. Class actions and other reform litigation have had a mixed history of success
- if success is defined by systems change, not just a technical legal "win." Professor Elizabeth
Cooper, who teaches a class at Fordham University Law School entitled Institutional Reform
Through the Courts, suggests that the Nicholson class action may have a greater chance of success
since it focused on changing a narrow, discrete wrong. Conversation with Elizabeth Cooper, Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (June 18, 2005).
137, E-mail from Jill Zuccardy, Director, Child Projection Project, Sanctuary for Families, to
Justine Dunlap, Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, May 31, 2005
(on file with author).
138. Buel, supra note 97, at 224.
139 In re Jane Doe, 57 P.3d 447, 464 (Haw. 2002). See also Brooke Kintner, The "Other"
Victim: Can We Hold Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Children from Harms of Domestic
Violence?, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 271,282-95 (2005).
140. Although it is axiomatic that protecting children is inherent in parenting, the author does
not mean to suggest that the inherent protective nature of parenting legitimizes charging battered
women with failing to protect their children from witnessing domestic abuse. It is important not to
wrongly extend appropriate responsibility into strict liability.
141. Miccio, supra note 31, at 1090.
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being legal to being subject to criminal and civil laws. To then move
rather quickly to charging battered women with failing to protect their
child from witnessing that abuse seemed regressive. Progress, however,
comes in fits and starts. Nicholson is surely a step forward. Perhaps it
will lead, as Zuccardy suggests, to a positive change in social attitudes to
towards battered women and their mothering capabilities. 
42
142. The Nicholson Review Committee Report offers some cause for concern here. It con-
cludes that ACS "remains equivocal" about acknowledging or accepting responsibility for the consti-









My aim is to provide a broad framework for understanding and
building on the Nicholson decision.' While I touch on some of the fac-
tual issues that arose in the case with respect to how domestic violence
impacts children, my major concerns are with the conceptual, historical
and political context in which the case was set. In particular, I want to
address the case as a particular moment in the history of the relationship
between the battered women's movement and the Child Protective Ser-
vices (CPS) system, the flawed understanding of domestic violence that
mediated this relationship and continues to shape how CPS responds to
battered women, and the implications for improved practice of our grow-
ing appreciation of the power dynamics involved in woman battering. I
also describe the dilemmas created for women like Ms. Nicholson, what
I call "the battered mother's dilemma," because of the discrepancy be-
tween what battered women typically experience and how domestic vio-
lence is identified and managed.2
I. WHAT IS THE QUESTION?
I entered the Nicholson case with a Manichean view of the parties
involved. Having been involved in the battered women's movement for
over thirty years as an advocate, researcher and forensic social worker, I
had learned not to idealize battered women or their behavior as mothers.
Still, when you meet Ms. Nicholson, Ms. Tillet or the other plaintiff
mothers, it is hard to avoid the impression that you're dealing with genu-
ine pioneers, women with a courage to "talk truth to power" that is rare
anywhere, let alone among the most vulnerable sectors of the population.
By contrast, I viewed the CPS system as a disaster. For the last three
years, as a member of the Nicholson Review Committee (NRC), I re-
t Evan Stark teaches in the Graduate Department of Public Administration at Rutgers
University-Newark and Chairs the Department of Urban Health Administration on the Newark
Campus of the UMDNJ School of Public Health. A founder of one of the nation's first shelters for
battered women, Dr. Stark testified as a domestic violence expert for the plaintiffs in Nicholson and
served as their representative on the Nicholson Review Committee. The following is a transcript of
remarks made on March 3, 2005 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium, "Children and
the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"
1. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. For a review of my testimony that documents our factual claims in the case, see generally
Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Developing an Appro-
priate Response, 23 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 107, 107-131 (2002).
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viewed complaints about Administration for Children's Services (ACS)
and dozens of family court petitions, met regularly with ACS leadership
and with other members of our panel trying to craft workable solutions
that would bring ACS into compliance with Judge Weinstein's injunc-
tion.3 I have not substantially changed my overall assessment of the CPS
system. But I have a far greater appreciation of the quality of commit-
ment and intellect at CPS agencies like ACS. And this appreciation is
the basis for one of the key questions raised by Nicholson: given such
talent and commitment, why do CPS agencies behave so badly towards
battered mothers?
4
Lest my praise seem backhanded, let me state what I couldn't say
publicly when I served as an advocate for the plaintiff mothers in the
review process. I believe that ACS's work on domestic violence is state
of the art and that its leadership in this area is exemplary. Before and
during their attempts at compliance, ACS consulted regularly with a
number of the nation's leading domestic violence experts, including
Lonnie Davis, Richard Gelles, Susan Schecter, Jeffrey Edelson, and
Kathryn Conroy. Elizabeth Roberts, the head of domestic violence pol-
icy at ACS, is a savvy and experienced practitioner with direct ties to the
Massachusetts child welfare system widely considered to have a model
domestic violence response. Before and after the trial, ACS maintained
regular contact with the William Casey Foundation and a body of exper-
tise through the foundation that is at the cutting edge of the issues raised
by the case. William Bell, the agency head during much of our efforts to
bring ACS into compliance, now works at Casey. Linda Spears from the
National Child Welfare League, who represented ACS on the NRC and
consulted with them throughout the compliance process, not only has a
working knowledge of how the two systems operate, but a principled
commitment to women's autonomy that is rare among persons so closely
identified with the child welfare system. And John Mattingly, the cur-
rent Commissioner of ACS, helped to fund the NRC and is one of the
most progressive voices nationally in child welfare.
I emphasize these points because the actions ACS took against Ms.
Nicholson and her co-litigants, charging them with neglect and removing
their children solely because the mothers were victims of domestic vio-
lence, could easily be misinterpreted as the work of a backwater crowd
of bureaucratic misogynists insensitive to the most basic principles of
respect.5 Indeed, when I asked a close colleague in the field who has
first-hand experience with ACS why she thought an agency with this
quality of outside consultation could have produced such draconian poli-
cies, she drew on her South Jersey farm roots to quip, "You can't make a
3. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
4. See id. at 219-20.
5. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
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silk purse from a sow's ear." My own view, however, is that a major
lesson from Nicholson is that the peculiar biases to which child protec-
tion is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and peculiar
role in our society allow and may even compel even its most progressive
personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible prac-
tices with respect to mothers in general and in particular to the class of
primarily disadvantaged and/or minority women who were the plaintiffs
in Nicholson. Moreover, I also believe ACS's actions were the logical
result of setting a view of domestic violence and how it harms children
into a narrow mandate that effectively excludes from its purview the
actions necessary to respond appropriately to cases of woman battering.
A common view when we began the Nicholson case was that "they
didn't get it," meaning that ACS leadership was stunningly naYve about
the reality of battered women's experience. While this is true to a certain
degree, in general the knowledge base from which CPS approaches bat-
tered women in its caseload is substantially the same as the knowledge
base that guides the advocacy movement. Indeed, the domestic violence
principles and guidelines ACS staff is asked to implement through their
case practice emphasize support for non-offending parents and children
and "accountability" for offending parents, the same tenets that guide the
battered women's movement. If the practices and outcomes of ACS in-
volvement for women and children are dramatically different than the
practices and outcomes when shelters or other advocacy organizations
are involved, this reflects the very different organizational and political
contexts in which these responses are shaped. These contexts and the
conceptual foundation on which they are built must be changed if we
hope to improve the outcome of CPS intervention with battered women
and their children.
Even a cursory review of ACS's organizational chart made it appar-
ent that frontline service staff (e.g. child protection supervisors and case-
workers) were not accountable to the domestic violence expertise on
board. Elizabeth Roberts, the titular head of domestic violence policies
at ACS, had no line authority over casework practice whatsoever, a point
I emphasized in my testimony.6 ACS continually reiterated during the
trial that removal solely for domestic violence was not their "policy.",7
But this defense was transparent. The written policies at ACS with re-
spect to domestic violence were only marginally related to actual prac-
tice. In marked contrast to the principles enunciating the importance of
"empowerment" for battered women, for example, was a standing direc-
tive from a previous commissioner that instructed caseworkers to resolve
"any ambiguity regarding the safety of the child ... in favor of removing
the child from harm's way."8 With this directive in hand, no account-
6. Stark, supra note 2, at 128.
7. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11.
8. Stark, supra note 2, at 128.
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ability for punitive practices in domestic violence cases, no technical
assistance on board to help resolve the ambiguities that are commonplace
in these cases, and a legal staff whose burnout was matched by the ease
with which their petitions were granted by family court judges, removal
(with or without a court order) became the agencies effective policy.
The problem here was not a lack of training. When Nicholson was de-
cided, caseworkers at ACS had a domestic violence protocol and assess-
ment tool in hand and received two full days of targeted domestic vio-
lence training. The training curriculum ACS used took an approach that
emphasized psychological dimensions of abuse, including women's pre-
sumed ambivalence about separating from violent partners, that bore
little relation to either the cutting edge definition of domestic violence as
a pattern or coercive and controlling tactics ACS adopted from Massa-
chusetts or to the criteria used in its protocol (also adopted from Massa-
chusetts) to assess the emergent nature of the problem.
9 Despite the lack
of coherent guidance provided to child protection staff, the training fairly
represented the existing state of knowledge in the field.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
The domestic violence field operates from what I term a "domestic
violence paradigm." This paradigm is built around four elements. The
first element is a definition of violence as a discrete act which causes or
is likely to cause injury; the second is the equation of abuse with inci-
dents of injurious or potentially injurious violence; and the third is an
assessment of severity according to a "calculus of harms"--the more
injury, the more serious the problem. The fourth element is a "victimiza-
tion narrative" that links domestic violence to various deficits in the vic-
tim, including a condition known as "learned helplessness" and an ability
to identify or utilize appropriate alternatives. The best known versions of
the victimization narrative are the models of "battered woman syn-
drome" or "post-traumatic stress disorder" that make up the heart of a
"battered woman's defense" widely used to represent women on trial for
assaulting or killing abusive partners.'0 Virtually every aspect of the
helping response we've devised for battered women is built from these
elements, including the definition of domestic violence as a crime, the
understanding of protection orders, the importance placed on "safety" by
our entire movement and the assessment tools we use to ration shelter,
9. For the CPS Model developed in Massachusetts, see Pamela Whitney & Lonna Davis,
Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in Massachusetts: Can Practice be Integrated in a Public Child
Welfare Setting?, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT No. 2, 158-66 (1999).
10. This stereotype is based on the now discredited view that battered women suffer from
"battered woman's syndrome" consisting of "learned helplessness" and a "cycle of violence" which
causes victims to be ambivalent about leaving. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 42-71 (1979); For a critique of this view, see generally DONALD DOWNS, MORE THAN
VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY AND THE LAW 3-16 (1996). Mary Ann
Dutton, Understanding Women's Response to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered
Women's Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191,1197-1201 (1993).
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medical care or police intervention. It was from this model that the ACS
training curriculum built its sympathetic portrait of battered mothers. Put
simply, it is generally assumed that battering consists of discrete, injuri-
ous assaults that can render victims incapable of acting effectively on
their own or their children's behalf. This view diverges dramatically
from what battered women actually experience in the vast majority of
cases. As a result, interventions based on the paradigm are largely un-
successful in ending abuse.
I will have more to say about this model momentarily. But two
points will help you anticipate where I am going. First, in contrast to the
paradigm, battered women report that abuse is typically "ongoing" rather
than comprised of discrete incidents and that in a majority of cases the
most salient elements involve forms of isolation, intimidation and control
rather than severe assault. Women's vulnerability to assault-and chil-
dren's as well-may be largely a function of these nonviolent con-
straints. Importantly, the basic harms inflicted by these "nonviolent"
forms of coercion and control are to women's basic liberties of move-
ment, association, speech and the like, rather than to their physical integ-
rity.1 As a consequence and in contrast to the victimization narrative,
although battered women evidence a greatly elevated risk compared to
nonbattered women for a range of medical, behavioral and psychological
problems, the vast majority of victims do not suffer from these problems.
This issue was critical to Nicholson because it suggested that battered
women were not like other women in the CPS caseload and required a
specialized response. The second point is that the punitive and unconsti-
tutional behaviors evidenced in Nicholson are the logical outcome when
this model is superimposed on the current statutory aim of CPS, even if
no other contributing factors are brought into the picture. In other
words, we need to assume nothing else to generate the actions of ACS in
Nicholson except that domestic violence creates an emergent situation
that effectively disables the protective capacities of mothers. Not only
does this view push certain actors (such as crisis managers, courts, shel-
ters and police) and responses to the fore; it also makes other possible
11. On abuse as ongoing, see Page-Hall Smith et al., Measuring Battering: Development of
the Women's Experience of Battering (WEB) Scale, WOMEN'S HEALTH, Winter 1995, at 273-88. On
the importance of isolation, intimidation and control, see John W. McCormack Graduate School of
Policy Studies Center for Social Policy, In Harm 's Way: Domestic Violence, AFDC Receipt, and
Welfare Reform in Massachusetts, (1997), at http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/csp/publications/
harms%20way.pdf Current controversies on defining nonlethal violence against women in intimate
heterosexual relationships, see Walter S. DcKcscrcdy, Current Controversies of Defining Nonlethal
Violence Against Women in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships: Empirical Implications, 6
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN No.7, 728-46 (2000); D.R. Follingstad et al., Factors Moderating
Physical and Psychological Symptoms of Battered Women, 6 J. FAM. VIOLENCE No. 1, 81-95 (1995);
M. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against
Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 283-94 (1995). M. Kasian et al., Frequency and Severity of
Psychological Abuse in a Dating Population, 7 J INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 3, 350-64 (1992).
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responses to the parties involved (such as a response based on partnering
and emphasizing their strengths and resiliency) unlikely.
III. THE NEXUS OF RESEARCH AND POLITICS
Critical to Nicholson were three convergent processes: a growing
body of literature that applied the domestic violence paradigm to chil-
dren; 12 mounting political pressure for child protective services (CPS) to
intervene in so-called "dual victim" families-where both a mother and
child are put at risk by an abusive male; and a body of case law that ap-
plies the Failure to Protect Doctrine (under state neglect statutes) to non-
offending parents in these families.1 3  Following the presumption that
being "exposed" to domestic violence harms children, CPS and the
courts in many states, with New York as the leader, instituted a policy of
charging battered mothers with neglect and temporarily removing their
12. For a review of this literature, see PETER C. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED
WOMEN 21 (1990), where it is estimated that 3.3 million American children are exposed to violent
incidents between parents. See also Wanda K. Mohr, Making the Invisible Victims of Domestic
Violence Visible, 2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. (Civil Research Institute, Kingston, NJ.), Au-
gust/September 1997, No. 6, at 81: J.L. Edelson, Children's Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence,
14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 8, 839-870 (1999); J.L. Edelson, The Overlap Between Child
Maltreatment and Woman Abuse, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 2, 1-6 (1999), available at
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR overlap.pdf. On-line re-
sources summarizing the literature include: National Women's Resource Center, Bibliography on
Children Who Witness Violence: Research & Intervention by J.L. Edelson, at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/bibs/bibkids/bibkids.html. For estimates as high as ten
million, see K. Kracke, Children's Exposure to Violence: The Safe Start Initiative, (U.S. Department
of Justice), April 2000, No. 13, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200113.pdf. For
a summary of statutes, see Annelies Hagemeister, Overlap of Domestic Violence and Child Mal-
treatment in U.S.A. State Civil and Criminal Statutes, at http://www.mineava.umn.edu/link
documents/statutes/statutes.shtml. This April 2000 table lists statutes alphabetically by state. On
legal trends, see Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge
of Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, IA CURRENT PERSP.
PSYCHOL. LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES: CHILDREN & FAM.: ABUSE & ENDANGERMENT 197, 216
(1992); Anne Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 L. & INEQUALITY 359,
362-81 (1987); See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 782 (N.C. 1982), Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d
614, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), and Fabritz v. Traurig, 583 F 2d 697, 699 (1978) where women were
charged because they failed to act to prevent children from being hurt or killed.
13. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of
the Passive Battered Mother and the Protected Child in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1089 (1995); see also Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unraveling The Battered Mother's
Dilemma, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 29, 59 (2000); The Failure to Protect Working Group, Charging
Battered Mothers With Failure to Protect: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 850
(2000). The best summary of this trend is Melissa A. Trepiccione, At The Crossroads of Law and
Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child An Acceptable
Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1522 (2001).
The critical case decisions in New York were In the Matter of Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Fam. Ct.
1992) (where a non-abusing battered mother was found neglectful for failing to protect her children
from sexual abuse by the father, even though the court acknowledged that she suffered from battered
woman's syndrome) and In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998) (where the court ruled
that by staying in the abusive relationship the mother had failed to exercise a minimum degree of
care). For examples of the argument that battered women's services should collaborate with CPS,
see Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call for
Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html, and Janet Carter, Domestic Violence,
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children if it was alleged that the children witnessed the violence or were
otherwise exposed to it.1 4 By re-victimizing battered women, these cases
raised acute dilemmas for those of us who had publicized the harm do-
mestic violence poses to children, urged CPS to provide safety enhancing
services to victimized mothers as well as children, and helped to train
CPS personnel.
The first piece of relevant background information is that, for at
least a decade prior to Nicholson, domestic violence researchers pro-
moted the idea that the connection between domestic violence and harms
to children was not only significant, but compelled protective interven-
tion.15
In one of the first studies of this connection, Dr. Anne Flitcraft and I
reviewed all the cases "darted" for suspicion of child abuse at Yale-New
Haven Hospital for a year. 16 Remarkably, we found that the mother had
also been abused in 45% of these cases. 7 A replication of this work at
Boston City Hospital's Pediatric Department reported that the mother
was battered in 60% of the child abuse cases.' 8 Data from CPS agencies
is less reliable because the proportion of cases where domestic violence
is identified depends on whether, and with what tools, screening for do-
mestic violence occurs, whether organizational culture supports interven-
tion, and whether the investigating agency is perceived as responsible for
adult as well as child safety. Despite differing estimates, ranging from a
low of 13% to 49%, evidence from CPS caseloads consistently highlights
the importance of domestic violence as a contextual factor for child mal-
treatment.' 9 Although estimates appear to increase if a domestic violence
protocol is in place and further still if questioning is routine, there is as
yet no "gold standard" to use as a baseline for performance.20 In part,
14. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Bat-
tered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 245-48 (1996) (explaining that
accusing battered mothers of neglect deprives them of control and further aggravates their prob-
lems).
15. Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on
Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES No.I, 97-98 (1988). For discussion of the service needs
in families where woman battering and child abuse coincide, see Sandra K. Beeman et al., Case
Assessment And Service Receipt In Families Experiencing Both Child Maltreatment And Woman
Battering, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 5,437-58 (2001). For examples of the argument that
battered women's services should collaborate with CPS, see Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In
the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and
Domestic Violence Constituencies, at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html,
and Janet Carter, Domestic Violence, ChildAbuse and Youth Violence: Strategies for Prevention and
Early Intervention, at http://www.mincava.urn.edu/link/documents/fvpf2/fvpf2.shtml.
16. Stark & Fliteraft, supra note 15, at 104.
17. Id.
18. Linda McKibben et al., Victimization of Mothers of Abused Children: A Controlled Study,
84 PEDIATRICS No. 3, 531-34 (1989).
19. Stark, supra note 2, at 109- 10.
20. SUSAN MITCHELL-HERZFELD, THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT (ASFA) STUDY
(2000) (unpublished report, on file with the The Evaluation & Research Unit of New York State's
Office of Children and Family Studies).
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this is because CPS workers are rarely accountable for identifying do-
mestic violence and CPS clients often fear that revealing domestic vio-
lence will jeopardize their parenting status or lead to an escalation of
abuse. One result is that a high proportion of the domestic violence cases
identified as such by CPS involve levels of injury that make reporting
unavoidable. Even the lowest incidence rates indicate that domestic vio-
lence is more often an issue in child protection cases than is substance
abuse, homelessness, mental illness or other comparable problems to
which considerably greater resources are devoted. Indeed, it is probably
the single most common context for child maltreatment.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES
Several things are notable about this research. The first is that it is
extremely weak methodologically. Most studies rely on small or unrep-
resentative samples, such as mothers in shelters, or on sources such as
population surveys where secondhand reports with no confirming evi-
dence are used to estimate prevalence rates. Substantial differences be-
tween the context, dynamics and consequences of child abuse and child
neglect have been widely noted. The mothers in Nicholson were charged
with neglect.21 But, the literature on how domestic violence harms chil-
dren typically focuses either on child abuse or on psychological or be-
havioral outcomes attributed to domestic violence rather than on neglect.
Conversely, there is virtually no data on "dosage" that would tell us
"how much" or what types of abuse are likely to harm children. Few use
comparison groups of children from nonviolent homes, differentiate vio-
lent families from high conflict or distressed families in which there is no
violence, assess children's strengths or coping responses, link test pro-
files that indicate deficits to actual malfunctions or control for such con-
founding factors as the disruptive effects of going to a shelter, develop-
mental age, exposure to community violence or other potentially trau-
matic life-experiences that may confound clinical measures of dysfunc-
tion. No attention has been paid to accompanying coercive or controlling
factors within the family that may affect children's reactions independ-
ently of violence. Moreover, studies that identify witnessing as the cause
of harm have rarely determined whether the children affected have also
been abused.22 Finally, virtually no studies have compared the actual
incidence of the behavioral problems that typically merit CPS interven-
tion among exposed children to baseline rates of these problems in the
general population or in foster care.
21. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
22. Stark, supra note 2, at 114.
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V. CONCEPTUAL FAILURE TO SHOW How DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HARMS
CHILDREN
Perhaps an even more important issue for our current discussion is
the consistent failure of researchers, including the range of advocates
who consulted with ACS, to conceptualize the widely documented "over-
lap" between domestic violence and harms to children's welfare. Of the
several hundred published studies on this connection, fewer than a hand-
ful even address, let alone go into detail about, the dynamics that actually
connect harms to mothers and children. A major explanation for the
inappropriate ACS response is that, although there is widespread pres-
sure for intervention in these cases, there are few conceptual maps to
help professionals who are statutorily responsible for children's safety
unravel the chain of causation in these cases or shape the evidence before
them into an intelligible and evidence based story to guide assessment,
judgment or intervention. As a defensive adaptation to this situation,
CPS agencies like ACS have relied heavily on blanket policies that in-
clude placement and accusations of "failure to protect" against abuse
victims as first-line interventions.
One scenario presumably needs no elaboration, where children are
directly injured during a partner assault. But we have no conclusive data
on this circumstance. When I looked at Connecticut data gathered by the
State Police, I found that children were considered "involved" in 17.6%
of the cases where at least one partner was arrested. 23 Yet, the harm al-
leged to the child justified a charge of "risk of injury" in only 441 of
15,060 incidents, fewer than 3%.24 An unpublished study of seventy-one
domestic violence cases, the New York State Office of Families and
Children reported that in three cases, children required outpatient medi-
cal treatment, slightly higher than the Connecticut figure. 5 To put these
figures in perspective, consider this: even if we assume all of the children
who required medical attention were "abused" and merited CPS inter-
vention, this is just slightly higher than the proportion of abuse found in
the general population (about 2.5%) and much less than the comparable
risk in foster families (about 5%).26 In other words, a generic policy of
placement in domestic violence cases would almost double the risk that a
child would be harmed.
We know some things about the dynamics when children are
harmed. In our Yale research, we determined that the typical abuser of
the children in these cases was the same man who was abusing their
23. 1999 CONN. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY ANN. REP. 4.
24. Id.
25. Mitchell-Herzfeld, supra note 20.
26. A report by the Public Advocate's Office in New York City identifies the overall risk of
child abuse in New York City as one in forty, about the same or only slightly less than the risk where
domestic violence occurs, and the risk in foster care as one in twenty, almost half again as high as
the risk posed by domestic violence. 2001 N.Y. PUB ADVOC. OFF. REP. 15.
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mother.2 7 Indeed that the fathers in abusive relationships were three
times more likely than fathers in non-abusive relationships to be respon-
sible for the harms to the children.28 But as a general rule, it has simply
been assumed that knowing the two events occur in some proximity-
that children are "exposed" and reveal possible problems on tests-is
sufficient to posit an "if/then" connection.
VI. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
One reason the "connection" was accepted so uncritically was be-
cause the women's advocacy community had been trying unsuccessfully
since the early 1970's to get the child welfare system to acknowledge the
importance of domestic violence for their clients. In 1985, when I pre-
sented the findings from our Yale studies and other evidence on the over-
lap at a national "Workshop on Violence as a Public Health Problem"
convened by Dr. Koop, the United States Surgeon General, the leaders
from the child welfare community in attendance responded with stone
silence. They saw no need to share the wealth with the battered women's
advocacy community, relatively new kids on the block, and feared that
identifying with an issue that smacked of "women's lib" could open a
political Pandora's Box.
Everything changed when Congress passed and President Clinton
signed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994.'9 Suddenly,
with a little over 1.2 billion in funds committed to domestic violence and
sexual assault, the battered women's movement was no longer marginal.
The phones started to ring. Funding for the Office of Maternal and Child
Health had been flat for a decade, I was told. Could they garner a por-
tion of VAWA if they recognized that "healthy" mothers also had to be
safe? Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), National
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) and other agen-
cies that had shown little interest in women except in their roles as child-
bearers and "mothers" were suddenly willing to hear about abuse. The
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has historically limited itself to re-
search. Yet, because they had climbed on the domestic violence wagon
early on, they got federal program dollars to dole out. The reauthoriza-
tion bills for CPS included grants to research and break the connection
between domestic violence and child maltreatment.
The lesson was clear. Our movement had changed the political con-
text in which agencies for women and children met. In hundreds of
communities, domestic violence services now sat at family violence
council meetings with local representatives from CPS. We had always
targeted CPS in our advocacy efforts, usually with little response. But
27. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 15, at 105-07.
28. Id. at 86.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2005).
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now we were in the limelight and they needed to catch up. So they in-
vited us to help train their workers, develop joint protocols, help explain
some of their more difficult cases and, yes, to join them in attempts to get
funds.
To understand the critical misstep that occurred next, put yourselves
in the shoes of these parties. Try to imagine what the battered women's
movement and CPS bring to the table or take away. The advocates came
armed with research showing the overlap-our clients are also yours,
they told CPS. From the advocacy standpoint, the more dramatic the
claims, the more useful. Since virtually all children in homes where their
mothers are being abused are likely to be "exposed" in some way, it did
not seem like too much of a stretch to generalize from the increased risk
for a number of problems associated with "witnessing" to the generic
risk faced by all children in homes where domestic violence occurred. It
is hard to fault the advocacy community for accepting on its face what
the research community presented, particularly since it confirmed what
we wanted to believe. So, we talked about harms and "witnessing" and
"exposure" and left the rest to the imagination of a CPS workforce sea-
soned on the worst sort of family dysfunctions.
What is the CPS caseworker or a supervisor hearing? She is statuto-
rily responsible for protecting children (not mothers). Now, she is told
that when she sees domestic violence, there is high probability a child
will suffer. Moreover, either for dramatic effect or because they don't
know any better, the advocates are emphasizing injurious violence, as if
this was the modal situation. This image rings true to CPS. Because
they rarely ask about domestic violence routinely, have no mandate to
protect women, lack the support needed to intervene appropriately and
are widely distrusted by the mothers in their caseload, CPS rarely see
cases until the violence becomes extreme, a situation that reinforces their
mistaken belief that any real case of battering constitutes an "emer-
gency." This is the woman with the blackened eye that caseworkers see
on Television and on the posters hung at Marshall's during Domestic
Violence Month.
The myth linking woman battering to physical injury was one of the
hardest to dispel during the Nicholson case. Again, my own research is
relevant here. In the Yale Trauma Studies, Dr. Flitctraft and I found that
battered women were at a much higher risk for injury than non-battered
women: if a woman presents with an injury to the hospital, it is more
likely to have been caused by a partner than by any other cause, includ-
ing auto accidents, widely believed to be the most common cause of in-
jury to women under sixty-five. 30 But even in the ER, only a tiny pro-
30. Shirley A. Wiegand, Deception and Artifice: Thelma, Louise, and the Legal Hermeneutic,
22 OKLA. CirY U. L. REv. 25, 43 (1997). On injury, homicide, suicidality and other health and
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portion of victims require hospitalization. In fact, depending on whether
we look at emergency medical data, police data, or general population
surveys, no significant injury occurs in an estimated 98% of all domestic
violence incidents.31
Enter Ms. Nicholson. In the target incident, the father of her daugh-
ter arrived at the apartment in a jealous rage, threw objects throughout
the house, then kicked and severely beat Sharwline, breaking 
her arm.32
Ms. Tillet, another plaintiff, was also badly beaten by her estranged hus-
band.33 Both women had separated from their abusive partners.
34 Ms.
Tillet had been assaulted before, but this was the first domestic violence
incident against Ms. Nicholson.35 None of their children witnessed the
abuse. 36 But this information made little difference to ACS largely be-
cause all the caseworkers saw was the "emergency" created by the vio-
lence and the mother's incapacity to take the steps needed to protect her-
self or her children. In many instances, the caseworkers were insensitive
as well as over-worked and underpaid; the lawyers involved were ill-
trained and often as dismissive of the caseworkers as of the mothers
whom they charged. Supervisors were often conspicuously negligent. In
this, the employees at ACS were no different than employees at any
comparable public agency or private service. To reiterate: to understand
ACS's response we need to know little more than how they understood
abuse and in what policy context this understanding took shape.
mental health problems, see EVAN STARK & ANNE FLITCRAFT, WOMEN AT RISK: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH 99-150 (1996).
31. For police data on injury, see 1999 CONN. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY ANN. REP. 7, showing that
adult victims require treatment in about 3% of the cases. Medical data is summarized in CLAIRE M.
RENZETTI ET AL., SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 345-71 (2000). For general
population data showing approximately 2% of domestic violence incidents cause injury, see Warren
H. Pearse et al., The Commonwealth Fund Survey of Women's Health, 10 WOMEN's HEALTH ISSUES
No.1, 35-38 (2000).
32. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 169. Ms. Nicolson first became a victim of domestic vio-
lence one winter afternoon while her infant daughter was asleep and her son was in school. Id.
Claude Bamett, the father of her daughter Destinee, arrived at her apartment in a jealous rage. Id.
While throwing objects throughout the house, he kicked, beat and severely assaulted Sharwline,
injuring her head with his gun and leaving her with a broken arm. Id Sharwline remained overnight
in the hospital while her cousin cared for the children. Id. Though separated from Claude, and never
before a victim of domestic violence, child welfare workers had police removed six-year-old Kendall
and baby Destinee from Sharwline's cousin. Id at 170. Sharwline was charged with neglect, even
though her children had not witnessed domestic violence prior to or during the incident. Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 180. Sharlene Tillet was not a first time victim of domestic violence. Id. While
pregnant with her second child, she separated from her baby's father and purchased a plane ticket to
relocate to California to protect herself from further abuse. Id. Before she left, however, he beat her
one night in her apartment. Id. After Sharlene gave birth to her son Uganda, a hospital social worker
routinely questioned her about any history of domestic violence. Id. Sharlene honestly responded,
the case was reported to ACS and the supervisor instructed the caseworker to remove the baby "if
the boyfriend is still in the picture." Id. at 180-81. When Ms. Tillet agreed to let the boyfriend drive
her home from the hospital, hoping not to make a scene, child welfare caseworkers and police offi-
cers removed her newborn from her custody. Id.
34. Trepiccione, supra note 3, at 1487.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1488.
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VII. WHY PUNISH MOTHERS?
If this framework explains why ACS defined the cases in Nicholson
as requiring an emergency response and why they felt it was not possible
to work with the battered mothers, we have yet to explain an important
aspect of the case, the decision to respond by charging the mothers with
neglect rather than, for instance, removing or charging the fathers, the
alternative we preferred.
A significant facet of the explanation for the punitive response by
ACS is the legendary gender bias that drives CPS. The role of bias will
become clearer momentarily, when we look at how the view of women
has changed over the last century in the child welfare system. Child wel-
fare services have the propensity to treat women almost exclusively
through their maternal role; to offer services which heavily emphasize
helping women to become better mothers rather than to find jobs or se-
cure housing; and the treatment of fathers or father-surrogates as if they
were invisible. For example, in New York, Connecticut and many other
states, child welfare cases are classified in the mother's name even if she
is dead. Moreover, even though men commit a higher proportion of seri-
ous and fatal child abuse than women, I am unaware of a single program
in the United States that specifically provides parenting skills for abusive
dads. Racial bias was another contributing factor. The proportion of
African-Americans in the CPS caseload is vastly disproportionate to their
proportion in the population as a whole.37 CPS workers routinely intrude
in the lives of poor and minority women, and then demand that they
jump through hoops to prove their worthiness as persons, in ways that
they, let alone their middle-class neighbors, would not tolerate for a mo-
ment. All of these factors played a role in Nicholson.
Given its historical tendency to define mothers as its clients, but not
fathers, once CPS determined to treat exposure to domestic violence as
an emergent situation requiring removal, the third background factor
followed-the application of the failure to protect and neglect doctrines
to non-offending parents. We are aware of how damaging these prac-
tices could be, in part, because your own Professor Miccio had fought so
hard to call our attention to them.
A personal note may be relevant here. My interest in the Nicholson
case was the direct outgrowth of the sense of disappointment and respon-
sibility I felt because the work we had done as researcher/advocates was
being used against the very people that we had hoped it would help. We
had naively assumed that once the information about domestic violence
and children was presented to the child welfare system, it would be
automatically translated into the sorts of practice we favored, enhanced
37. Ana M. Novoa, Count the Brown Faces: Where is the "Family" in the Family Law of
Child Protective Services, I SCHOLAR 5, 8-9 (1999).
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advocacy for battered mothers, accountability for abusive men and
greater safety and support for all victimized parties. That the opposite
occurred made us appreciate that any information we provided on the
misfortunes of women would be downsized and inverted to fit within a
very narrow purview of the child protection mission. One obvious con-
clusion from this realization is that the child protection mission must
change.
A final point before we move on is how deeply divided the advo-
cacy community remains about where the responsibility of the abusive
partner ends and the responsibility of the victimized mothers for harms
suffered by children begins. Since both Ms. Nicholson
38 and Ms. Tillet39
were taken by surprise, they can hardly be held accountable for the sup-
posed "exposure" of their children. In any case, their children did not
directly witness the violence and there was no evidence they were
harmed.4n
But what if Ms. Nicholson or Ms. Tillet had refused to separate
from their abusive partners or had returned to an abusive relationship as
Ms. Tillet was falsely suspected of doing? Should they then be held ac-
countable? Given its long-term commitment to the belief that domestic
violence automatically harms children, even when the facts of the
Nicholson case became clear, there were still some leading advocates
who hesitated to condemn ACS' behavior. In part this was because so
many leaders in the advocacy movement are deeply invested in the belief
that CPS can be turned around if only the proper training is provided or
the proper formula developed to mix domestic violence and child protec-
tion services. In part, a deep ambivalence remains about whether even
being physically abused-particularly if the injuries are not life-
threatening--can reduce the enormous responsibility we place on women
as default caretakers.
This was illustrated by the response among some feminists to the
tragic murder of Lisa Steinberg by Joel Steinberg. Despite the fact that
Mr. Steinberg had so brutalized his live-in partner, Hedda Nussbaum, she
had to literally crawl out of the apartment to get help with a ruptured
spleen, the ambivalence towards Hedda felt by many in the women's
movement was illustrated in Waverly Place, a semi-fictionalized account
of Lisa's murder by Susan Brownmiller, a feminist pioneer in the anti-
rape movement, that sharply condemned the character based on Ms.
Nussbaum.4' Whatever else may motivate such attitudes, they are rooted
to a large extent in a misconception of what actually goes on in abusive
38. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 168-73.
39. Id. at 180-81.
40. Trepiccione, supra note 13, at 1488.
41. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, WAVERLY PLACE (Grove Press I st ed. 1989).
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relationships. This is the issue to which I want to turn now in more de-
tail.
VIII. FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TO COERCIVE CONTROL
I have already suggested that the dominant paradigm provides an
inadequate frame for understanding the battered women experience and
provided some factual data to contradict the equation of abuse with inci-
dents of severe violence. To reiterate, the vast majority of abusive inci-
dents involve pushes, shoves, slaps, hair-pulling and numerous other acts
that are unlikely to cause injury and are relatively trivial from a medical
or criminal justice standpoint. Some critics of the battered women's
movement, and most notably NYU Law and Social Work Professor
Linda Mills, take evidence that most domestic violence is minor to mean
we have exaggerated the seriousness of the problem and that it should be
decriminalized.42 This is not my position. What I am suggesting is that
our understanding of why domestic violence is serious is flawed. While
violent incidents can create a life-threatening emergency, the greatest
danger to all involved is a function of the frequency of abusive episodes
and their cumulative effect on women's safety and decision-making.
About 40% of all battering cases involve "serial" abuse, for instance,
where violence occurs several times a week and it is by no means un-
usual in my caseload for women to report hundreds, even thousands of
assaultive incidents over many years.43
One implication of this is that if we wait for an injury before we ask
about or identify domestic violence, we will miss more than ninety per-
cent of all incidents and probably enter a case when a victim's options
are already severely constrained. Another implication of taking the his-
tory of abusive violence seriously is that the fear or psychological prob-
lems we see are the cumulative outcome of multiple episodes, not of the
immediate effect of a particular incident. This is important because it is
easy to think that a victim is exaggerating the danger she is in or the de-
gree of oppression she faces when we measure her reaction by the level
of harm caused by a particular incident. Conversely, if there is no previ-
ous history of abuse and there is no other reason to believe the assailant
continues to pose a danger, there may be no emergency risk to the
woman, let alone to her child, even if the presenting incident is severe.
44This was the situation with Ms. Nicholson. Without an historical un-
derstanding and belief violence itself constitutes the emergency, CPS
both underestimates what is needed in cases where violence is ongoing
but not currently severe and exaggerates the risk posed to Ms. Nichol-
42. See generally Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Ahuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REv. 550, 551-613 (1999).
43. 1984 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. REP. 1.
44. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
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son, where the serious assault is not part of a pattern.45 At present, agen-
cies like ACS take the worst possible approach to these cases, failing to
identify the first as requiring supportive services and considering the
latter an "emergency" in which there is insufficient time to conduct a
careful assessment of needs, partner with victims to devise a safety-plan
or to provide enhanced advocacy with the criminal justice system.
There is another unfortunate consequence of the violence-based, in-
cident-specific definition of abuse that bears mentioning now, because it
profoundly affects the calculations women make about how to protect
themselves. Like CPS, the criminal law views domestic violence as in-
cident specific. So do the courts. In most jurisdictions today, domestic
violence incidents are treated alongside traffic offenses, most cases are
dismissed or nollied-80% or more in my own state of Connecticut, for
instance and almost no one goes to jail for any significant length of
time.4 6 I estimate that, even with mandatory and pro-arrest policies in
place nationwide, the chance that a man will go to jail for any given do-
mestic violence incident is about four in ten thousand or just a little bet-
ter than the chance of winning the lottery. Again, this has less to do with
police or court bias than with the law's failure to grasp the cumulative
significance of what is typically an ongoing course of assaultive conduct,
much like harassment or stalking.
So consider what it means when the same court system that threat-
ens to remove a woman's children because she has exposed them to an
abusive partner also tells her, if only by example, that they will not pun-
ish a man who has assaulted her dozens, perhaps hundreds of times. This
discrepancy between what batterers do and what the CPS, justice and
court system define as the domestic violence crime explains the tortured
machinations though which battered women strive to end or minimize or
manage the abuse. When Ms. Tillet bought a plane ticket to California to
protect herself from further abuse or agreed to let her boyfriend drive her
home from the hospital rather than make a scene, she was selecting ways
to minimize future abuse that were likely to be more effective than any
other option currently available to her.47 In several cases that came be-
fore the NRC, ACS charged mothers with neglect for not getting or not
personally serving protection orders. The expectation that women will
follow certain steps--even if there is no evidence these steps are likely to
be more effective than other steps-is a common foundation for punitive
responses to battered mothers.
45. See id. at 169.
46. 1991 CONN. ST. POLICE ANN. REP. 4.
47. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81.
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IX. A TYPOLOGY OF ABUSE
A second piece of "new" knowledge is that not all battering is the
same.
For many years, domestic violence researchers puzzled over the fact
that the portrait of domestic violence that emerged from population sur-
veys differed markedly from the portrait we got from crime surveys or
from the points-of-service where women sought help. For example,
more than 100 population-based studies now show women and men are
equally prone to use force to settle their differences in relationships and
that the use of force is "mutual" in almost half of these situations. 4 By
contrast, both crime surveys and research conducted in hospitals, court
settings or shelters show that battering is overwhelmingly a male crime
committed against female partners.49 One explanation was that men and
women were equally violent, but that the greater severity of male vio-
lence explained why women (but not men) showed up in the ER, called
police and considered their partner's use of force a "crime." This ac-
count was not satisfying, however, since, as I've indicated, the vast ma-
jority of incidents reported to helping services do not involve injury.
Another response was for the researchers on different sides of this debate
to attack one another as biased or to fault the methods used in various
studies. The discrepancies in the data were serious because, among other
things, they made it impossible to agree on incidence or prevalence fig-
ures and so made it impossible to determine the need for services or
whether interventions were working.
A sociologist, Michael Johnson, helped resolve the dispute by mak-
ing a point that should have been obvious-that the surveys were picking
up a very different population than the battered women who came for
help. 50 What is increasingly clear is that force is used in at least three
distinctive ways by partners, in "fights," in "assaults" and as part of a
pattern that includes tactics to intimidate, isolate and control a partner,
the pattern I term "coercive control." Each of these situations poses dif-
ferent types and levels of risk to children and a nuanced assessment that
hopes to provide appropriate interventions should take this into account.
X. COMMON COUPLE VIOLENCE
The most common use of force in couples is what Johnson terms
"common couple violence."51 In these situations, which are basically
48. An overview of this work is provided by Murray Sraus, Physical Assault by Women: A
Major Social Problem, (1997), at http://pubpages.unh.edu/-mas2/VB33.pdf.
49. This work is summarized in DEMI Kuaz, Physical Assault by Husbands: A Major Social
Problem, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 88-103 (Richard Gelles & Donileen
Loescke eds., 199 1).
50. M. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Vio-
lence Against Women, J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 57, 290 (1995).
51. Id.
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akin to what most people would call "fights," one or both partners use
force to address a situational issue or difference of opinion or to express
feelings of frustration or anger. Women appear as likely to use force in
this context as men. But typically, neither party considers the use of
force illegitimate, injury is rare and outside help is rarely called for or
required. Interestingly, unlike the classic domestic violence situation, the
use of force appears to decline in these relationships over time and some
studies even suggest that couples that engage in this sort of fighting may
be more stable and more "satisfied" with their relationship than couples
where force is not used.
Of course, wherever children are present when force is used, they
can be harmed. Whatever our moral views about the use of violence,
however, it is important to understand that in inner-city communities
where there may be fewer resources than elsewhere that allow people to
settle their differences without violence, the use of force is commonly
understood as a conflict resolution strategy, i.e., a way to reduce serious
violence. In my son's high school, if you didn't fight when you were
called out, whether you were a boy or a girl, you ate your lunch in the
bathroom. And if you did fight, even if you were beaten up, there was
far less chance that you would be picked on afterwards than if you did
not. Many of the women I see take this attitude into their relationships
and believe, rightly or wrongly, that fighting for what they want is the
only way to get even a semblance of equality. Children also learn this
value on the street and in school as well as in their homes. But there is
no evidence whatsoever that these situations threaten children to any
substantial degree. I am not defending this particular use of force among
partners. But I hope that even those of you who believe that any expo-
sure of children to fighting can harm them will recognize that institu-
tional intervention to "protect" children in these circumstances is intru-
sive to the extreme, not to say an unconstitutional violation of privacy
rights.
XI. DOMESTIC ASSAULT
The second context in which force is used by partners involves
"domestic violence." This situation involves the unilateral use of force
to hurt a partner or their children, often in response to jealousy, in the
context of drug or alcohol use, and/or as part of a broad pattern of crimi-
nal activity. Domestic assault may extend to child abuse, inadvertently
hurt children, or be psychologically traumatic. Since this form of domes-
tic violence is rarely accompanied by strategies designed to subordinate
the partner, however, victims who are assaulted in this context typically
retain their psychological integrity, primarily require criminal justice
intervention, and are ready allies in safety planning for children. Women
frequently commit domestic assaults as well as men and with much the
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same motive, though they are significantly more likely to be injured than
male partners.
52
Unlike fights, these assaults rarely grow out of conflicts or dis-
agreements and are often designed to suppress conflict rather than to
resolve it. Moreover, these assaults appear to increase in frequency and
severity over time and victims are far more likely to define them as ille-
gitimate or as crimes and to seek outside assistance. Domestic assaults
where violence is the sole or principal element of abuse probably consti-
tute somewhere around 50-60% of the cases in which women primarily
(but not exclusively) seek help. 53 Emotional abuse is a common element
in these cases, but rarely are victims kept from key activities in their
lives, such as working, caring for their children, going to school or so-
cializing with friends or family. Although we may not fully empathize
with women who do so, some women in my practice "accept" assault in
their relationships, usually because they believe that the alternative, leav-
ing the partner permanently or making the violence the focus of their
lives, will do more to disrupt their life-plans or their parenting, than sim-
ply trying to minimize the harms caused. Such women should be fully
apprised of the risks their decisions pose to children.
Applying a calculus of harms to the means and consequences of
domestic assault is a good way to judge its severity and its potential to
harm children. Rarely do these situations present an emergency requir-
ing removal, let alone removal without a court order. At the same time,
if violence is severe, as it was against Ms. Nicholson, children can be
deprived of significant caretaking by their mother for varying lengths of
time and so require alternative care-taking arrangements (as Ms. Nichol-
son recognized) and, in extreme cases where alternatives within the fam-
ily or kin network are unavailable, even temporary placement outside
this network. Because the psychological and physical risks to children in
placement can be as great, or greater, than allowing them to remain in
situations where protections are unsure, the balance of harms is a critical
piece to be worked out jointly with the non-offending parent.
The appropriate steps in such cases are to have the father or father
surrogate removed from the home if the victim so desires, provide the
enhanced advocacy with criminal justice needed to protect the family and
offer the family appropriate resources (such as shelter or alternative
housing if needed) to support them. Because the autonomy and parent-
ing capacities of primary caretakers is unlikely to be seriously compro-
mised by domestic assault, CPS is obligated to develop safety or other
52. See Kurtz, supra note 49, at 88-103.
53. Among men arrested for domestic violence crimes in Quincy, Mass., 38. 1% admitted they
had prevented their partners from freely coming and going in their daily routine, 58.5% said they
denied their partners access to money and other resources and almost half reported restricting their
partners in three or more additional ways. E_ Buzawa et al., Response to Domestic Violence in a Pro-
Active Court Setting: Final Report, (1999), at http://www.ncjrs.orglpdffiles1/nij/grants/1 81428.pdf.
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plans for the children in these situations with the full partnership of the
non-offending parcnt. This strategy differs markedly from the approach
we saw so often in Nicholson and which is commonplace in the rest of
the country, namely where mothers are mandated into services, charged
with "neglect" if they refuse a service option (such as going to a shelter
or securing a protection order) provided by the caseworker or a pressured
into "voluntary" placement agreements by the threat of removal. Impor-
tantly, women may also be pressured in these ways by battered women's
shelters. Partnering is particularly important in the present context,
where there is only a small likelihood that protection orders or even
criminal charges on their own will result in more than a temporary cessa-
tion of abuse.
XII. CAN CASE WORKERS PARTNER WITH ABUSED WOMEN?
Before turning to the third context in which force is used, I would
like to briefly address another misconception widely made about battered
women in the CPS caseload, that even if they are not disabled by the
violence, their parenting capacities are nonetheless compromised by the
secondary or indirect affects of abuse on their psychological functioning.
As we've seen, this too is a basic tenet of the paradigm.
In Nicholson, we assessed this issue from two vantage points. First,
we asked whether violence impaired women's parenting capacity as
such. Second, we compared rates of problems often linked to impair-
ment among battered and non-battered mothers within the CPS caseload.
Despite evidence that some proportion of battered women experience
moderate to severe symptoms of depression, post-traumatic stress disor-
ders or other mental health or behavioral problems, there is no evidence
that their capacity to parent is compromised as a result. To the contrary,
even among the most severely abused, only a small minority of abused
women require shelter, and the vast majority exhibit unimpaired capaci-
ties to parent. Evidence of this comes from a recent study, authored by
Chris Sullivan, of battered women in shelters.
5 4
Utilizing multi-variant techniques, Sullivan and her colleagues con-
cluded "a mother's experience of physical and emotional abuse had no
direct impact on their level of parenting stress or use of discipline with
their children., 55 Both by their own and their children's reports, the vast
majority of mothers in this study were emotionally available to their
children (ninety-eight percent), continued to value parenting (ninety-one
percent), and provided appropriate supervision and discipline (ninety-one
percent), typically using timeouts, grounding and taking away privi-
54. Chris M. Sullivan et al., Beyond Searching for Deficits: Evidence that Physically and
Emotionally Abused Women are Nurturing Parents, 2 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE, 61-62 (2000).
55. Id.
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leges.5 6 Seventy-three percent of the battered mothers reported spanking
or slapping their children, though only fifty-eight percent of the children
reported ever being spanked or slapped.57 Whatever one may think about
the proportion of battered mothers who employ corporal punishment,
however, it is actually smaller than the comparable proportion among
American parents generally. 58 Perhaps the most telling findings are that
children of battered mothers in battered women shelters reported rela-
tively high and stable scores on their self-concept across time, and exhib-
ited overall adjustment that fell within the range of what is considered
normal.5 9
Even if Sullivan and her colleagues are correct in concluding that
battered women retain their capacity to parent, a more critical problem is
whether they are hindered-and their children put at risk-because they
develop a range of problems commonly associated with neglect in the
CPS population such as substance abuse or mental illness. In the Yale
Trauma Studies, for instance, Dr. Flitcraft and I found that battered
women in the hospital population had significantly higher rates of a
range of behavioral and mental health problems than non-battered
women. 60 Indeed, they were nine times more likely to abuse drugs, fif-
teen times more likely to abuse alcohol and far more likely to have a
"psychotic break," report depression, and to have attempted suicide.
61
Since these problems only became disproportionate after the onset of
abuse, they had clearly developed in the context and as a response to
battering and could not be its cause.
Even in the trauma sample, battered women were statistically much
more likely to present these problems than non-battered women, how-
ever, the vast majority of battered women did not, in fact, develop these
problems.62 Still, we expected that the multi-problem profile we found
among battered women in the emergency room would be replicated
among the battered mothers we identified in the study of children
"darted" for abuse. To our surprise, however, we found that the battered
mothers of abused or neglected children were much less likely than non-
victimized mothers to have histories that included disproportionate rates
of alcohol or drug abuse, mental illness, sexual abuse or violence in
childhood.63 In fact, we found that the population of "darted" children
could be basically divided into two subgroups, "neglected" children with
56. Id. at 65-66.
57 Id.
58. Over 90% of American parents report spanking their children, and the overwhelming
majority support the practice. M.A. Straus, Discipline and Deviance: Physical Punishment of Chil-
dren and Violence and Other Crime in Adulthood, 38 SOC. PROBS. 133, 136 (1991).
59. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 51-71.
60. Id.
61. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 30, at 12.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 30.
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multi-problem mothers (there was little data on fathers) who often came
from multi-problem families-of-origin and children who were being
"abused," usually by the same man who was assaulting their mothers.64
The results of our work at Yale were supported by the AFSA study of
CPS cases in New York City cited earlier. This study found that caretak-
ers who were not victims of domestic violence were almost one hundred
percent more likely to be identified with abusing drugs (19.4% - 11.3%)
or both alcohol and drugs (2.0% vs. 1.4%).65 By contrast, fully eighty-
four and one half percent of the domestic violence victims had no mental
health problems.
66
How should we explain these seemingly contradictory findings, that
battering causes a range of problems among victims and yet, within the
CPS population, these victims look considerably better from a psycho-
logical or behavioral standpoint than other clients? The explanation is
that battered mothers comprise a distinct population within the CPS
caseload because they enter the caseload almost exclusively because of
what their partner has done to them, not because of psychological or
behavioral problems that place their children at risk. Within the multi-
problem CPS caseload, they typically present as high functioning and
capable parents who are relatively problem free.
This information is particularly important in understanding the
wrongs committed by ACS in Nicholson. ACS charged the Nicholson
mothers with "neglect" despite the fact that there was no evidence of
"neglect" in the classic sense and this was a population that did not re-
semble the typical population of neglectful mothers in any sense.67 The
battered mothers in Nicholson present a need for help in the CPS popula-
tion that flows directly from their victimization and from no other
source. Though emergent psychiatric care or mental health counseling
for symptoms related to trauma may be occasionally required by these
women, typical needs include economic resources, shelter and other
housing options, as well as enhanced advocacy-particularly with the
criminal justice and court systems. As importantly, given the evidence
that their parenting skills are typically unimpaired by battering, parenting
classes are rarely required or appropriate and may send the unintended
message that the woman, not her abuser, is responsible for her victimiza-
tion. Yet these are precisely the "services" to which battered mothers
were referred or mandated. Finally, the fact that the vast majority of the
battered mothers in the CPS caseload are psychologically and behavior-
ally "normal," at least in a statistical sense, eliminates the usual rationale
given by CPS for not treating clients as equals and making them full
64. Stark & Flitcrafl, supra note 15, at 105.
65. See Mitchell-Herzfeld, supra note 20.
66, See id
67. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
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partners in service planning. Clearly too, based on this data, there is no
rationale whatsoever for considering placement as a first-line option.
XIII. COERCIVE CONTROL
The third context in which force is used by partners involves coer-
cive control, where physical assault is complemented by a pattern of in-
timidation, isolation and control.
When we opened the first shelters in the 1970's, women told us re-
peatedly "the violence isn't the worst part." Because we had learned in
working with rape victims that violence is hard to talk about, we redi-
rected those who said this to "talk about the violence." Now, almost
thirty years later, we have come to realize that the most devastating con-
text for battering is when minor physical abuse is embedded in a pattern
that deprives women of basic rights and resources, exploits them sexu-
ally and often monetarily, isolates them from friends, family, profession-
als and other potential sources of support, and implements a regime of
regulation over everyday affairs. In study after study, we are now find-
ing-because we are asking for the first time-that varying majorities of
abusers are taking their partners money, denying them food, monitoring
their going and coming, prohibiting their use of the phone, forcing them
to check in or out, limiting their access to work, school or church, moni-
toring their time and relationships and so forth. I don't have time to
document these findings here but only to introduce you to the phenome-
non.
To some extent, this regime of control resembles the situation of
hostages, victims of kidnapping or indentured servants. But there are
three critical differences that define what legal scholar Elizabeth Schnei-
der calls the "particularity" of abuse. 68 First, because of the presumption
of intimacy, the abusive partner has access not only to the victim, but to
knowledge about her personal life and her children's lives that allows
him to manipulate her in ways that are particularly threatening to her. He
knows her illegal activity, whether she uses illicit drugs or is stealing
from work or is occasionally leaving her nine year old home alone with a
twelve year old. He knows that she was sexually abused by an uncle
who hid from her in a family closet. So he plays this game when he
wants to teach her a lesson. This combination of intimate knowledge and
continued access is the most serious facet of battering in terms of
women's decision-making.
Secondly, these forms of control operate across social space. I
mean this literally. A common element in coercive control is the use of
means to track and regulate victim behavior when the couple is sepa-
68. Elizabeth M. Schnieder, Particularity and Generality: Challenges Of Feminist Theory
And Practice In Work On Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527-28 (1992).
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rated, through beepers, tracking devices or other forms of surveillance
for instance, when she is at work or shopping or in the car. This aspect
of coercive control makes separation largely ineffective as a means of
freeing herself from abuse.
The third particular element of coercive control is the extent to
which regulatory tactics target women's everyday behavior and particu-
larly those behaviors associated with stereotypic gender roles. We are
talking here about how they dress, clean, cook, drive, care for the chil-
dren and so forth. Nor is coercive control only a problem in the most
extreme cases of abuse. Instead, there is growing evidence that at least
some of these restrictions are present in a majority of the instances where
women seek help with abuse. Coercive control currently has no legal
standing.
We are only beginning to get a handle on coercive control and what
its presence implies for children's welfare or CPS practice. The major
risks to children involve attempts to deprive the primary caretaker of
support and resources needed for basic survival, including food, money
or access to transportation. It is already apparent that coercive control
has several important implications for how we intervene in battering.
First, the presence of coercive control shifts the focus of under-
standing from the psychological effects of abuse to the objective parame-
ters of exploitation and deprivation. While mothers subjected to coercive
control may experience a range of medical, behavioral or psychological
problems, the risk of neglect in these cases is typically a direct result of
the constraints under which she is living, not an incapacity or inability to
provide or protect. In the presence of coercive control, there is no need
to posit a psychological dependence or even an investment in maintain-
ing the relationship to understand why it is so difficult for victims to af-
fect a permanent separation. This also shifts attention from "why women
stay?" to how to effectively limit the access of a controlling partner to his
partner and her children. Conversely, the range of interventions that
focus on self-esteem or parenting issues would seem to be largely irrele-
vant if the major problem in the household is that the woman's decision-
making has been usurped by being denied money and regulated in her
everyday behaviors. Until the law clearly recognizes coercive control as
a course of conduct and liberty crime, however, it is not clear how inter-
vention should proceed.
At the same time, secondly, coercive control is often hard to see,
largely because it builds so heavily on the constraints on women's be-
havior they inherit with their role as default homemakers, caretakers and
sex objects. For example, if women are expected to clean and cook, it is
hard to discern what difference it makes that there are "rules" in the
household for how high the bedspread must be above the rug or how and
when dinner is to be served. We assume that "men" make the major
financial decisions in a household. So the fact that a man takes the
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woman's paycheck, freely uses her money card or goes through her
pocket for spare change to support his gambling or drug habit may not
seem like anything more than a "bad" luck extension of business as
usual, not behavior we would encourage certainly, but also not behavior
we would automatically link to abuse. Victims too are often confused
about what label to place on coercive control. Subtle steps often link
what feel like expressions of "love" such as being told he likes her hair a
certain way or that she shouldn't go to a certain club or to hang out with
certain friends to buying her clothes, not letting her shop by herself, or
drive, or talk on the phone, or see these friends. Although these prohibi-
tions are almost always backed up by the implication "or else...." vio-
lence may be minimal in these relationships or may become so routine it
appears, or even feels normal. The fact that coercive control relies so
heavily on enforcing traditional gender roles-what I term "sexism with
a vengeance"--contributes to its invisibility. So does the fact that coer-
cive control is so alien to the experience of the vast majority of men.
In addition to the direct risks children face in cases involving simple
domestic violence or coercive control, they are also endangered by two
common patterns, "the battered mother's dilemma" and when child abuse
occurs as "tangential spouse abuse."
XIV. THE BATTERED MOTHER'S DILEMMA
The battered mother's dilemma refers to the choices the offender
forces the victim to make between their own safety and the safety of their
children. A particular incident may bring this dilemma into sharp focus,
as when a woman realizes that she may be hurt or killed if she attempts
to protect her child from an offender's abuse. In a case in which I testi-
fied, for example, a woman whose life had been threatened returned to
her house and was killed when her husband took their eighteen month
old child "hostage. 69
Typically, however, the battered mother's dilemma describes an
ongoing facet of abusive relationships where the offending partner re-
peatedly forces a victimized caretaker to choose between taking some
action she believes is wrong (such as physically disciplining her child),
being hurt herself, or standing by while he hurts the child. Threatening
to hurt the primary caretaker if she reports domestic violence or child
abuse is a classic instance of the battered mother's dilemma. Confronted
with these dilemmas, victims attempt to preserve their rationality and
humanity by selecting the least dangerous option, a decision-making
process I term "control in the context of no control." It is the responsi-
bility of CPS or the police to redress the imbalance in power from which
this dilemma arises, thereby increasing the choices available to the vic-
tim. Ignorance of the external constraints to which a caretaker is re-
69. State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45, 47 (Conn. 1992).
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sponding, however, often leads agencies to mistakenly hold her culpable
and respond punitively, thereby aggravating rather than rclieving the
dilemma.
XV. CHILD ABUSE AS TANGENTIAL SPOUSE ABUSE
A related but separate dynamic occurs when child abuse appears as
"tangential spouse abuse." Here, the offender treats the child as an ex-
tension of the mother, and threatens or harms the child to increase the
mother's dependence, compliance and/or fear. Child abuse as tangential
spouse abuse is particularly common during separation and divorce,
when the offender's access to his partner, but not to the children, may be
limited. The frequency of this dynamic is an important reason why a
mother's hesitation to separate, or seek a protection order should be
taken seriously during safety planning. Examples of this dynamic in
intact couples include threats to report the mother to CPS, using children
to spy on their mother, punishing a mother by denying her access to the
children, hurting the children whenever the mother does something that
makes him jealous, or being passive-aggressive by consenting to care for
the children so the mother can work and then neglecting them. Mothers
caught in this dynamic are particularly susceptible to guilt, whether in-
duced by the offender's accusations or by institutional victim blaming.
The child's risk in these scenarios is a function of the type of abuse
employed (common couple violence, domestic assault or coercive con-
trol) and the extent to which children are implicated in the pattern (e.g.
by "tangential spouse abuse"). In all of these cases, the abusive partner
is the immediate source of threat to the child and therefore the only ap-
propriate target for removal or punitive intervention. At the same time,
the child's vulnerability may condition the mothers, as when the mother
is held hostage by her partner's threats to the children (child abuse as
tangential spouse abuse). The reverse may also be true, namely that the
child may be vulnerable because the offending partner has effectively
disabled the mother's capacity to protect (e.g. by denying her money or
refusing to let her leave the house for food). In these instances, the
safety of either requires a global assessment of the overall levels of vio-
lence and entrapment in the relationship regardless of whether actual
child abuse or neglect has occurred. Child maltreatment in these situa-
tions can be prevented only when it is addressed in tandem with interven-
tions that remove the offending partner and protect and empower the
victimized caretaker. To devise such interventions requires frank sharing
of information, a realistic picture of the constraints on the victim's
choices, mutual and independent planning for safety of mother and child
based on the child's developmental age and the victim's experience with
the offender, and a reliance on the victim to make protective decisions if
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given the resources and opportunity to do so safely. 70 The data on bat-
tered mothers in the CPS caseload suggest that such a response is not
only required, but that it is also feasible given the relative strengths of
this population and the resiliency typically demonstrated by the children
involved.
Current policies and practices by CPS agencies like ACS aggravate
"the battered mother's dilemma" and the probability that child abuse, as
tangential spouse abuse, will occur. While the offending partner is the
principal source of the mother's dilemmas, these are often exacerbated
by the agencies to which the victim turns for help, particularly those
agencies responsible for child protection, CPS and the courts. In the
Yale Trauma Studies, for example, we found that children darted for
child abuse or neglect were more likely to be placed if their mother was
battered than if she was not, even when we controlled for the level of
injury alleged to the child, a frankly punitive response.7 1 Current CPS
policy and practice aggravate the battered mother's dilemma in a number
of ways. For instance, the increasing propensity for CPS agencies and
courts to equate domestic violence with abuse or neglect means that if a
mother reports domestic violence to ACS she risks losing her child, an
example of the battered mother's dilemma. If she does not report, how-
ever, she risks further harm to herself or her child. Moreover, because
the mother cannot talk forthrightly with the case-worker, given the policy
implications, she may misrepresent her situation, further increasing her
vulnerability to punitive interventions (because she is perceived as un-
trustworthy and reinforcing the mistaken perception that she is ambiva-
lent about the violent partner or resisting services).
The ACS practices documented in Nicholson also lend credibility to
the batterer's threat that if the victim disobeys him, she will lose her
children-another example of child abuse as tangential spouse abuse.72
Through the review process, the NRC found that caseworkers routinely
delivered so-called "safety" plans (e.g. going to a shelter, leaving the
abuser, or moving) as what, given the punitive consequences of noncom-
pliance, amounted to a mandated service, and without consultation with
the client or domestic violence expertise. In one case brought to the
NRC by plaintiff attorneys, for instance, the victimized caretaker was
cited for neglect because she had failed to personally serve her abusive
partner with a protection order. The devil's choice in this instance is
either to put herself and the child at further risk or lose the child.
70. Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call
for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, at
http://www.mincava umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html-
71. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 15, at 103-05.
72. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 167.
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Mothers frequently were placed in similar dilemmas involving los-
ing their children of losing their low-rent housing, employment or sup-
port network (by entering a shelter, for instance). ACS training materials
emphasized that battered mothers might be "ambivalent" about separat-
ing from offending partners because of their psychological investment in
the relationship, not because of the risks involved. This emphasis rein-
forced the view that non-offending mothers had to be pressured or
threatened into doing the right thing for their children, an approach
which almost always backfired. Again, the CPS response is self-
fulfilling: against the intimidating context within which safety concerns
are addressed, women are reluctant to report domestic violence until it
escalates to a point where children face imminent danger. In sum, in
addition to being insensitive to victim needs and leaving them at even
greater risk, typical CPS policies and practices also aggravate the possi-
bility that children will be harmed in families where domestic violence
occurs. During the review process, ACS introduced multidisciplinary
teams that included domestic violence expertise. Although caseworkers
were encouraged to utilize such expertise, there were no consequences
when they did not and they sometimes proceeded with victim-blaming
and punitive interventions despite the contrary advice of the domestic
violence expertise at their disposal.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
The Nicholson decision with the Nicholson Review Committee
(NRC) as the monitor of compliance aimed at stopping the ACS practice
of removing children from mothers and charging the mothers with ne-
glect solely because they were victims of domestic violence or because
they had refused services mandated because of domestic violence. In
response to the injunction ACS sharply curtailed its removal of children
solely because their mother is abused; dramatically reduced the number of
mothers cited for neglect because of domestic violence; informed staff and
clients about the requirements of Nicholson; revised its domestic violence
curriculum to reflect Nicholson; made domestic violence expertise available
to frontline staff through Consultation Teams; developed a training program
for staff on emergency removal that is consistent with Nicholson; devised a
system to monitor cases involving domestic violence and to selectively
review practice in these cases; and implemented a process to ensure that
attorneys draft petitions that are consistent with the principles enunciated in
Nicholson.
Only time will tell whether the practices found unconstitutional will
be resumed without the temporary injunction in place and without the
surveillance of the NRC. The decision by the New York Court of Ap-
peals upholding the principles enunciated in Nicholson make it possible
for plaintiffs to go to state courts if the behaviors found unconstitutional
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in Nicholson are continued. 73 By the time the NRC disbanded, the only
petitions primarily concerning domestic violence were filed against the
offending father. There were still petitions being filed against women
who had been abused, but the primary allegation in these cases usually
involved another issue, like substance abuse or leaving a child on their
own. The NRC was concerned that pre-textual allegations are being used
to conceal the prosecution or indication of mothers primarily due to domes-
tic violence. In one case we reviewed, for instance, the allegation that the
battered mother had left her children alone was based solely on the report
of a neighbor that was never verified and the pertinent issue for ACS
seemed to be that she had failed to personally serve her partner with the
court order she had secured. Caseworkers could consult domestic vio-
lence experts on newly installed Consultation Teams. But they were
under no obligation to follow their recommendations. So, the case-
worker in the example above continued to pressure the mother to enforce
the court order, although the domestic violence expert from the ACS
multidisciplinary team she had consulted strongly advised against this
approach.
Apart from reviewing departmental statistics on removals and re-
viewing the petitions to assess the basis for going to court, the NRC had
no way to tell whether frontline practices with respect to battered moth-
ers and their children have changed. To get at case practice, we pro-
posed to conduct a "quality service review" of several cases involving
domestic violence. These reviews look at every aspect of the agency-
family interaction, relying on direct interviews with family members,
caseworkers, supervisors and any other professional or related persons
involved in the case. This initiative was frustrated by ACS, although
they were to select the target families. Several issues were also not ad-
dressed by ACS. There was no more evidence that frontline staff were
being held accountable to the agency's domestic violence policies after
the two year review process than before, for example, let alone to the
recommendations of the multidisciplinary teams. Nor was there any
substantial shift in the resources allocated to domestic violence within
the agency. Although anywhere between twenty and fifty percent of the
CPS caseload involves domestic violence, only a tiny proportion of the
agency's funds were being devoted to this problem. An outstanding is-
sue was the ease with which "indicated" parties are placed on New York
State's "black list" (and so cannot get positions in child care) and the
difficulty of getting off the list, even after a case is withdrawn.
In its concluding report, the NRC articulated its assessment of what
had been accomplished. We wrote:
73. Id. at 260.
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Nicholson not only enunciated the law. As is now widely acknowl-
edged throughout the country, Nicholson also identified grievous
harms to battered women and their children and outlined a set of
principles to redress this harm. Even after months of testimony by
plaintiff mothers, significant findings of constitutional violations by a
federal court and two years of operating under a temporary injunction
enforced by the NRC, ACS remains equivocal in its acceptance of re-
sponsibility for these harms7 4
Operating under the terms of the temporary injunction, the nation's
largest child welfare agency has come to the brink of implementing a
model of what it means to protect children exposed to domestic violence
and preserve their families in ways that are supportive, just and respect-
ful. 75 It would indeed be tragic if, out of the public limelight afforded by
Nicholson and without the scrutiny provided by the NRC, ACS reverted
to the punitive, unfair and unconstitutional practices it has done so much
to undo. Our hope that this will not be the case is based on the compe-
tence, commitment and judgment of the ACS leadership.
76
I do not share even the limited optimism expressed by this assess-
ment. Far from being the actions of a an agency that is out of the main-
stream, I believe that the responses of ACS to battered mothers are the
culmination of two processes, the constraints on effective intervention in
family problems imposed by the narrow mission of child saving and the
long history of child welfare in this country. Both reflect a core dilemma
in child services, how to protect children without confronting the envi-
ronmental and political contexts from which harms to children arise.
These contexts are reflected in woman battering, where individual men
exploit persistent sexual inequalities to coerce and control individual
women who, in many cases, are also mothers. By all accounts, woman
battering is the single most important context from which children enter
the child protection system, whether rightly or wrongly. The idea that
we discharge our responsibility to the victims in these situations by re-
moving the children from possible threats is wrong in both its sub-
stance-because the risks to children almost certainly increase with
placement in foster care-and in form, because, as Judge Weinstein put
so clearly, it is so patently unjust to punish those who are already being
victimized.77
In its construction, the NRC reflected the lawsuit itself. Each mem-
ber, with the marked exception of our Chair, retired North Carolina fam-
ily court Judge William Jones, was appointed to represent a different
party in the dispute. With very few and very limited exceptions, we were
74. Nicholson Review Committee Report, to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, United States District
Judge, Eastern District of New York, 10 (Dec. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
75. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
76. Supra note 74.
77. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
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able to do what the parties could not: we reached consensus on every
complaint that we heard. Although some of us thought there were other
ways to approach our charge, we agreed to operate as a complaint-driven
process, pursuing the complaints as a window to understand how the
agency was complying with the injunction and what remedies were nec-
essary. The sense that changed policy might not be reflected in reformed
treatment of battered women and their children was also shared. It may
be going too far to say that we also agreed that the capacity for CPS to
treat battered mothers as women with needs in their own right was un-
dermined by a mission-driven accountability structure that directs inter-
vention away from appropriate practice and towards victim-blaming
strategies, including placement. Even within that context, however, we
shared a faith that caseworkers might better learn how to "walk in the
shoes" of their abused clients, to recognize their commitment to what
was best for their children and, from this vantage, to reframe their
choices in ways that afforded women the autonomy they needed to es-
cape the dilemmas in which they had been put by their abusive partner.
In Ms. Nicholson's case, this would have meant trusting her confidence
that her husband was no longer a threat. In Ms. Tillet's, it would have
meant asking "what is the context?" before assuming that letting her abu-
sive partner drive her home meant she was "ambivalent" about protecting
herself or her child from violence. Partner, don't patronize, became one
of our watchwords.
Everyone involved on the NRC concurred that ACS's practices with
respect to battered women were unconstitutional and needed to stop. But
throughout our preparation for Nicholson and the review process, we
continued to debate what we saw as the ultimate solution. Should ACS
identify battered women and immediately refer them to the advocacy
system for assessment and support? Could we reform ACS from within,
by bringing domestic violence expertise on board for instance, the way
they've done in Massachusetts? Should we work to expand the respon-
sibility of CPS to include the safety of all family members? Or, should
we return the detection and response of child abuse to the police, disman-
tle the current CPS system and find a more effective way to help families
brought low by the range of problems currently identified with "ne-
glect?" Obviously, resolving this debate goes far beyond the scope of
our discussion today.

ROPER V. SIMMONS: INSIGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S FORMER LAW CLERK
EDWARD LAZARUSt
Editor's Note: The following is a transcript of Mr. Lazarus's pres-
entation at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law on March 4,
2005.
Good morning, and thanks so much for having me out here. Special
thanks to Heather, who contacted me, I guess last fall, about coming out
when I did a presentation at a Children's Rights conference, and to eve-
ryone here who has made this trip so easy. It's really been a pleasure.
I'm going to have another opportunity a little later this morning to do
Q&A with Mitchel Brim about the Roper case.' So I'm going to save
some of my comments about the specifics of that case for a little bit later
on in the morning. I thought what I would try and do first is talk more
generally about how the Supreme Court thinks about capital cases; how
it decides cases, what drives the Supreme Court's decision-making and
putting Roper v. Simmons into a little bit broader context.
I wasn't in the courtroom the other day when the Justices handed
down Roper v. Simmons, but I have talked to some people who were in
the courtroom. As you may know, when the Court issues a decision, it
just doesn't publish its decision and hand [it] out at the press office or put
[it] up on the website. They actually sit up there on the bench and the
presiding Justice, it's usually Chief Justice Rehnquist, but these days he's
not around, so it's Justice Stevens, he calls the case number and says that
they're going to announce the decision, and then he turns it over to the
author of the decision, in this case, Kennedy. And the author of the deci-
sion gives a two or three minute synopsis of the decision and then they
move onto the next case that they are announcing.
This week, that's not what happened. Justice Kennedy did give his
two or three-minute synopsis, but then, Justice Scalia, who was in the
dissent in this case-as those of you who follow it know, it was a 5-4
decision.2  There were two dissents.3 Justice Scalia wrote for himself,
the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. 4 And Justice Scalia read signifi-
t Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. The following is a transcript of remarks
made on March 4, 2005 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium, "Children and the
Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"
1. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
2. Id.
3. See id at 1206 and 1217.
4. See id. at 1217.
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cant portions of his dissent from the bench. That happens about, oh, per-
haps four or five times a term out of the eighty cases that they hand
down. And it happens when one of the dissenting Justices is so deeply
upset about the majority opinion-thinks that this case is so outrageous
in the way it was decided-that he or she feels compelled to express per-
sonal outrage by sitting up there on the bench and basically railing
against the majority opinion. And that's what Justice Scalia did this
week.
What that's an indication of is, as much as Justice Scalia saw this as
a bad decision-the dissenters always think that the majority opinion is a
bad decision-he thinks it's bad in a really profound and broad way. It's
not just about the juvenile death penalty. This case to him is about some-
thing much broader. And so, I thought I'd try and talk about why he
thinks that and how you get around to framing the broader issues that
were at stake in Roper.
But first I thought I'd start by talking a little bit about judicial deci-
sion-making at the Court. I don't know if you all are familiar with legal
realism, but it's the philosophy that was developed at Yale Law School
that takes a rather pragmatic view of how judges decide cases-one hu-
morist once described legal realism as reducing how judges decide cases
based on what they had for breakfast that day.5 Now, I'm not willing to
go that far, but I have my own sort of realist theory of how Justices de-
cide cases, and I'm going to call it my theory of interior decoration.
My theory of interior decoration is that if you could just go into a
Justice's office, you [could] discern by their choice in interior decoration
pretty much what you need to know about that person's jurisprudence.
And it really will allow you to predict an awful lot about how they would
go about deciding cases and what results they would reach.
So, I thought I'd take you into Justice Blackmun's chambers, just
for a few minutes, and describe some of his interior decoration and how
you could really sense his jurisprudence and his method of deciding
cases. Then I'll talk about a few of the other Justices, [and] then talk a
little bit about a death penalty case-not a juvenile death penalty case,
but another death penalty case-and then wrap it up by coming back to
5. This approach is often caricatured as the "what the judge ate for breakfast" approach.
Charles Yablon, who has tried to trace the origins of the "what they ate for breakfast" proposition,
argued that it may in fact have been erroneously derived from a statement by Roscoe Pound. Yablon
showed that in 1905, Pound contrasted the western notion of a "rule of law" with law making by an
"oriental cadi administering justice at the city gate by the light of nature tempered by the state of his
digestion .... " Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 236 n. 16 (1990) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L.
REv. 20, 21 (1905)). In the 1930s, Jerome Frank referred to Pound's comment, arguing that "no more
than in France, Germany, England or the United States, is the judge in Mohammedan countries
supposed to decide cases according to his passing whim or the temporary state of his digestion." Id.
(quoting Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 18 (1931)).
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this question of what are the big issues that these cases raise when you
think about how the individual Justices, based on what they had on their
walls, decide cases.
Now, when you walked into Justice Blackmun's chambers, the first
thing you would notice is that on all the bookshelves there would be
these orange Wheaties boxes. They were not the most important things
in the room, but it did tip you off that he was a huge Minnesota Twins
fan, because he had Wheaties boxes from all the Twins' championship
seasons. Then, on one wall, he had a life-sized baseball bat hanging
there. Underneath there was a small brass plaque that said, "I shall never
forgive myself." I remember the first time I was in his office, I asked
him about that plaque and the baseball bat, and he told me the story be-
hind it. He wrote this opinion that never gets read in law school any-
more, but it's called Flood v. Kuhn.6 It was an anti-trust opinion involv-
ing baseball.
Curt Flood was an outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, a very well
known player. Back then, this is before the age of free agency-I don't
think any of you were born before the age of free agency-but it used to
be that owners could control where players played. They didn't have the
ability to move around teams the way they do today. And so, Curt
Flood, who wanted to be able to move and make more money, chal-
lenged what was called the "baseball reserve system." He brought this
lawsuit claiming that the reserve system was a violation of the Federal
Antitrust laws; that teams were colluding with each other.7 Justice
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in that case, Flood v. Kuhn, and if
you look it up in the U.S. Reports, you'll see it's a very, very unusual
opinion. The first section of the opinion has absolutely nothing to do
with the law whatsoever. 8 It is a tribute to the game of baseball.9 Justice
Blackmun adored the game of baseball and he writes this flowery thing
about America's pastime, and he puts in a list of his hundred favorite
players of all time.' 0 There are people on there--obviously Babe Ruth,
that type of thing-but there are also really incredibly obscure players.l"
There was one athlete on the Court at that time, Byron "Whizzer" White.
Whizzer White was one of the greatest football players who ever lived,
before he got into law. And he was so disgusted by the fact that Justice
Blackmun has written this absurd trivia to the game of baseball that he
actually refused to sign the opinion for that reason.' 2
6. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
7. See id. at 259.
8. See id. at 261-64.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 262-63.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 285 ("Mr. Justice White joins in the judgment of the Court, and in all but Part I
of the Court's opinion.").
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But, in any event, there it was, and Blackmun publishes his opinion
and the next day he gets a phone call from his best friend up in Minne-
sota. "Hello, Harry?" "Yeah. How you doing?" "Read your opinion in
Flood v. Kuhn. Great job. I loved that whole thing about the tribute to
the game of baseball. Only one problem-where's Mel Ott?" Mel Ott
was right fielder for the New York Giants, he had five hundred and
eleven home runs, and he's in the Hall of Fame. 13 "What do you mean?
I love Mel Ott. He's right there on the list." Blackmun's friend said,
"Harry, he's not there."
Blackmun goes to his copy of the opinion, flips through it and sure
enough, he's left Mel Ott off. To which he said the famous words, "I
shall never forgive myself." And the baseball bat on his wall is the last
Louisville Slugger-Mel Ott model that was ever made, and his clerks
gave it to him.
But what's at least arguably interesting or important about this Mel
Ott story is, he was actually serious when he said he would never forgive
himself. Justice Blackmun was the most compulsive, detail-oriented-
some might say anal-human being I have ever run across. And being a
lawyer, I've run across a lot of compulsive-anal people. And it had a
deep, deep effect on his jurisprudence. I would even go so far as to say it
had an especially deep effect on his death penalty jurisprudence.
Now, why is that? Well, Justice Blackmun read every petition that
came in to the Supreme Court of the United States. These capital cases
come in with tremendous frequency. He read all the papers in those
cases. And he started out as a Justice in 1972 in the case of Furman v.
Georgia.14 He wrote a dissent in Furman v. Georgia-which is an anti-
death penalty decision-saying, "I don't much care for capital punish-
ment, but I can't find anything in the Constitution that suggests that it's
unconstitutional."' 5 That's where he started in 1972, his second year on
the Court. Before he left the Court, he'd become a death penalty aboli-
tionist. And one of the main things that drove him in the direction of
abolition was reading the cases over and over and over again, and you're
struck really-and I'll talk about a little more later-[by] two things in
these cases. One is the horrible crimes that are involved. But the other is
how frequently the system of justice seems to have broken down under
the pressure of death penalty cases. And it's the meticulousness with
which he went about his job that I think drove Justice Blackmun through
the years, by experience, towards being an abolitionist.
Another thing that was in his office that was of particular note, he
had behind his desk the swords of his grandfathers. Both of them had
13. See "Batting" spreadsheet, at http://www.baseball-reference.coffi/o/ottme0l.shtml (last
visited June 16, 2005).
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. See id at 405.
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fought for the Union in the Civil War. And in another comer, he had a
shrine to Abraham Lincoln-a silhouette, a bust, some framed quota-
tions.
What did that all mean for Justice Blackmun? Justice Blackmun
was someone for whom the struggle of Abraham Lincoln, the struggle to
save the Union, the decision to emancipate the slaves was bred into his
bones. He was a northern Lincoln Republican. A very different kind of
Republican than we think of in the modem Republican Party. He was a
Lincoln Republican from the North. And that had real consequences for
his jurisprudence.
Did any of you ever read the novel, Killer Angels?16 Killer Angels
is an incredible Civil War novel about the Battle of Gettysburg, and one
of the heroes of that book is a man named Joshua Chamberlain. He was
a real-life figure who led the Twentieth Maine at Little Round Top, the
area in which, basically, the most vicious fighting occurred. The Union
position held and it turned the tide in the Civil War. When Blackmun
talked about Killer Angels, as I remember doing with him one morning at
breakfast, he literally got tears in his eyes. I mean, that's how much that
was present history for him.
So what does that mean jurisprudentially? People often ask that
question. How did Blackmun get nominated as this rock-solid conserva-
tive by Nixon in 1971, and turn out to be this flaming lib by the time he
gets off the Court? And the answer in part, [in] a significant part I would
say, are those swords behind his desk and that shrine to Lincoln. Be-
cause as this Court moved into the areas of states' rights, nothing could
be more antithetical to everything that Justice Blackmun believed in than
the notion of states' rights.
States' rights was the philosophical conception of the Constitution
over which the Civil War was fought and against which the Union
fought. Lincoln was for the Union and that's what Justice Blackmun was
for. And so, on this Court, as issues of states rights, [and] issues of
remedying the history of discrimination--questions like affirmative ac-
tion or other kinds of anti-discrimination measures-came before the
Court, Justice Blackmun was always going to be on the liberal side of
those issues because of his-what I'll call his--Civil War heritage.
And if you want to know why Justice Souter, again nominated as a
conservative, has emerged as a liberal, or probably the second-most lib-
eral Justice on this current Court, the answer is exactly the same.
Souter's great-great-grandfather nominated Abraham Lincoln in 1860; he
had relatives who worked on the Underground Railroad. He is a New
16. MICHAEL SHAARA, THE KILLER ANGELS: A NOVEL OF THE CIVIL WAR (1993).
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Hampshire Lincoln Republican. I've never been in Souter's chambers,
but I'll bet you there's Civil War stuff up there in spades.
What else was in Blackmun's chambers? He had on one bookshelf
a little Plexiglas cube, and inside that cube there was a swatch of fabric.
And in the swatch of fabric, there was a hole in that piece of fabric and
he had it framed there. Over the time I worked for him, I found out that
that was a swatch of fabric from his favorite reading chair that he had in
his apartment and one day somebody shot a bullet through his window
and hit that chair. Nobody was in it, nobody was hurt in his apartment,
but it's a kind of morbid souvenir. I'm not a mind reader and I actually
never asked Blackmun why he had that thing there, but I'm pretty sure I
know why. Which is, everywhere Blackmun went after January 22,
1973, when he wrote Roe v. Wade,17 he was followed by controversy and
protests. He used to get these letters every week. He read every one of
them, too, from these people who would write in. Very strange letters.
"Dear Justice Blackmun. You are worse than Hitler. Love, Bill."
But, this was a shadow that he carried around with himself. And I
think for Justice Blackmun, whose reaction to all this was complicated,
the swatch of fabric was a reminder of how Supreme Court decisions do
affect people's lives in a very, very profound way. The lives of women
who wanted the right to choose; and no less, the lives of those who be-
lieved sincerely that to do so was murder. And he was always humble in
his approach to his job as a consequence of that sense of just how great
the Court's power really is and was. And I think that that is something
that deeply, deeply shaped Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence. He was
the most empathetic Justice probably in the history of the Supreme
Court. The guy who wrote famous weird line[s] in his opinion[s], like
"Poor Joshua!" which is a famous line from a case involving the abuse of
a child. 18 Not the usual fare for Supreme Court Justices or their opinions.
But that's something you could tell if you sort of had a magnifying glass
and went around his office and looked at all the stuff he had in there.
And it doesn't only hold true for Justice Blackmun. If you go into
the offices of say, Tony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor and you
look at their offices and you ask yourself, well, what does their decor tell
you? You'll see a very different type of motif in their offices than you'll
see in Blackmun's office or Souter's office. You'll see a Western motif.
O'Connor's office is filled with Navajo rugs and things like that, things
that describe her Arizona heritage. In Kennedy's chambers he has a
Remington statue-these are Westerners. They are not caught up in
Civil War issues. They have an individualistic view of things. And just
to take two positions of theirs that seemed politically or ideologically in
17. 410 US. 113 (1973).
18. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 82:4
ROPER V SIMMONS: INSIGHTS
conflict, but really aren't, these are two Justices who have voted with
deep skepticism toward affirmative action but with considerable sympa-
thy towards gay rights.
What unites those two positions? Well, I think their Western ap-
proach unites those two positions. They don't believe in groupthink.
They want individuals to be taken as individuals, albeit Justice Kennedy
didn't exactly stay true to that in the juvenile death penalty cases, as I'm
sure Mitchel [Brim] will say. But, when it comes to affirmative action,
they don't like groupthink. When it comes to what they view basically
as bigotry towards people based on their group identity, meaning gays,
they don't like that either. And I think that's kind of a Western or fron-
tier approach to jurisprudence that you can see very much from the decor
in their office.
Why do I go through this riff on interior decoration? I do it because
it's important to keep in mind that the Court is not a monolith. It's nine
individuals who come to the Court with passions and prejudices and in-
clinations that are just their own. And at the end of the day, especially in
a Court that divides as closely as this one, that matters, because one per-
son's inclination can turn the tide between having the juvenile death pen-
alty and not having the juvenile death penalty. Having a right to choose
and not having a right to choose. Having affirmative action, not having
affirmative action. A whole host of issues, and they are often driven by
factors that you don't really learn in the law books.
So, I thought I'd talk now, specifically about the death penalty for a
little bit. Not about the juvenile death penalty until the end. I'm going to
talk about a case that came to the Court in the late 1980s called Texas v.
Tompkins,' 9 and it's a case you won't find-you won't find a published
decision on the case. It you go look it up you'll see there's just a little
squib. It says that the judgment of the, I guess it's the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas is affirmed by an equally divided vote.20 That's what
happens when there's a tie at the Supreme Court. There's no opinion
when you have a tie at the Supreme Court. They just issue an affirmance
to the lower court with that one sentence. But a lot happened in Texas v.
Tompkins before they got to their tie, and I thought I'd talk a little bit
about that as a way of describing what was really at stake in Roper v.
Simmons and why Justice Scalia got so really, really mad when it didn't
come out his way.
Phillip Tompkins was a borderline mentally retarded man living in
Texas, in Houston. 2 He was driving around late at night and he decided
19. 490 U.S. 754 (1989).
20. See id.
21. See Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 213 (Tex. Crim. App., 1987) (psychologist's
report stated that "Matthews ... requested that she give him 'specific kinds of help' that related to
his inability to sleep and eat, and his problems with depression.").
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he wanted to buy his girlfriend dinner. He didn't have any money so he
came up with a scheme to get some money. He was going to rear-end a
car driven by somebody, and when that person stopped, he was going to
take out his knife and hold the person up at knifepoint and get money.
So, he executed his scheme. He rear-ends the car of a young
woman named Mary Berry, and he takes out his knife, demands her
money and she doesn't have it. She just has an ATM card. So, he forces
her into the car and they drive around Houston for a while, while she
tries to explain to Phillip Tompkins how to use her ATM card. This was
the 1980s-it was not so common as it is now, and his mental faculties
were diminished. But, he finally gets the drift of it and gets her pass-
word. He takes her out by the Astrodome and ties her to a tree. Then, he
stuffs a bed sheet in her mouth. Off he goes to the bank and he takes
money out of her account, and we know that because he's caught on tape
by the ATM camera that's always there. He's also seen by a security
guard at two in the morning while he's doing this. While he's doing this,
Mary Berry very painfully choked to death on the gag that he had shoved
in her mouth. He's caught and convicted of capital murder, which is
intentional murder during the course of another felony, being robbery,
and he's sentenced to death.23
For a lot of us at the Court, there was something chilling about this
case. Not because it was one of the worst crimes we saw. Sad to say, it
wasn't one of the worst capital cases we saw. Those cases often involve
children, torture, and all kinds of other incredible behavior. But it was
chilling because we all worked until midnight when, at the Court, they
used to turn the computers off to force us to go home, and we would
walk to our cars in the Supreme Court parking lot and drive home by
ourselves. Especially the women clerks who worked on that case just
had one of those "there but for the Grace of God go I" feelings about it
[that] kept them up at night. The other thing that was almost typical of a
capital case, just the way terrible crimes are, was that here was another
case where something seemed to have gone very, very wrong in the ad-
ministration of justice.
By the time the case got to the Supreme Court there were two issues
involved. One of the issues arose out of a Supreme Court precedent
called Beck v. Alabama.24 In Alabama at one time there was a rule in
capital cases-have you all had criminal law? Yes? Okay, so this will
be familiar territory to all. In Alabama there was a rule in capital cases
that no lesser-included offense instructions would be given. The jury
22. For facts see Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 210-11; Brief for Petitioner at 2-4, Texas v. Tomp-
kins, 490 U.S. 754 (1989); Respondents Brief at 3-6, Texas v. Tompkins, 490 U.S. 754 (1989).
23. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 198.
24. 447 U.S- 625 (1980).
25. Under the Alabama death penalty statute the trial judge was prohibited from giving the
jury the option of convicting the defendant of a lesser-included offense; instead, the jury was to
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would only be given a choice between conviction on capital murder or
26acquittal. Nothing in between. And the Supreme Court had been asked
to decide: Is that Constitutional? And the Supreme Court had decided
that, no, that's not Constitutional.27 The reason it decided that is, look,
what if the jury thinks that the defendant is guilty of a really terrible
crime, but not capital murder? Capital murder is reserved for an unusual
set-a narrow set of cases. So what if they think-terrible crime, murder
in the heat of passion or something, but not capital murder? And the
choice is between convicting on capital murder or letting somebody who
has done something really awful go completely free. Juries are going to
have too much of a tendency to convict on capital murder, so you can't
do that.28 You must give at least one lesser-included offense instruction.29
So what was the question in the Phillip Tompkins case? Phil Tomp-
kins' defense at trial was: I didn't mean to kill Mary Berry. 3 ) He copped
to the incident, but he said he didn't mean to do it.3' And his lawyer
asked the judge to give two lesser-included offense instructions as a con-
sequence of that.32 To give an instruction on reckless murder and on
negligent homicide, and the judge refused.33 The judge said, "I'll give
you a lesser included offense instruction, but not those two.3 4 I'll give
you the lesser included offense instruction of intentional murder, not in
the course of a robbery."
35
Now, that was not the aspect of the case that was in doubt. He'd
been caught on videotape and seen by a security guard. So the question
that came to the Supreme Court was: Is it okay under Beck v. Alabama
to have any lesser included offense instruction, or does it have to be a
lesser included offense instruction that actually meets the element of the
case that is in question? And the Texas Appellate Court said-no prob-
lem. 36 The way we look at it is, he was too reckless to be negligent and
too negligent to be reckless, and the trial court was right to not give these
either convict the defendant of the capital crime, in which case it must impose the death penalty, or
acquit him. ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(b)(1975).
26. See id.
27. See generally Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
28. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 637 ("The failure to give the jury the 'third option' of convicting on
a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.").
29. See id.
30. See Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing at 4, Texas v. Tompkins, 490 U.S. 754 (1989)
("Petitioner argued that instructions on the lesser offenses were warranted because the jury could
infer from the evidence that the petitioner had not intended to kill the deceased when he left her
bound, gagged, and tied to a tree.").
31. See id.
32. See id. ("Petitioner requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offenses of
felony murder, involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.").
33. See id.
34. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 198.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 213.
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instructions. 37 I'm not sure I understand what that means, but that's how
it came up to the United States Supreme Court.
The second issue in the case had to do with a case called Batson v.
Kentucky.38 It's probably a case that you all are familiar with in criminal
law. That's the case which says that prosecutors cannot use their per-
emptory challenges to strike people from the jury on the basis of their
race.39 Now, of course, that's been expanded-it applies to civil cases
and applies to both the prosecutor and defense, it applies to gender-it's
a much broader rule. Back then, it was prosecutors can't use peremptory
challenges, which are those challenges that you don't need to give a rea-
son for, to eliminate people on the basis of race.
The way a Batson challenge works is that the defendant usually tries
to make a statistical showing that there's a pattern of striking minority
jurors, and then the prosecutor must come up with case-related, race-
neutral explanations. Then the judge's job is to determine whether those
explanations are real or whether they are a pretext for race discrimina-
tion.
So, in the Phillip Tompkins case, there were thirteen blacks and Phil
Tompkins was black.40 There were thirteen blacks on the jury panel. 4'
The prosecutor used challenges for cause to eliminate eight, and then
used her peremptory challenges to eliminate the other five.42 So, Tomp-
kins was tried in front of an all-white jury.43 [Tompkins] brought the
Batson challenge, [and] the prosecutor came up with explanations for
what she had done. 4 But some of those explanations didn't ring true.4
5
She said, for example, one juror had been eliminated because he was
illiterate.46 Well, it turned out he wasn't illiterate.47 In another instance,
she said that she'd eliminated someone because he was a postal worker.
48
Now, what that has to do with the price of eggs in China, who knows?
But she said she had had bad luck with postal workers in previous
cases. 4 9 But then it turned out on cross-examination that she'd had to
37. Seeid. at211-13.
38. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. See Id. at 95 ("Thus... a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his
case."1).
40. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 198.
41. See id.
42. See id
43. See supra note 30, at 5.
44. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 202.
45. See id. at 219-20.
46. See id.
47. See id
48. See id. at 205.
49. See id.
[V1ol. 82:4
ROPER V SIMMONS: INSIGHTS
admit that she'd actually had very good luck with postal workers in pre-
vious casesf50
The trial judge looked at these excuses and said, "I don't believe
this.5 1 I think these are not legitimate or true justifications for your chal-
lenges.52 But I can think of some reasons why you wouldn't have wanted
to have those jurors on this jury, so I'm going to say it's okay. 53 And
that had gone up to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which is the
highest court in Texas, and they had looked at it and said, "Well, that
can't be right.5 4 The issue is not whether the trial judge could think of
reasons for getting rid of these jurors. The issue is whether the prosecu-
tor's explanations are pretextual or not., 55  But, then they said, "Well,
we're not in the business of assessing credibility in this court, so we're
just going to affirm.,
5 6
And that's how that came up to the Supreme Court. I think most of
us who looked at this case thought to ourselves, "Well, Tompkins is
probably right on the jury instruction issue; he's absolutely right on the
Batson issue. This is going to be one of those easy cases and this guy's
going to get a new trial."
Oral argument comes around-nothing very significant usually
happens at Supreme Court oral arguments, but this was a particularly
interesting and amusing oral argument. At that time, Thurgood Marshall
was still on the bench, the first African-American Justice who had spent
a large part of his career trying capital cases in the South in front of all-
white juries. And the lawyer for the State of Texas got up and about
three minutes into her presentation, Marshall just leaned into his micro-
phone: "Postal worker." Just like that. The lawyer looks up like
"where'd that come from?" The lawyer goes on another thirty seconds
and Marshall moves in, "Postal worker." After about the fifth time, the
Texas lawyer just practically lost it. But Marshall was having his fun.
After argument, they go off and they have their vote. So, they go into
their secret conference and go around the table, which they do, and each
person states his or her views and they take a vote.
50. See id.
51. See id. ("Perhaps, indeed, federal postal employees share a common view of the criminal
justice system antithetical to the interests of law enforcement. But if so, we are not aware of
it .. .").
52. See id.
53. See id. ("Notwithstanding what we have stated, we find that the prosecuting attorney's
reasons that she gave constitute a racially neutral explanation, and it is not the office of this Court to
judge her credibility.").
54. See id. at 202 ("This Court and the courts of appeals are principally reviewing courts. We
do not substitute our judgments of witnesses' credibility and evidentiary weight for those of the fact
finder, but affirm those judgments whenever the record discloses sufficient evidence in their sup-
port.").
55. See id. at 205.
56, See id. at 205-06.
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On the jury instruction issue, the vote was five [to three]-oh, I
should tell you that Justice O'Connor didn't participate in this case, there
were only eight Justices participating. Justice O'Connor's husband's law
firm was doing Tompkins' case pro bono, so she stepped off the case. So
you've got eight of them sitting around the table, and the vote is five to
three on the jury instruction issue, that it was okay. It doesn't matter that
the jury instruction conform with the aspect of the case that's in doubt, as
long as the jury has another third option, that's enough.
Then, on the Batson issue, it was five to three for Tompkins. Five
of the Justices voted that he needed a new trial, that this was clearly a
violation of Batson. The other three disagreed. And the line-up was
very predictable. The Justices have changed since then, but they are still
very predictable and still divided just about as closely as they were then.
At that time, Brennan and Marshall always voted in favor of the capital
defendant. They believed the death penalty was unconstitutional in
every circumstance, no matter what precedent said. No matter what, they
believed morally it was wrong and, therefore, they were going to vote to
reverse every capital case.
Blackmun had not moved that far at that time, but he was growing
increasingly close to the abolitionist camp, although for reasons very
different from Brennan's and Marshall's. And, so, he was the sure vote
in that direction as well. Then, on the other side, you had the Chief,
Rehnquist, you had Scalia, and you had Whizzer White. All of them
were very conservative on capital cases and pretty much a sure bet the
other way.
So, the swing votes in this case were Stevens and Kennedy, who
was brand new to the Court. Justice Stevens and he were the ones who
flipped each way, so they joined the three conservatives on the Beck is-
sue, and joined the more liberal Justices on the Batson issue. And the
way it works at the Court is that the senior member of the majority gets
to assign the opinion. If the Chief Justice is in the majority, then he gets
to assign it. But if he's not, as he wasn't in this case, the senior Justice in
the majority does. So, between Kennedy and Stevens, Stevens is far
senior to Kennedy, so he assigned it-he took it for himself. And he
took it for himself because he was very, very interested in the Batson
issue and he wanted to send a message to state courts which he felt were
paying absolutely no attention to Batson whatsoever, and he wanted to
send a message that they ought to cut it out. So, what happens at the
Supreme Court is, the majority opinion is written, and it circulates. And
what you are waiting for, after circulation, when you're the author of the
majority, is what is called "join memos," which are these little notes that
get sent around from the other chambers that just say things like, "Please
join me to your opinion," and you need to get four of those to get a ma-
jority. Justice Brennan used to love waving his around--"You need five
votes around here to do anything." You need five votes, so you need
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four join memos. And then you're all set. Then you could ignore what
anybody else thinks. So, Stevens is waiting for his join memos to come
in and on the Beck issue, he gets his join memos right away. He gets
Kennedy, and White and Scalia and Rehnquist, on up, so he's all set.
But on the Batson side of things, he immediately gets the three liberals,
Brennan and Marshall and Blackmun, but he gets silence out of Tony
Kennedy. And nobody can really figure out what the heck's going on
because, after oral argument, Tony Kennedy had gone in to see Thur-
good Marshall.
By the way, [Thurgood Marshall] is another Justice [whose] interior
decoration told a lot about him. He wrote the Kenyan Constitution, and
his office was filled with African memorabilia, including a number of
very sharp spears that he used to go over and fondle whenever a clerk
was bugging him. He was quite ornery by that time in his life, and I
think his decor reflected that. But, jokes aside, Kennedy had gone in to
see Blackmun after oral argument. Kennedy's a very jolly fellow-the
kind of guy you'd like to have a round of golf with-and he was trying
to make friends. He was brand new to the Court. So he goes in to see
Thurgood Marshall, "Thurgood, do you believe this case? I mean, that
postal worker excuse. That's the most ridiculous thing I ever heard."
And they yukked it up for a while and then Kennedy went to his own
chambers.
Now, the opinion has come around, and you get dead silence out of
the Kennedy chambers and in the Court, you know, if you're not hearing
back from somebody over the course of a few weeks, something bad is
going to happen. And, sure enough, after about three months, Tony
Kennedy sends around a note. And it's a couple of paragraphs and it
says, "I've changed my mind on the Batson issue. I have looked through
the entire trial record and I can think of reasons why a prosecutor
wouldn't have wanted those jurors on the jury." So he did exactly what
the trial court had done, exactly what you're not supposed to do on Bat-
son, changed his mind and changed his vote. That meant that Stevens
lost that half of his opinion, because it was four to four now on the Bat-
son issue, which would have meant that they would affirm the lower
court's Batson ruling by an equally divided court.
So now, instead of having an opinion that was going to say new trial
for Phillip Tompkins, he had an opinion that said, Phillip Tompkins'
conviction and sentence are affirmed. Stevens got very upset about this,
and I think it's the only time in Court history this ever happened. The
author of the opinion himself, Justice Stevens, decided to change his own
vote on the other side of the case, on the Beck v. Alabama side of the
case, and pretend that he thought that that should come out the other
way, so that that would also be four-four and the whole case would just
disappear and he would throw his entire opinion draft into the trash can.
And that's what he did.
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It didn't help Phillip Tompkins any, because his conviction and sen-
tence were now affirned and he was on his way [to the death penalty]. I
guess in Texas at that time it was lethal injection.
As an aside, I'll tell you what happened with Phillip Tompkins. His
lawyers filed another habeas petition and they started looking into the
sentencing phase of the case. There had been an expert who testified on
the question of future dangerousness. In Texas, every jury in capital
cases is asked three questions, one of which is: How much of a risk of
future dangerousness is the defendant? And the state always brings in an
expert who says this guy is the most vicious human being alive and has a
hundred percent chance of future dangerousness.
And the defense always brings in an expert who says he was bru-
tally treated as a child and with enough therapy he'll be an angel. In this
case, the state had used an expert named Jean Matthews who claimed to
have known Phillip Tompkins from a previous stint that he did in jail.
She was a criminologist with a Masters Degree from the University of
Florida or Florida State. So the defense lawyers called down to Florida
State and said, tell us about Jean Matthews, does she really have a Mas-
ters Degree? And they say yeah, she does. She has a Masters Degree in
music. She was a trombone expert. Texas was so embarrassed by having
called an expert witness who turned out not to be an expert, that they
actually commuted Phillip Tompkins' sentence.
But, nobody at the Court knew that that was going to happen. And
everybody at the Court knew something else-which was that Phillip
Tompkins had confessed to this crime. He's given the police a very,
very lengthy confession and in that confession, he had described every-
thing that happened about bumping into Mary Berry and holding her up
at knifepoint and taking her out to the Astrodome and stuffing a gag in
her mouth. And how, when he had come back from the bank, she was
dead.
And, you know, I had prosecuted for several years, saw quite a few
confessions, and re-read Phillip Tompkins' many times. And there's just
some things that have a ring of truth about them. I don't think anybody
really questioned whether Phillip Tompkins' confession was true. It had
actually been suppressed at his trial for a variety of reasons. But it meant
that everybody at the Court really knew that Phillip Tompkins had not
intended to kill Mary Berry. And, under the capital jurisprudence in this
country, it's unconstitutional to execute someone who didn't intend to
kill. So, everybody at the Court knew that Phillip Tompkins didn't de-
serve, from a Constitutional standpoint, to be executed. And, yet, the
Court split four-four and was perfectly willing to let Phillip Tompkins be
executed, regardless of that fact. And, that raised, for me, really haunt-
ing questions about what was going on. I really didn't believe, although
some of the liberals at the Court did, that it's just because the conserva-
tives are a bunch of cold-hearted sons of-whatever. It's because there
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was a war going on inside the Court. A war of ideas, but one that had
really shunted to one side the questions of individualistic justice of any
particular case, and had brought to the fore larger jurisprudential ques-
tions which dominated everything.
And, here's where we'll get back to the juvenile level of the death
penalty. The conservatives on the Supreme Court, then and now, be-
lieved that the liberal Justices use some of the more amorphous phrases
in the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause. What does that
mean? Or, cruel and unusual punishment. What does that mean? They
use the inherent vagueness of those terms to foist their own views of
what is right and wrong into the Constitution and onto the elected
branches of the government. That's the center of Roe v. Wade. If you
take the religious component out, the jurisprudential battle in Roe v.
Wade is substantive due process. And what is substantive due process?
If you are conservative, you believe it is this container into which the
liberal Justices pour their own moral value system and read it into the
Constitution. And, if you are a conservative Justice, you believe that the
jurisprudence about what is a cruel and unusual punishment, which is
defined by our "evolving standards of decency," is a container into which
the liberal Justices pour their value system and foist it onto the Constitu-
tion and onto the law.
And so, why is it that Justice Scalia read his dissent in Roper v.
Simmons? It can't be because it's about the juvenile death penalty. It's
not a trivial issue by any means. But there are only seventy juvenile of-
fenders on death row at the moment. This is not a matter of profound
national significance in anything more than a symbolic sense. It is be-
cause in a jurisprudential sense, from Scalia's point of view, what is go-
ing on here [is] that the Court, despite all these conservative appoint-
ments, is still ultimately a Court where Justices pour their own moral
sentiments into the Constitution at the expense of the elected branches of
government. And what's really going on in Roper v. Simmons is that
Justice Kennedy, joined by the four more liberal members of the Court-
doesn't like the fact the United States is the only country in the world
that actively proclaims its support for the juvenile death penalty prior to
this case. He doesn't want to be on the wrong side of history. He thinks
it's a morally bad idea. And so, he is using the vague phrase, "evolving
standards of decency," to read his own morality or the majority's moral-
ity, into the Constitution.
And if you read Scalia's dissent, it is peppered with references to
the abortion debate. And the reason is that he doesn't see this as being
any different from that from a jurisprudential standpoint. This is the
abortion debate all over again. It is the gay rights debate-do homo-
sexuals have a right to consensual sodomy in their own homes under the
right to privacy, which is an unenumerated right in the Constitution?
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These cultural social issues are at stake in Roper v. Simmons from a
jurisprudential standpoint. And that's why the Court is so deeply, deeply
divided and why a case that's really of very narrow scope is a case with
enormous importance. What it shows is that Tony Kennedy has become,
in these issues, the moral compass for the Court. And the question then
becomes: Is it a good thing or a bad thing for the country that he hasthat
kind of authority? And we can take that up in the Q&A later on. Thank
you so much for listening for an hour.
A SNEAK PREVIEW INTO How THE COURT TOOK AWAY A
STATE'S RIGHT TO EXECUTE SIXTEEN AND SEVENTEEN
YEAR OLD JUVENILES: THE THREAT OF EXECUTION WILL
No LONGER SAVE AN INNOCENT VICTIM'S LIFE
MITCHEL BRIMt
INTRODUCTION
Imagine your daughter, Elizabeth, fourteen years of age, and her
best friend, Jenny, sixteen years of age, after a long day at high school
decide to take a shortcut home down a railroad track through a park.
While walking through the park, they are attacked by five vicious ani-
mals.' All gang members. 2 Elizabeth was grabbed and taken down the
incline off the railroad tracks.3 Testimony revealed that Jenny became
free and could have run away but decided that she wanted to help her
best friend who was crying out for help.
4
For the next hour or so, there were never less than two males on one
female. The girls were repeatedly raped orally, vaginally, and anally.
5
One of the gang members bragged about how loose and sloppy one of
the girls was, and another bragged about having virgin blood on him.
Taking away these two innocent teenagers' self-esteem and inno-
cence by raping them for over an hour was not enough for these vicious
animals. These animals meticulously took Elizabeth and Jenny into an
isolated area of the woods. Two of them placed a belt around their necks
and pulled from each end until the belt broke.
After the belt broke, the killers used a shoelace to finish their job.
One of the killers complained that, "The bitch won't die and it would
have been easier to have used a gun."'6 After having her ribs kicked in
and her teeth knocked out, Elizabeth was strangled to death, after crying
and pleading for her life.
t Southwestern School of Law, J.D. Author of The Ultimate Solution to Properly Adminis-
ter the Ultimate Penalty, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 275 (2003). Mr. Brim is also the sole author of the Brief
of Arnici Curiae on behalf of Justice for All Alliance in support of Petitioner in Roper v. Simmons.
Brief of Amici Curiae Justice for All Alliance, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-
633). The following is a transcript of remarks made on March 4, 2005 at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium, "Children and the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"





6. The Murders of Jennifer ErIman and Elizabeth Pena, at
http://www.murdervictims.comNVoices/jeneliz.html (last visited June 20,2005).
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Should the fate of these people who disrespected the dignity of
these two innocent girls be based on whether their actions were commit-
ted when they were sixteen, seventeen or one day before their eighteenth
birthday? How should the United States Supreme Court decide whether
states should be able to execute sixteen and seventeen year olds?
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This article will evaluate, analyze, and criticize how the United
States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons recently prohibited any state
from executing a sixteen or seventeen year old. 7 Instead of drawing a
categorical rule barring the imposition of capital punishment on anyone
under the age of eighteen, this article will establish that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment our forefathers
created, dictated that the Court adopt a standard that provides
states guidance to properly administer the ultimate punishment in a ra-
tional and consistent manner for the worst of the worst on a case by case
basis. Victims suffer daily knowing their loved one was brutally raped
and killed by people who intentionally, consciously and maliciously took
away their right to live in a democratic society. Victims now feel a sense
of injustice as a result of the United States Supreme Court in Roper v.
Simmons prohibiting states from executing anyone under the age of
eighteen. The reason victims feel a sense of injustice is because as a
society, we rely on the criminal justice system to ascertain the appropri-
ate punishment for a particular case and crime. We relied on the United
States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons to link the ultimate punish-
ment to those who are among the worst of the worst by upholding prece-
dent which requires individual consideration as a constitutional require-
ment before sentencing one to death.8 The Court ignored this precedent
and based its decision on erroneous assumptions about juveniles as a
class.9 By grouping all sixteen and seventeen year olds together as a
class, the Court disregarded and ignored the fact that the Respondent,
Christopher Simmons, was fully responsible for having committed a de-
liberate premeditated murder. Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowl-
edge the fact that juveniles are all different with respect to their experi-
ence, maturity, intelligence and moral culpability.
The Court created federal law protecting anyone under the age of
eighteen from capital punishment by utilizing an arbitrary standard it
created, but never defined, known as the "evolving standards of decency
doctrine." This enabled the individual justices of the United States Su-
preme Court to use their own morality and make a decision based on
their own prejudices and biases. Instead, the plurality should have em-
7. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
8. See Enund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978)).
9. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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braced the factors that are reflected through state legislation and defined
by the Court as what punishment amounts to cruel and unusual.
II. A CATEGORICAL RULE BASED ON AGE IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF
ONE'S MORAL CULPABILITY
The Court should not have drawn a bright line rule at the arbitrary
age of eighteen because age does not define one's character, judgment,
maturity, personal responsibility, or moral guilt. No one, including psy-
chiatrists, psychologists and brain specialists, dispute that some sixteen
and seventeen year olds are as mature or more mature than some of those
who are eighteen and older. United States Supreme Court Justices, even
the plurality in Roper v. Simmons, Nobel Peace Prize winners, the
American Medical Association and the European Union all agree. 10 In-
stead, the Court's new bright line of eighteen years of age "treats all per-
sons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass .... "11 Fur-
thermore, the Court's ruling treats sixteen and seventeen year olds as a
class of animals who are incapable of making a conscious decision or
who do not know or understand that it is wrong to kill someone. Such an
assertion is not in fact the case. The reasoning in Roper v. Simmons is
flawed because even though juveniles can be immature and impulsive at
times that does not mean that they can not be fully responsible or morally
culpable for having committed premeditated murder. Sixteen and seven-
teen year olds are certainly capable of understanding right from wrong
and the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, they are capable of
forming the requisite intent to kill to merit the death penalty. Moreover,
they are capable of being deterred from forming the requisite intent to
kill. All of these statements will be illustrated and supported by an
analysis of Roper v. Simmons.
In Roper v. Simmons, respondent possessed the requisite intent to
kill evidenced by his statements to his friends that he would "find some-
one to burglarize, tie the victim up, and ultimately push the victim off a
bridge., 12 Christopher Simmons meticulously and methodically planned
to kill Ms. Crook and in fact arranged for his friends to meet him at a
particular time and location to commit murder.' 3 Christopher Simmons
also deliberated over killing Ms. Crook when he burglarized her home,
taped her hands behind her back, taped her eyes and mouth shut, placed
her in the back of the minivan and drove her from her house in Jefferson
County to Castlewood State Park in St. Louis County. 14 Christopher
Simmons contemplated killing her as he proceeded to torture her. He
10. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1186.
11. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
12. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997).
13. Id. at 178.
14. Id. at 170.
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pulled her out of the van, restrained her hands and feet, covered her head
with a towel, hog-tied her hands and feet together with electrical cable,
and covered her face with electrical tape.15 He then deliberately pushed
her off of the railroad trestle into the river.16 His belief that his age
would allow him to "get away with" such a heinous act shows both a
reckless indifference to human life and knowledge of the consequences
of his actions.' 7 Yet, the plurality in Roper v. Simmons overlooked the
fact that Simmons possessed culpability qualifying him among the worst
of the worst deserving of execution by comparing general differences
between those under eighteen and adults and making a generalized
statement that "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders."' 8 If the Court would have adopted the stan-
dard proposed in the Amici Curiae brief by Justice For All Alliance then
it would have been possible to determine with reliability which sixteen or
seventeen year olds are among the worst offenders meriting the death
penalty.
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT MANDATING
INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
BEFORE SENTENCING A JUVENILE TO DEATH DICTATES A CASE-BY-
CASE ANALYSIS RATHER THAN A BRIGHT LINE RULE
Respect for humanity by treating people as unique individuals is the
cornerstone underlying the Eighth Amendment. In fact, the Court and a
majority of state legislatures have held that individual consideration by
respecting humanity is a constitutional requirement before sentencing
one to death. 19 This requires consideration of an individual's character,
the record of the juvenile offender, and the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense.20 Yet, the Court in Simmons ignored this precedent by fail-
ing to base its decision on the facts and moral culpability of Christopher
Simmons.
The Court should have abided by this precedent and not have
grouped juveniles together as a class but rather recognized that each in-
dividual defendant is different with respect to his or her maturity, intelli-
gence, capability and moral guilt. The Court should have upheld Justice
O'Connor's ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma,2' in which she stated:
[G]ranting the premise that adolescents are generally less blamewor-
thy than adults who commit similar crimes, it does not necessarily
15. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 169.
18. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1186.
19. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 309 (1976); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
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follow that all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that
would justify the imposition of capital punishment.
22
Juveniles as young as fifteen can form the requisite intent to kill and
are able to both understand the consequences of their actions and con-
form their conduct to civilized standards. This is clearly illustrated by
looking at the moral culpability of William Wayne Thompson, who was
fifteen when he committed the brutal murder of his brother-in-law,23 and
Christopher Simmons, who was seventeen when he committed a brutal,
premeditated murder.
24
In Thompson, the petitioner's heinous acts reveal his culpable men-
tal state. He shot his brother-in-law twice, cut his throat, chest and ab-
domen.25  He subsequently chained his body to a concrete block and
threw his body into the river so that "the fish could eat his body. 2 6 He
clearly knew that these atrocious acts were wrong and would end up tak-
ing the life of his innocent brother-in-law.
In Simmons, Christopher Simmons, at age seventeen, decided he
wanted to commit murder. In chilling, callous terms, he talked about his
27
plan, discussing it for the most part with his two friends. He planned to
commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering into a person's
home, tying up the victim, and throwing the victim off of a bridge.28
This is exactly what Christopher Simmons did, and before he did it, he
specifically told his friends that he "could get away with it," because of
his age.29
Using duct tape to cover the eyes and mouth of the victim, the two
perpetrators put Ms. Crook in her minivan and drove her to a state park.30
There, they walked her, with a towel over her head, to a railroad trestle
spanning the Meramec river.3' They tied her hands and feet with electri-
cal cable, bound her face completely with duct tape and pushed her, still
alive, from the trestle.32 Suspended in mid air after being shoved while
blindfolded must have been horrifying for this innocent woman, espe-
cially considering her fear of heights.
Whatever can be said about the comparative moral culpability of
seventeen year olds as a general matter, Simmons' actions unquestiona-
bly reflect a consciousness materially more depraved than that of the
22. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817 (1988).
23. Id. at 815.
24. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1184.
25. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 820.
26. Id. at 859.
27. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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average murderer. Simmons's prediction that he could murder with im-
punity because he was younger than eighteen suggests that he did take
into account the punishment or the perceived risk of punishment in de-
ciding whether to commit the crime.
Based on this evidence, the sentencing jury certainly had reasonable
grounds for concluding that, despite Simmons' youth, he had sufficient
psychological maturity and demonstrated sufficient depravity when he
committed this horrific murder to merit a sentence of death. Yet, the
Justices comprising the plurality in Roper v. Simmons ignored these facts
and instead based their decision on general differences between juveniles
and adults.33 Such a reliance on generalities clearly violates their own
precedent which requires a sentencer to analyze all of the specific aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances of the individual offense.
The plurality in Roper v. Simmons made a bold statement that it dis-
trusts a jury's ability to determine with reliability which sixteen and sev-
enteen year olds are among the worst of the worst deserving of execu-
tion, when they had a prime example right in front of them.34
Consider some of the justifications for the plurality's ruling. They
found that a lack of maturity and an under-developed sense of responsi-
bility are found in youth more often than adults.3 5 Adolescents are over-
represented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.36
Second, they found that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, such as peer pressure. 37 How-
ever, this is not true in every case, including Christopher Simmons'.
Lastly, they found that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult.3' They assert that personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory and less fixed.39 That may be true. However, there's no evi-
dence linking specific characteristics of teens' brains to any legally rele-
vant condition, such as impaired moral judgment or an inability to con-
trol murderous impulses. It is not logical to say we should excuse Chris-
topher Simmons because other juveniles' brains may not be fully devel-
oped, when that fact was never established in his case at the trial court
level. In fact, according to a prominent brain development researcher,
UCLA's Elizabeth Sowell, no current research connects specific brain
traits of typical teenagers to any mental or behavioral problems. 40 The
33. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
34. Id. at 1197.




39. Id. (citing to E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
40. Dudley Sharp, Why Some "Juvenile" Murderers Should Qualify For The Death Penalty:
Brain Science and Other Issues, at http://www.dpinfo.com/juveniles.htm (last visited June 26,
2005).
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hardest thing for neuroscientists to do is to try to bring brain research
into real-life context.
IV. GOALS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Deterrence
The foundation of our judicial system is based on moral culpabil-
ity.4 1 The Court has consistently held that punishment be directly linked
to one's blameworthiness.42 In fact, causing harm intentionally must be
punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.
One of the rationales for imposing the death penalty - deterrence - is
linked to moral culpability, because it is based on the notion that a person
will not form the requisite intent to kill because of the threat of death.
The facts underlying Simmons is a prime example that the death
penalty did in fact serve as a deterrent. Christopher Simmons would not
have killed an innocent woman, if he knew he would have received the
ultimate penalty, indicated by his statement to friends that he could "get
away with it" because of his age.43 He considered the perceived risk of
punishment before he committed the crime and he fully understood the
consequences of his actions. In the end, Christopher Simmons was cor-
rect; he persuaded the Court to wrongfully assume that, magically, be-
cause of his age or inability to vote or lawfully drink, he does not possess
the requisite intent to merit the death penalty.4
According to Justice Scalia's dissent in Simmons, the fact that al-
most every state prohibits those who are under eighteen years of age
from voting, serving on juries or marrying without parental consent is
patently irrelevant and was an argument that was rejected in Stanford v
Kentucky. 
45
It is ... absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive care-
fully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be ma-
ture enough to understand that murdering another human being is
profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most mini-
mal of all civilized standards.4 6
Serving on a jury or entering into a marriage involve decisions far
more complicated than deciding to take a life.
41. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 528, 545 (1987).
42. Id.
43. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
44. Id. at 1186.
45. Id. at 1224; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
46. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1224 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Retribution
Another rationale, retribution, is only served by taking the lives of
those who, like Christopher Simmons, fully understand the consequences
of their actions, evaluate the risk of punishment, and make the conscious
decision to take another person's life. As a result of the ruling in Roper
v. Simmons, five Justices erroneously concluded that just because you are
one day younger than eighteen you are incapable of forming the requisite
intent to merit the death penalty.
Mr. Pena and Mr. Ertman, the fathers of the two victims described
above, have to live the rest of their lives knowing that their innocent
daughters' dignity was disrespected because their killers get to breathe
air as civilized human beings while their daughters were not given that
same opportunity. Similarly, Purdy Mitchell has to live the rest of her
life knowing that Christopher Simmons got away with taking the life of
her sister by committing a pre-meditated, cold-blooded murder despite
his knowledge of the consequences of his actions.
Victims like Mr. Pena, Mr. Ertman, and Purdy Mitchell will never
feel a sense of justice, because the Court in both Thompson and Simmons
based its decisions on an erroneous assumption about characteristics of
juveniles in general, while ignoring the moral culpability of both Thomp-
son and Simmons.
Whose dignity are we respecting by drawing a bright line rule at the
arbitrary age of eighteen that enables us to ignore the foundation upon
which this judicial system is based? The answer is clear once you under-
stand how Thompson and Simmons were decided.
The plurality in Roper v. Simmons erroneously concluded that there
was a national consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen year
olds by misconstruing Atkins v. Virginia.47 The plurality in Simmons
erroneously used Atkins to conclude that sixteen and seventeen year olds
are exempt from execution for several reasons.
For example, the Court concluded that the evidence against execut-
ing juveniles was similar to the evidence the Court relied on in Atkins to
exempt the mentally retarded from execution.48 In Atkins, thirty states
barred the death penalty for the mentally retarded, and even among those
states theoretically permitting such punishment, very few had carried out
execution of a mentally retarded person.49 In contrast, when Roper v.
47. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
48. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
49. Id.
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Simmons was decided, fifty percent of the states that expressly author-
ized juvenile executions administered it to seventeen year olds.
50
V. THE COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONSIDER INHERENT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUALS AND
JUVENILES IN REACHING ITS DECISION
The fact that the execution rate among juveniles has declined over
the past five years is inconclusive because the reasoning behind the sta-
tistic is unknown. The Court failed to recognize that juveniles who are
sixteen and seventeen years of age are substantially different than those
who are mentally retarded. In Atkins, the Court observed that mentally
retarded persons suffer from major competence and behavioral deficits,
sub-average intellectual functioning, and significant limitations in adap-
tive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, that be-
come manifest before the age of eighteen. 51 Because of their impair-
ments, they have diminished capacities to understand and process infor-
mation, to communicate, and to abstract from mistakes and learn from
their experiences 2 These impairments make the goals of the death pen-
alty nonexistent and also make capital punishment for the mentally re-
tarded a disproportionate one because of their inability to fully under-
stand and comprehend the consequences of their actions.53
These same impairments, however, simply do not exist among ju-
veniles who are sixteen and seventeen years of age. Some sixteen and
seventeen year olds are more mature and advanced than some eighteen
year olds. In fact, the plurality in Simmons acknowledged the fact that
some eighteen year olds achieve a maturity level that some adults never
achieve. 4 Similarly, sixteen and seventeen year olds are not as easily
manipulated into making confessions as the mentally retarded because
juveniles do not suffer from the same impairments.
VI. THE COURT'S USE OF THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
DOCTRINE AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS ANALYSIS IGNORES PRECEDENT,
THE RESPONDENT'S MORAL CULPABILITY, AND CONSTITUTES AN
ARBITRARY DECISION BASED UPON ASSUMPTIONS
In order to understand how the Court reached its conclusion in
Roper v. Simmons, we must analyze how it utilized this notion of stan-
dards of decency. The Court has decided that in determining whether the
50. Charles Lane, 5-4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions, WASHINGTON POST,
March 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62584-
2005Marl .html.
51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).
52. Id. at 318.
53. Id. at 318-20.
54. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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juvenile death penalty comports with contemporary standards of de-
cency, its inquiry must start with state legislation.
The way the Court looks at state legislation is inherently arbitrary
because it is inconsistent in determining which states to consider in its
analysis. For example, in Thompson and Stanford, the Court only
counted the number of states that explicitly set a minimum age prohibit-
ing a juvenile from execution because it reasoned that those were the
only states that considered juveniles in their determination.5 5 However,
the plurality in Roper v. Simmons included twelve states that did not ex-
plicitly set a minimum age prohibiting a juvenile for execution in its
analysis. 56 By doing so, it violated both Thompson and Stanford.
The reasoning in Roper v. Simmons for including the twelve states
makes an erroneous assumption about the decisions of legislatures. The
Court included twelve states in the analysis because it erroneously as-
sumed that those state legislatures decided that the death penalty is inap-
propriate for all offenders, including juveniles. 57 According to Justice
Scalia's dissent, the insinuation that the Court's new method of counting
contradicts only the Stanford court is misleading. 8 None of the cases
dealing with an alleged Constitutional limitation of the death penalty has
counted those states eliminating the death penalty entirely as supporting
a consensus in favor of that limitation.59 It sheds no light, whatever, on
the point at issue.
The fact that twelve states have eliminated execution entirely indi-
cates absolutely nothing about the consensus that offenders under the age
of eighteen deserve special immunity from such a penalty. In fact, in
repealing the death penalty, those twelve states considered none of the
same factors that the Court put forth as determinative of the issue before
it in Roper v. Simmons, which were: lower culpability of the young, in-
herent recklessness, and the lack of capacity for considered judgment.60
What might be relevant, perhaps, according to Justice Scalia, is how
many of those states permit sixteen and seventeen year old offenders to
be treated as adults with respect to non-capital offenses.6 ' They all do;
some even require juveniles as young as fourteen to be tried as adults if
they are charged with murder.62 According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he at-
tempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority consensus into a faux
majority by counting Amishmen is an act of nomological desperation., 63
55. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 827; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
56. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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VII. THE COURT'S NATIONAL CONSENSUS ANALYSIS IS ARBITRARY
BECAUSE IT FAILED To ADOPT THE OBJECTIVE CRITERIA AND/OR
GUIDELINES THAT HAVE ARISEN OUT OF STATE LEGISLATION TO
RATIONALLY DECIDE How MANY STATES FORM A NATIONAL
CONSENSUS
Relying on the number of states to conclude whether or not a na-
tional consensus exists is inherently arbitrary in and of itself. For exam-
ple, in 1989, when Stanford was decided, the Court noted that twenty-
two of the thirty-seven death penalty states permitted the death penalty
for sixteen year old offenders. 64 Among those thirty-seven states, twenty-
five permitted it for seventeen year old offenders and twenty-two permit-
ted it for sixteen year old offenders.65 These numbers, in the Court's
view, indicated there was no national consensus sufficient to label a par-
ticular punishment cruel and unusual.66
When Simmons was decided, there were twenty states out of thirty-
eight that imposed the death penalty upon juveniles who are seventeen
years of age at the time they committed premeditated murder.67 More
than fifty percent of the states that addressed the issue authorized it.
Also, the Court failed to acknowledge the fact that no states could au-
thorize the execution of a fifteen year old after 1988, because Thompson
expressly prohibited a state from doing so by ruling that it was cruel and
unusual punishment.
68
In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court failed to draw a key
distinction between the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins and
the execution of juveniles with respect to its national consensus analysis.
For instance, in Atkins, very few states actually executed the mentally
retarded. In fact, it was rare for a state to execute a mentally retarded
person even in the minority of states that authorized it.6 9 In contrast,
however, when Simmons was decided, twenty out of the thirty eight
states that had given express consideration to a minimum age for the
death penalty expressly authorized the execution of seventeen year
olds. 70 The only difference in the number of states that authorized exe-
cuting sixteen and seventeen year olds from 1989 to the time Simmons
was decided, is five states.71 Yet, the majority in Simmons found this to
be significant.72 It also found a recent trend toward cracking down on
juvenile crime to be of importance without clarifying or establishing its
64. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
65. Id. at 370.
66. Id. at 371.
67. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
68. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
69. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.
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relevance to whether executing a sixteen or seventeen year old consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishmcnt.
73
The majority's erroneous assumption about the decisions of legisla-
tures violates the reasoning in Thompson. In Thompson, the plurality
based its decision that a juvenile under the age of eighteen is exempt
from execution on the fact that no death penalty state that had given ex-
press consideration to a minimum age for the death penalty had set the
minimum age lower than sixteen.74 Yet, in Roper v. Simmons, the plural-
ity violates this reasoning by erroneously assuming and concluding that
among the twelve states that prohibit executions altogether, they all con-
sidered juveniles as part of the rule-making process.
75
Subjective determination of the Justices that ultimately determines
how many states form a national consensus contradicts the purposes be-
hind the evolving standards of decency doctrine the United States Su-
preme Court created. The evolving standards of decency doctrine was
adopted in 1910 by the United States Supreme Court to interpret what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the notion that signifi-
cant changes in societal mores over time may require us to re-evaluate a
prior decision.7 6 However, this is impossible now, considering that the
ruling in Roper v. Simmons, that anyone under the age of eighteen is ex-
empt from execution, is now federal law.
The country can't change the law once the Court makes its decision.
Further, the decision of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
was supposed to be determined by society as a whole through state legis-
lation, not by the Court becoming a sole arbiter of our nation's moral
standards.
77
Utilizing the evolving standards of decency doctrine enabled the
Court to contradict itself by considering certain evidence in one land-
mark case but not in another. In Thompson, the Court considered re-
spected professional organizations and the beliefs of other nations, in-
cluding Anglo-American heritage and the Western European community,
in its analysis. 78 Yet, in Stanford, eleven years later, the Court did not
consider such evidence. 79 However, in Roper v. Simmons, the plurality
did consider beliefs of other nations as confirmations for its conclusions
and to note that the United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.80 Are
beliefs of other nations really relevant? Haven't we as citizens of the
73. Id.
74. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
75. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
76. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
77. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
78 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
79. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
80. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
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United States created our own laws and precedent? In fact, isn't it the
duty of the United States Supreme Court to uphold its own precedent to
create federal law?
In addition to utilizing beliefs of other nations, the plurality in Sim-
mons relied on general popularity of anticrime legislation and an unsub-
stantiated trend in cracking down on juvenile crime to substantiate a na-
tional consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen year olds.8'
Does the general popularity of anticrime legislation or some trend in
enforcing juvenile crime bear any relevance to whether executing sixteen
and seventeen year olds constitutes cruel and unusual punishment?
Never in the past has the Court considered such evidence in deciding
whether it is constitutional to execute juveniles.
Not only has the Court considered different evidence in landmark
cases concerning the execution of juveniles, it has also interpreted the
same evidence concerning the frequency of juvenile executions differ-
ently. For example, in Stanford, the Court found the fact that the actual
execution for crimes committed under the age of eighteen accounted for
only two percent of the total number of executions that occurred between
1642 and 1986 to be insignificant.82 Yet, eleven years earlier, the Court
in Thompson found it significant that no execution of anyone under the
age of sixteen had taken place since 1948, despite the prosecution having
tried thousands of murder cases. 83 However, recently, the Court in Sim-
mons found the infrequent practice of executing juveniles to be of impor-
tance.84 Nobody really knows why the practice of executing juveniles is
infrequent. What does that statement really mean anyway? What ex-
actly did the Court base its statement on that executing juveniles has be-
come infrequent? It would have been highly probative for the Court to
have ascertained whether executing juveniles has become more or less
frequent than when Stanford was decided.
The Court not only interpreted statistics regarding the frequency of
juvenile executions differently in landmark cases but also inconsistently
construed a juvenile's responsibility. For example, in Thompson, the
Court relied on a juvenile being less blameworthy than an adult because
he or she is "less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."'85 Yet, in Stanford, the
Court disregarded the petitioner's argument that seventeen and eighteen
86year olds cannot be held fully responsible for their actions.
81. Id. at 1193.
82. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74.
83. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
84. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1185.
85. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
86. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
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The plurality in Simmons made its decision by ignoring the thresh-
old inquiry in determining whether a particular punishment complies
with the Eight Amendment: whether it is one of the "modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in prior cases, the evidence is clear that the Eighth Amendment
was not originally understood to prohibit capital punishment for sixteen
and seventeen year old offenders.
88
VIII. SOCIETY DEEMED RESPONDENT'S EXECUTION ACCEPTABLE AS
INDICATED BY THE RECENT TREND OF IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
ON THOSE WHO MERELY APPRECIATE THE HIGH RISK OF DEATH BUT
DO NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF MURDER
The plurality in Simmons made an erroneous conclusion when it
stated "[p]etitioner cannot show national consensus in favor of capital
punishment for juveniles." 89 As was eloquently contained in large bold
print in the brief of amici curiae on behalf of Justice For All Alliance, a
societal national consensus exists authorizing Simmons's execution, as
evidenced by the recent trend of imposing the death penalty on those
who merely appreciate the high risk of death and do not actually commit
the act of murder. The United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia
specifically based its ruling of whether a national consensus exists pro-
hibiting execution of the mentally retarded on the notion that it is not so
much the number of states that is significant, but rather the consistency
of the direction of change. 90 The plurality in Roper v. Simmons should
have considered and acknowledged the fact that a societal national con-
sensus exists to impose the death penalty on one who did not kill nor
intend to kill but rather was a major participant in a felony murder.
91 The
rationale for this landmark decision in Tison v. Arizona is that actively
participating in a felony murder shows a reckless disregard for human
life, a highly culpable mental state meriting the death 
penalty.92
Intending to kill, taking into account the perceived punishment for
doing so, and following through with that intention, as Simmons did, is
an even higher culpable mental state than participating in an act that
shows a reckless disregard for human life. Therefore, society deems it
acceptable to execute Simmons, who committed a deliberate, premedi-
tated murder by taking an innocent woman out of her home, tying her up
hog-tied fashion, driving her to the end of a railroad trestle and pushing
her into a river down below.
87. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
88. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
89. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1194.
90. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
91. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
92. Id. at 157-58.
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It is deeply ingrained in our criminal justice system that intentional
harm must be punished more severely than unintentional harm.93 In Ti-
son, the petitioner did not specifically intend to kill the victim, nor did he
actually kill the victim. 94 In contrast, Christopher Simmons possessed
the specific intent to kill, and did in fact kill his victim. In Tison, the
petitioner was executed, therefore the respondent in the instant case
should have been executed.
CONCLUSION
The Court's reliance on a standard it created and labeled "the evolv-
ing standards of decency doctrine," is inherently arbitrary, violates
precedent and ignores the foundation upon which the judicial system is
based. It has no place in American jurisprudence. Instead of grouping
juveniles together as a class and drawing a bright line at the arbitrary age
of eighteen, the Court in Roper v. Simmons should have looked at juve-
niles individually and respected them as human beings with unique char-
acteristics, life experiences, personal responsibility and moral blamewor-
thiness. Like in Furman v. Georgia,95 the Court was urged to commit
error, and did so by concluding that anyone under the age of eighteen is
incapable of possessing the requisite mental state to merit the death pen-
alty.96 This is just not the case when we are dealing with sixteen and
seventeen year olds. In fact, it only disrespects sixteen and seventeen
year olds to characterize them as vicious animals rather than human be-
ings with a conscience and the ability to both know it is wrong to kill and
to conform their conduct to the most minimal standards of civilized soci-
ety.
It is a grave injustice, not only to the victim and the victim's family,
but also to society as a whole because the Court is able to disrespect the
victim and the victim's family by not basing its decision on the respon-
dent's moral culpability but rather on the Justices' individual perceptions
and biases. An issue of this magnitude should not be based on the gen-
eral characteristics of juveniles nor on whether the Justices decide to
include twelve states in its evolving standards of decency analysis.
Rather, it should be based on clear, objective criteria, which has evolved
out of state legislation and can carefully and adequately aid sentencers in
making a rational decision.
The United States Supreme Court had an obligation to provide the
states with the clearest guidance possible. It failed to do so when it based
its decision on the fact that it did not trust a jury to decide a murderer's
fate by weighing all of the mitigating and aggravating factors.97 Instead
93. Tison, 481 U.S. at 156.
94. Id. at 144.
95. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96. Furman, 408 U.S. at 285-87.
97. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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of undermining the very foundation of our capital sentencing system,
which entrusts juries to make difficult and uniquely human judgments
that deny codification and that build discretion, equity and flexibility into
a legal system, it should have embraced it. What does the Court's dis-
trust of jurors say about our judicial system as a whole? If the Justices
do not trust a jury to decide a juvenile's fate, then what prevents future
cases concerning other areas of law from reliance on the same rationale?
Why trust a jury to make any decisions regarding a defendant's mens rea
related to murder? Why have a jury system at all? As is evident, this
kind of mentality could inevitably lead to the end of our jury system al-
together.
It is surprising and unacceptable in a system that creates rules based
on precedent that the plurality of Roper v. Simmons failed to recognize or
acknowledge the fact that the Supreme Court of Missouri flagrantly vio-
lated precedent by ignoring Stanford v. Kentucky which authorized the
execution of sixteen and seventeen year olds.
98
The Supreme Court of Missouri was correct in its assumption that
the United States Supreme Court would arbitrarily rule in Simmons' fa-
vor. There is an inherent problem with our judicial system when an
issue of such magnitude concerning the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause under the Eighth Amendment is decided by people who are able
to make their decision publicly before the case is even in front of them.
In a society that relies on the judicial system to remedy wrongs and
achieve justice, it is very disturbing that we respect the dignity of one
who shows a conscious disregard for humanity by taking another's life,
after fully understanding, evaluating and intending the consequences.
Yet, at the same time, we flagrantly disrespect someone, like Jennifer
Ertman, a sixteen-year-old teenager, who risked her life in an attempt to
save her best friend's life, showing her respect for humanity and dignity.
The Court failed to uphold justice by not linking the ultimate punishment
to those who are morally culpable for having committed premeditated
murder like Christopher Simmons. In doing so, it neglected the only
sense of justice many families of victims feel after having their loved one
taken from them. The Court extended Christopher Simmons humanity
when he did not give that same respect to Shirley Crook. 99 He took
away her fundamental right to live, while knowing and intending the
consequences of deliberately pushing her off a railroad trestle into a river
far below.
The Court was ultimately responsible for making sure that states
chose the appropriate punishment for those who are morally culpable for
having committed premeditated murder making them among the worst of
98. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
99. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
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the worst. The Court failed this responsibility by sending a message to
sixteen and seventeen year olds that one can commit premeditated mur-
der without having to suffer the ultimate consequences. The sad reality
of Roper v. Simmons, as Justice Kennedy stated during oral argument,
may be that gang members use sixteen and seventeen year olds as hit
men to commit premeditated murder. The death penalty no longer serves
as a deterrent for juveniles who, like Simmons, are able to rationalize the
consequences of his or her actions before he or she decides to commit
premeditated murder. The possibility of deterring a sixteen or seventeen
year old from intentionally taking another's life and saving an innocent
victim no longer exists.

